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 This four-paper dissertation improves our understanding of how regional entrepreneurial 
economies emerge and develop over time. It illuminates the mechanisms of regional industrial 
development, focusing on the role of entrepreneurial finance, social networks, and technology 
licensing regimes. The dissertation advances a new theory of regional coherence that posits 
system-oriented knowledge spillovers and organizational linkages lead to economic growth. It 
tests the proposition that regional coherence is influenced by the actions of embedded actors over 
time, including organizations, policy, and entrepreneurs, and that the degree of coherence, in 
turn, influences regional entrepreneurial development.  
 Paper one reviews the literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems and intermediary 
organizations and presents a future research agenda. Papers two and three examine the process of 
entrepreneurial emergence with an in-depth analysis of one ecosystem: North Carolina’s 
Research Triangle region’s life sciences cluster. Paper two empirically demonstrates temporal 
phases of regional industrial development and examines the interacting roles of private and 
multi-level public (state and federal) funding of startups in facilitating emergence. Findings 
indicate clear differences in the relationship between funding sources and in how these funding 
sources influence firms’ survival across development phases. Paper three investigates the 
influence of entrepreneurs’ participation in local entrepreneurial support organizations, relative 
 
 iv 
to their pre-founding social and human capital, in helping their firms access finance and survive. 
Findings demonstrate that entrepreneurial support organization use is importantly related to 
firms’ ability to acquire external finance and survive; however, certain firms benefit more than 
others. Finally, paper four advances the topic of knowledge spillovers between organizations as a 
mechanism of regional development by examining the differing diffusion patterns of two 
technologies which were sufficiently novel to introduce new patent classes. This paper asks 
whether diffusion differed more across organizations and cities depending on the organizational 
form of the inventing organization or on the organization’s technology licensing strategy. 
Findings show that diffusion patterns differ more depending on the technology licensing strategy 
than organizational form, which has implications for the public and private management of 
intellectual property. Aside from each paper’s contribution to the literature, each paper has 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
A large literature examines the question of why some regions succeed in nurturing high-
technology industries and entrepreneurship, while other regions, that are seemingly rich in 
factors that should produce such growth, fail. Answers remain elusive and our current 
understanding is incomplete. This creates a policy problem, because governments devote 
considerable resources to try to create vibrant local economies. Local governments develop, 
fund, and operate programs and policies to bolster local entrepreneurial activity, often by 
mimicking the actions of seemingly successful regions, or by attempting to attract and build new 
industries, often without regard to whether the desired industry matches and builds on current 
capabilities. Answering questions about regional entrepreneurial development therefore carries 
policy as well as scholarly significance and has implications for firm strategy.   
This dissertation argues one reason behind divergence in regional entrepreneurial 
development is due to the degree of coherence in the regional system. I define regional 
coherence as the degree of alignment in knowledge and institutional and organizational policies 
and actions that create necessary resources for entrepreneurial development, as well as the degree 
of network connectivity which allows entrepreneurs an ability to access and make use of 
resources. Such coherence occurs when a region’s scientific, industrial, and technological bases 
operate in a synergistic, system-oriented fashion, driven by knowledge spillovers and 
organizational linkages that lead to economic and innovative growth. This dissertation tests the 
proposition that regional coherence is influenced by the actions of embedded actors over time, 




including organizations, policy, and entrepreneurs, and that the degree of coherence, in turn, 
influences regional entrepreneurial development.  
Each chapter of this dissertation examines a different set of relationships that occur 
between policies, entrepreneurs, firms, and intermediaries, in order to examine why and how 
alignment occurs and the impact on regional entrepreneurship and innovation development. The 
entrepreneurial ecosystem is used throughout this dissertation as a useful framework which 
allows an account of the types of organizations, institutions, and people which should be present 
in an entrepreneurial community and which relationships could exist between them. This 
dissertation adds theoretical and empirical rigor to the study of ecosystems as it also attempts to 
move the ecosystem framework toward an ecosystem theory.  
Specifically, this dissertation advances three main hypotheses, each dedicated to one 
paper.   
i. Entrepreneurial ecosystems emerge through complex processes that bring about 
the accumulation of individual entry by entrepreneurs and must be considered 
within a long temporal framework. Multi-level public and private funding is the 
mechanism behind local industrial emergence, but different funding sources play 
a role in different stages of ecosystem emergence. Without consideration of these 
temporal and relational differences, policymakers, civic leaders, and start-up 
managers are at risk of choosing sub-optimal funding and development strategies. 
ii. Entrepreneurial support organizations, an increasingly popular economic 
development policy tool, endow participant start-ups with local institutional 
capital to help them navigate their local entrepreneurial ecosystems to gain 
funding and other resources and networks. The influence of these organizations 




on start-ups, however, must be considered within the context of start-ups’ pre-
entry human and social capital in order to provide a more holistic understanding 
of the role of support organizations within the local ecosystem.  
iii. The distinction between public and private science (science originating from 
public versus private organizations) is commonly made, but the empirical 
evidence supporting this distinction is thin. New technologies emanating from 
both types or organizations can follow the same general diffusion and geographic 
spillover patterns. A more useful distinction is made between the licensing and 
commercialization strategies of organizations in explaining how social networks 
and related local knowledge bases influence whether a new technology is adopted 
and built upon with new patents. 
 Each of the three chapters dedicated to these hypotheses uses different methodological 
approaches and different data sources to examine the micro-foundations of regional 
entrepreneurial development. Each chapter concludes with policy implications as well as 
implications for entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ecosystem members as relevant. Before these 
empirical chapters, however, chapter one presents the literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems 
and intermediary organizations in order to introduce the topics which feature prominently in the 
dissertation. 
Chapter Two. Chapter two presents an overview of the literature and theory which will 
serve as a framework for the subsequent three empirical chapters. An overarching theme of this 
dissertation is that entrepreneurship does not occur in a vacuum and that context, especially 
policy and institutional context, have important consequences for entrepreneurial actions and 
outcomes. When entrepreneurs lack the resources required to commercialize their innovations 




and build their firms, they look to external sources of help within their local ecosystem. This 
chapter presents an overview of the five most common types of ecosystem resources 
entrepreneurs turn to for support: university technology transfer and licensing offices; physical 
spaces (incubators, accelerators, and co-working spaces); professional services providers; 
networking, connecting, and assisting organizations; and finance providers (including venture 
capital, angel investors, public financing, and crowdfunding). These organizations often operate 
patiently and behind the scenes to support firm and ecosystem development. Recent calls for 
more evidence on the context of entrepreneurship has brought these organizations to the 
forefront of the ecosystem framework, however, and so academic and practitioner interest in 
understanding their antecedents and consequences has grown. This chapter highlights how each 
intermediary type supports new ventures while also offering insight into opportunities for 
coordination and development among the organizations and suggestions for future research. 
Chapter Three. The third chapter investigates the temporal development of regional 
entrepreneurial ecosystems. It does so by empirically examining one industry in one region over 
a long time period (36 years), using a unique longitudinal dataset of entrepreneurial firms. This 
paper focuses on start-up funding from private, federal, and state sources as the mechanism 
behind emergence. The paper uses several innovative techniques for empirically identifying the 
stages of industry development (threshold regression), examining the relationship between 
funding sources over time (dynamic random effects probit model, regime analysis), and 
explicating the role of each funding source in helping start-ups survive (discrete event history 
analysis, regime analysis). Findings indicate clear differences in the relationship between 
funding sources and in how these funding sources influence firms’ survival across development 
stages. Furthermore, the accumulation of financial resources at the firm level is demonstrated to 




promote industry development at the region level. Aside from theoretical implications for the 
literatures on ecosystems, entrepreneurial finance, and industry emergence, the paper has 
important implications for policymakers attempting to nurture new industries and for 
entrepreneurs attempting to navigate their ecosystems and grow their firms. If financial resources 
matter differently to firms and regions depending on the phase of emergence, then ‘one size fits 
all’ firm strategies and policy mechanisms are inappropriate to promote economic growth. 
Chapter Four. The fourth chapter expands our understanding how organizations, 
policies, and other actors in an entrepreneurial ecosystem interact in a way that can lead to 
economic prosperity. The chapter asks why entrepreneurs choose to participate in entrepreneurial 
support organizations and under what conditions their start-ups benefit most. I empirically 
investigate how participation in entrepreneurial support organizations influences firms’ ability to 
acquire external financial capital, controlling for start-ups’ internal stock of social and human 
capital. I coarsen exact match the data to create a control group of similar firms. I then examine 
how support organizations influence the likelihood of firm failure relative to the start-up’s own 
human, network, and financial capital using discrete event history analysis. I find entrepreneurial 
support organization use is indeed importantly related to firms’ ability to acquire external finance 
and survive. Aside from the tangible resource and knowledge services such organizations 
provide, the organizations act as network brokers, connecting entrepreneurs to finance and new 
ties by acting as bridges across small world clusters. Certain start-ups benefit more from 
participation. Since entrepreneurial support organizations contribute a public good, findings have 
direct implications for policymakers attempting to develop these organizations, for the managers 
who operate them, and for entrepreneurs who may be considering participation. 




Chapter Five. The fifth chapter uses a national level patent dataset to test the knowledge 
spillover hypothesis. The paper examines the differing diffusion patterns of two technologies 
which were sufficiently novel to introduce new patent classes, recombinant DNA (rDNA) and 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), focusing on the role of social networks and knowledge 
relatedness. The paper asks whether diffusion patterns differ across corporate versus university 
channels as rDNA was patented by a university, while PCR was patented by Cetus, a for profit 
firm, or whether diffusion differs more depending on the organization’s commercialization 
strategy. This question is important as distinctions between university and corporate patent 
regimes have been made in the literature for many years, without much empirical evidence. 
Findings indicate that social and cognitive proximity matter differently for spillovers depending 
on the licensing and commercialization approach, rather than an organization type distinction. 
This finding implies private, public, and nonprofit organizations’ licensing schemes may have 
broader impacts than typically considered, and these should be carefully weighed when devising 
a commercialization strategy. This consideration is especially important for the case of public 
and nonprofit organizations which usually have a public service mandate. 
  





CHAPTER 2 – BEHIND THE SCENES: INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATIONS THAT 




When they lack resources to commercialize science, entrepreneurs rely on intermediary 
organizations often within their local ecosystems. This paper seeks to improve our understanding 
of how intermediaries operate to advance the commercialization of science by providing a set of 
specialized services. We review five intermediaries commonly mentioned in the ecosystem 
literature: university technology transfer and licensing offices; physical space (incubators, 
accelerators, and co-working spaces); professional services providers; networking, connecting, 
and assisting organizations; and finance providers (including venture capital, angel investors, 
public financing, and crowdfunding). Specifically, we explore how these various intermediaries’ 
function and provide complementary and related services in support of scientific 
commercialization through entrepreneurship. After defining intermediation, we review the 
literature on each organization type, providing a definition and considering the contribution of 
the intermediary and the related policy implications. Each section concludes with suggestions for 
additional research.  





A successful theater performance requires a large support cast working behind the scenes, 
without which the show would not go on. Just as the audience focuses its attention on the 
dramatic action happening on stage, the commercialization of science tends to orient its gaze 
toward the innovative technology and its enabling star, the entrepreneur. But as with theater, 
diverse entities work behind the scenes to support the necessary processes of founding, 
managing, and scaling a new scientific venture. In the commercialization of science, the least 
visible players are intermediary organizations—entities that operate in the void between the 
scientific discovery and the ultimate realization of value from commercialization, providing 
specialized services and access to equipment and resources beyond the reach of many start-up 
firms. Although these support organizations have a long history of helping disseminate 
information important to technology innovation, they are often treated as tangential to the study 
of science-based entrepreneurship (Howells, 2006). Yet varying access to these background 
supports can have a profound effect on entrepreneurial performance, as well as helping to sustain 
innovative activities within a regional economy (Cooke et al., 1997). 
Academic interest in entrepreneurial ecosystems creates an opportunity to shine the 
spotlight on these behind-the-scenes organizations. By definition, ecosystems are “a set of 
interconnected entrepreneurial actors, institutions, entrepreneurial organizations and 
entrepreneurial processes which formally and informally coalesce to connect, mediate and 
govern the performance within the entrepreneurial environment” (Mason & Brown, 2014, p. 5). 
Thus, the nascent ecosystem literature makes room for a variety of innovation-supporting 
intermediaries, including nonprofit, private, and public organizations as well as universities, 
incubators, entrepreneurial support organizations, professional service providers, and venture 




capitalists (Auerswald, 2015; Bell-Masterson & Stangler, 2015; Isenberg, 2011; Mack & Mayer, 
2015; Mason & Brown, 2014; Stam, 2015). The ecosystem model also suggests an organic and 
fluid relationship between intermediaries that coevolve in a region. While each type of 
intermediary offers the potential to bring unique—yet complementary—services and supports to 
a regional ecosystem, there is also the potential for multiple intermediaries to coordinate, and 
even duplicate, efforts to address persistent innovation challenges or gaps. Thus, to fully 
appreciate the synergistic effects of this relational dynamic, we first need to recognize the 
contribution each intermediary makes to this science commercialization ecosystem.  
The objective of this paper is to improve our understanding of intermediaries in the 
commercialization of science. We limit our review to five intermediaries commonly mentioned 
in the ecosystem literature: university technology transfer and licensing offices; physical space 
(incubators, accelerators, and co-working spaces); professional services providers; networking, 
connecting, and assisting organizations; and finance providers (including venture capital, angel 
investors, public financing, and crowdfunding). Specifically, we explore how intermediaries 
operate in the context of scientific entrepreneurship by providing a set of specialized services to 
advance the commercialization of science. What unites these various intermediaries is their 
function and provision of both complementary and related services in support of scientific 
commercialization through entrepreneurship. After a brief framing of intermediation, we review 
the literature on each organization type in turn, providing a definition and considering the 
contribution of the intermediary and the related policy implications. Each section concludes with 
suggestions for additional research. 




Intermediaries Inside and Out 
Consideration of intermediaries adds a new theoretical dimension to studies on the 
commercialization of science. The Bush (1945) linear model argued that commercialization 
could be left entirely to the private sector if government supported upstream research (Hart, 
1998). Stokes (1997), however, questioned this division of labor, arguing that interactions 
between public- and private-sector actors are often essential for bringing scientific discoveries to 
market. Adding to the discussion, Branscomb and Auerswald (2002) used the colorful metaphor 
“valley of death” to not only explain the frequent failure of science-based commercialization, but 
also to recognize the need for intervention to bridge these noted gaps. 
As this suggests, the ability to commercialize science depends on complex, dynamic, and 
adaptive responses and relationships among private, quasi-public, and public-sector 
organizations. The concept of systems of innovation has been used to capture the relational 
dimensions and characteristics of environments that support knowledge creation and enhance 
innovation (Edquist, 1997). Systems of innovation are most succinctly defined as “the set of 
institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance. . .of national firms” 
(Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993, pp. 4–5). Yet the innovation system approach often assumes 
homogeneity within a single country, when significant regional differences within countries 
suggest that innovation is more often a subnational phenomenon. 
Recent work by several European scholars has attempted to expand the triple helix model 
to include intermediaries that operate between universities, industry, and government in several 
European contexts (Fernández-Esquinas et al., 2016; Suvinen et al., 2010; Todeva, 2013). While 
this work attempts to make the role of intermediaries more central, and uncovers the specific 




challenges of intermediation among the tripartite partners with differing goals, the theory is 
limited by its singular focus on university–industry–government links.  
In contrast, the ecosystem concept, which originated with practitioners in the mid-1990s 
(Autio & Thomas, 2014), recognizes the micro-geography of innovation and thus captures the 
diverse mix of locally embedded support organizations that contribute to innovation. The modern 
concept of an innovation ecosystem is rooted in the earlier literature on systems of innovation 
and builds on endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1990). New growth theory, for example, puts 
knowledge creation at the center of models of economic growth, while resonating with 
observations of the dynamic intraregional social relations described as part of late 19th-century 
Marshallian industrial districts. Increased interest in capturing the subnational geography of 
innovation suggests an opportunity to look closely at the intermediary organizations that 
contribute to the vital health of a regional innovation ecosystem.  
It has long been recognized that innovative firms must be able to access, acquire, 
assimilate, and exploit external knowledge to develop and sustain competitive advantage (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). Yet firms, especially small entrepreneurial firms, 
rarely innovate in isolation. Networking with other firms often aids in the transmission of tacit 
and highly complex knowledge across firm boundaries, where vertical integration is inefficient 
and knowledge cannot be easily priced (Powell, 1990). Equally important, however, is access to 
other mediating agents and intermediary organizations that act as boundary spanners to help 
facilitate network formation among firms while also extending essential resources, services, and 
guidance in support of innovation and the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge (Howells, 
2006; Wright et al., 2008). 




Intermediaries are especially important for science-based entrepreneurial firms, given 
high barriers to commercializing scientific knowledge. At a general level, intermediary 
organizations support innovation by directly engaging with individual establishments through the 
provision of services and access to resources that can enhance business development or expedite 
technology commercialization. More specifically, intermediaries work with science-based 
entrepreneurs to overcome information and resource asymmetries by providing specialized 
information about intellectual property protection, the navigation of clinical trials in the life 
sciences, and the negotiation of technical standards for firms innovating in information, Internet, 
and equipment technologies. Some intermediaries offer specialized services that help 
entrepreneurs refine their ideas and business plans, reducing the transaction costs of engaging in 
commercialization activity. McEvily and Zaheer (1999) found that the development of new 
capabilities is stronger in firms with ties to regional intermediaries. 
Intermediaries can also help firms resolve financial constraints either directly, through 
subsidies, or indirectly, by making introductions to other sources of finance. Intermediaries also 
play an essential coordinating role, forging networks and partnerships across the science-based 
business community and introducing nascent entrepreneurs to more established and influential 
business leaders, mentors, or partners. In this regard, intermediaries do not just address 
innovation gaps at the individual firm level; they also contribute to agglomeration economies by 
shaping and reshaping relational dynamics within and across the regional economy, by creating 
an industry commons (Berger, 2013). Intermediaries diffuse knowledge across firms and supply 
chains, thus providing a mechanism to give greater material substance to the concept of 
knowledge spillovers. 




While Marshall (1890) noted that the “secrets of the industry are in the air,” these 
intermediate support organizations provide channels for air circulation, a concept supported by 
recent research. Corredoira and McDermott (2014), for example, supported these findings, 
suggesting that intermediaries play an invaluable role in filling structural holes that separate 
firms, allowing for the fluid movement of knowledge. Their geographic concentration can also 
contribute to greater regional specialization, thereby helping to motivate new product and firm 
development (Feldman & Kogler, 2010). 
Yet despite these advantages, it is important to consider the possibility of negative 
externalities from the networking role of intermediaries. For example, Pahnke et al. (2015) found 
evidence of competitive information leakage across shared intermediaries. Specifically, when 
firms are indirectly linked because they share the same intermediary (e.g., a venture capital firm), 
information may accidentally be leaked to a competitor and hinder—rather than support—
innovation. This suggests that there are important qualitative differences in the ways that 
intermediaries operate. 
Innovation is clearly a high-risk undertaking, not simply for entrepreneurial firms that 
seek to transform novel ideas into society-enhancing solutions and marketable products, but also 
for the regions in which these innovative firms are embedded. In this regard, it is important to 
also recognize an additional, yet often obscured, contribution of regional intermediaries. An 
intermediary can reach well beyond the business community to support and sustain regional 
innovation and science commercialization through their ongoing interaction with other 
intermediaries. This is the essential idea behind innovation systems or ecosystems: The whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts. 




Intermediaries have been known to join forces to shape and inform policy action and 
regional strategy, even engaging in forms of collective action to amass political support to 
advance policy goals and capacity building (Feldman & Lowe, 2017). But equally, 
intermediaries align efforts to shape the types of scientific discoveries that get commercialized 
by local entrepreneurs, and in ways that often reflect the unique social, environmental, or 
technological challenges facing residents in their region (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2006). In this 
respect, intermediaries are not only well positioned to address some of the emergent gaps in US 
federal science policy, but they also provide a resource for guiding policy in support of science 
commercialization and regional economic development. 
Methodology 
With this potential contribution in mind, we examined the ecosystem literature. 
Admittedly, the ecosystem concept encompasses a variety of cultural, social, and symbolic 
conditions that augment the contribution of more formal support institutions (Stam, 2015). Still, 
as Spigel (2015) noted, formal institutions within an ecosystem are tangible entities that are most 
easily influenced by policy. We focused on five tangible, physical entities most commonly 
featured in ecosystem analysis: university technology licensing offices; professional service 
firms; workspace providers, including incubators, accelerators, and co-working spaces; 
organizations that provide networking and programmatic assistance; and financing entities, 
including venture capital, angel investment, public funding, and crowdsourcing. Table 2.1 
defines each intermediary and provides examples of their roles in scientific entrepreneurship. 
   
 
Table 2.1. Intermediary definitions and roles in scientific entrepreneurship 





University offices that manages intellectual property of 
university-created technologies  
Provide incentives for invention disclosure  
Engage faculty in development process 




Third-party firms—including law, accounting, and real estate 
firms—that provide resources and connections 
Reduce transaction costs  
Advise IP and business formation strategy 
Act as dealmakers  
Other Assisting 
Organizations 
Public, quasi-public, and nonprofits groups that provide 
networking, specialized services, and programs  
Facilitate networking and mentoring  
Influence policy through agenda setting 
Physical Space Intermediaries 
Incubators 
Physical space for early-stage firm formation and idea 
development   
Offer affordable space 
Provides support services  
Generate revenue for incumbent firms 
Accelerators 
Physical space, complemented with provision of resources and 
financial investment  
 
Offer intensive programming   
Accelerate milestones  
Invest in exchange for equity 
Co-working spaces Physical space that promotes proximity and interaction 
Provide flexible, less structured programming 
Offer space for social interaction 
Facilitate networking and peer mentoring 
Financial Intermediaries 
Venture Capital firms 
Investment firms that raises funds from individuals and 
institutions to support new ventures with high growth potential  
Provide multistage, benchmarked financing 
Motivated to increase firm performance 
Angel Investors 
Individual investors or investment clubs that provide early-
stage financing in support of new ventures 
Provide early-stage funding 
Act as a source of patient capital 
Offer business advice and mentoring 
Public funding programs 
Public and quasi-public programs that provide financial 
assistance in the form of grants or loans to new ventures 
Offer a long-term source of support   
Act as a non-dilutive source of funding 
Signal quality for private financing mechanisms 
Crowdfunding platforms Method of securing large numbers of small investments  
Recession proof 
Enable inventors to gain immediate product 
feedback  





    
 16 
For each of these categories, we conducted an extensive literature search using a variety 
of keywords outlined in Appendix 1. This produced a large cross-section of the literature. 
Scholarly journal articles were found through online searches of bibliographic databases such as 
Web of Science, Google Scholar, and ProQuest Summon. In an effort to reduce bias in the 
results of searches, we specifically included highly cited as well as more recent articles. We also 
included articles from a range of journal rankings and disciplinary fields. Papers were included 
based on whether they contributed to the state of knowledge on intermediation or a specific 
intermediary organization. 
University Technology Transfer and Licensing Offices  
The commercialization of academic science typically begins with university technology 
transfer or licensing offices (TTOs) that work with businesses to license a university-created 
technology (Spigel, 2015; Stam, 2015). In the United States, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 
formalized a process for the licensing of university inventions that resulted from government-
funded research, although there was a historical precedent for university ownership (Mowery et 
al., 2004). Other countries have adopted policies similar to the US system of university 
ownership or, alternatively, assert professors’ privilege so that the individual inventor retains 
ownership (Cunningham & Link, 2016; Huyghe et al., 2016). Many review articles consider the 
role of universities in the economy and highlight their role in ecosystems (D’Este & Patel, 2007; 
Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Rothaermel et al., 2007). Our focus, however, is limited to the specific 
role of TTOs as intermediary organizations that assist in the commercialization of science. It is 
worth noting that ideas with scientific value can also originate from government labs and from 
private firms, although there is less research on their commercialization efforts. For private 
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firms, internal offices and legal counsel (rather than intermediaries) manage the licensing 
relationship (Kline, 2003; Maine, 2008). 
TTOs participate in markets for technology, defined as “transactions for the use, diffusion 
and creation of technology (or intellectual property)” (Arora et al., 2001, pp. 423). While firms 
of all sizes license technology, academic startups feature most prominently in scholarly work as 
they are seen to offer the possibility of greatest impact. Yet university technology transfer is 
characterized by highly skewed distributions, with the majority of offices failing to break even 
while other TTOs have big hits and enjoy strong revenue flows (Feller & Feldman, 2010). 
Siegel and Wright (2015a) argued that TTOs overcome three main challenges: (1) they 
provide faculty incentives to disclose inventions and engage in the commercialization process, 
(2) they maintain researcher involvement in the development process, and (3) they provide 
information about the value of technology. Of course, faculty can bypass the formal TTO process 
by patenting directly with industry (Siegel et al., 2004). While some critics complain that 
licensing may diminish the traditional strength of informal university knowledge spillovers, 
Thursby and Thursby (2002) provided evidence that this is not the case. In a study of TTOs in 
the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden, however, Wright and colleagues (2008) 
found that TTOs are better at intermediating the transfer of explicit rather than tacit knowledge. 
The organization of the TTO and the level of resources committed by the university are 
important to the capacity to commercialize technology (Bercovitz et al., 2001; Siegel et al., 
2003). Thursby and Kemp (2002) found that private universities tend to be more efficient in 
licensing than public universities, while universities with a medical school are less efficient in 
licensing. O’Shea et al. (2005) found that the number of start-ups a university is able to generate 
is related to past university TTO success, faculty quality, the size and source of research funding, 
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and the amount of resources devoted to TTO staff. Markman et al. (2005) found a positive 
relationship between the speed with which the TTO processes new invention reports and the 
creation of start-ups. Importantly, based on the case of Belgium’s K.U. Leuven TTO, Debackere 
and Veugelers (2005) argued that well-managed and-structured TTOs reduce information 
asymmetries between industry and university, fostering industry–university linkages that are 
lacking in the European context and cause the “European paradox” of high levels of scientific 
expertise with low contributions to industry. This idea is reflected in findings by Huyghe and 
colleagues (2016) showing that more than half of surveyed pre- and postdoctoral researchers at 
24 European universities were completely unaware of their university’s tech transfer operations.  
TTOs use various mechanisms to improve the commercialization of academic science, 
including equity and uniform start-up licenses, educational support programs, and incubators. 
Universities started using equity in lieu of licensing fees to encourage new firm formation 
(Feldman et al., 2002). Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) found that TTO policies, rather than 
capital market constraints, affect the number of new ventures created: More start-ups are formed 
when TTOs make equity investments. Many types of licensing agreements are used by TTOs, 
with new express licenses recently becoming popular (Rector & Thursby, 2016).  
The commercialization of academic science now involves more stakeholders, especially 
at the regional level. Furthermore, the methods of commercialization have expanded—for 
example, accelerators and business plan competitions (Siegel & Wright, 2015b). If the local TTO 
is not effectively engaged, other intermediaries are likely to gain importance in the ecosystem. If 
TTOs serve an important purpose, then faculty members who commercialize on their own (either 
through professor privilege or by circumventing the process) should find a substitute 
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intermediary. And even when the university TTO is well resourced and has a strong history, 
other intermediaries may assist with commercialization activity. 
Physical Space: Incubators, Accelerators, and Co-Working Spaces 
The commercialization of science requires physical workspace, laboratory space, clean 
rooms, and advanced equipment. Incubators, accelerators, and co-working spaces provide 
entrepreneurs access to physical facilities at below-market rates, and with preferential terms. 
Moreover, the collocation of physical facilities allows for the circulation of ideas. Incubators, 
accelerators, and co-working spaces may be affiliated with universities or operate as public, for-
profit, or nonprofit entities. Mian et al. (2016) called for the development of a field of study 
called technology business incubation (TBI) to further define these intermediaries’ contributions. 
Perhaps what is most interesting is that while incubators have been in existence for more than 
half a century, accelerators are a much newer phenomenon, and new organizational forms (such 
as co-working spaces) are proliferating. In general, the trend is for physical space providers to 
add services that aid commercialization, reflecting the political and social context surrounding 
these organizations (Phan et al., 2005). 
Incubators. Incubators, as the name implies, attempt to support early-stage firms to a 
point where they hatch, or become viable entities. The expectation is that successfully incubated 
firms can exit in a strategic business position (Aernoudt, 2004). Though first appearing in the 
1950s, incubators began to grow in number in the United States during the 1980s for reasons 
including the passage of Bayh-Dole, expansion of IP rights in the US, and newfound profits from 
biotechnology commercialization—all factors driven by the potential for commercializing 
science (Hackett & Dilts, 2004). The rise of European science parks occurred largely as a result 
of triple helix partnerships designed to replicate US successes (Colombo & Delmastro, 2002). 
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Categorizing the organizational forms and management practices of incubators has been a 
vexing problem, which is one reason there is little conclusive empirical research. Bruneel et al. 
(2012) presented an evolutionary process that characterizes generations of incubators, with each 
augmenting the value proposition. First-generation incubators focused only on offering 
affordable space, while second-generation incubators added knowledge-based business support 
services. Third-generation incubators began to add networking support and serve earlier stage 
companies, focusing more on selection and quicker tenant turnover in an effort to make profits. 
While the earliest incubators were publicly financed, for-profit and corporate incubators 
emerged, with incumbent companies offering incubation as a means to generate new sources of 
revenue (Becker & Gassmann, 2006). 
Incubators can also be categorized according to their objectives: Mixed-type incubators 
serve all technologies and types of firms, while economic development incubators aim to 
leverage local activities to create employment opportunities (Aernoudt, 2004). Those in a third 
category, technology incubators, typically focus on specific sectors (often aligned with cluster 
development strategies) and offer access to shared specialized resources, such as testing facilities 
or chemical formularies, that are especially important for the commercialization of science. In a 
study of 13 specialized and 13 diversified German business incubators, Schwartz and Hornych 
(2010) found that a firm’s industry rather than incubator specialization better explains the 
likelihood of firm linkages to academic institutions and found no difference in internal network 
patterns between incubator types. This heterogeneity of mission, organizational form, and 
practice complicates impact assessments (Bergek & Norman, 2008; Di Gregorio & Shane, 2003; 
Hackett & Dilts, 2004, 2008; Mian, 1996, 1997; Mian et al., 2016; Theodorakopoulos et al., 
2014). 
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Not surprisingly, the effectiveness of incubator participation on the commercialization 
outcomes of individual firms also varies. Schwartz (2013) found that incubated firms do not have 
a statistically significantly higher chance of survival than non-incubated firms. In contrast, Lewis 
et al. (2011) used discriminant analysis and found that business incubation positively affects firm 
outcomes. Incubator quality is more predictive of outcomes than incubator size, age, or regional 
capacity for entrepreneurship. They also found that most top-performing incubators tend to be 
nonprofit, have government support, have larger budgets, and exhibit similar management 
practices (Lewis et al., 2011). Furthermore, incubator success is correlated with having incubator 
graduates and technology transfer specialists on the incubator’s board. 
In interesting new research analyzing the roles of business incubators in emerging 
markets, Dutt and colleagues (2016) found that these incubators may operate as “open system 
intermediaries” to support market development as well as to support individual business 
development. These contrast to “closed system intermediaries,” as open system intermediaries 
“seek to create benefits for parties beyond a well-identified set of participating actors” (p. 819). 
More research on intermediaries in these emerging economies is warranted. 
The number of incubators is ever increasing, suggesting an opportunity for evidence-
based research to guide operations. Contradictory results may reflect the wide range of services 
offered by incubators, from subsidized real estate to intensively managed, supportive 
environments. This suggests the possibility of developing a matrix of incubator characteristics 
matched against the local characteristics of entrepreneurs and the existence of other support 
organizations in the region. 
Accelerators. Although accelerators have been described as a “new generation incubator 
model” (Pauwels et al., 2015, p. 13), they differ from incubators on a number of variables, 
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including duration, business model, selection, and mentorship, among others (Cohen, 2013). 
Firms are typically provided with a small investment in return for an equity share. Selection into 
accelerators is highly competitive, which sends a quality signal to outside investors (Kim & 
Wagman, 2014). Accelerators make extensive use of seminars for education about 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, mentorship is intense in accelerators, and a multitude of 
relationships can exist between the accelerator and the startup, including direct investment, help 
with finding additional investment, and partnering in pilot production and distribution (Kohler, 
2016). Accelerators also stress finding the value proposition for the customer, which can be 
especially beneficial for scientists-turned-entrepreneurs who tend to focus on the scientific 
aspects of their firms. Moreover, many accelerators focus on ideas, projects, or ventures before 
the formation of a company. After an intense three- to six-month program, entrepreneurs have 
gained information about the viability of their project—the science may be strong, but if a 
market does not yet exist then it is not a good opportunity. 
Accelerator funders are more like venture capitalists in that they invest in a group of 
firms, while expecting to receive large returns on only a few ventures. Therefore, they will 
accept earlier investments overall, which is important for commercializing science. Hallen et al. 
(2014) studied the impact of accelerators based on the time it takes ventures to reach certain 
milestones, such as the first round of VC. They found mixed results using a Cox proportional 
hazard model on a matched set comparison of accelerated and nonaccelerated ventures. They 
found no difference between accelerated and non-accelerated firms, but firms in some specific 
accelerators did realize a faster time to milestones than those in other accelerators. Hallen and 
colleagues (2014) argued that these results are indicative of the difficulties in the acceleration 
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process. Empirical work is needed to shed further light on acceleration processes and outcomes, 
as data on accelerators becomes more widely available. 
Recent studies have found that accelerators do have an effect on early firm outcomes. 
Winston-Smith and Hannigan (2015) used hazard analysis to compare start-up exits and follow-
on funding outcomes between accelerated and angel-funded firms. With data from two top 
accelerators and 19 top angel funders, they found that accelerated ventures are more likely to exit 
by acquisition, and at an earlier date, than angel-funded firms. Accelerated firms are also more 
likely to receive a first round of VC funding earlier than angel-funded firms, and this earlier date 
is around the time of the accelerator’s “demo day.” Winston-Smith and Hannigan (2015) argued 
that these findings are the result of differences between the processes of angel and accelerator 
investing, and the ways in which angels and accelerator managers realize returns. The fact that 
accelerator operators invest in cohorts and spend more time nurturing and mentoring the firms 
could be such an explanation. 
The presence of an accelerator may signal a strong or growing entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
Fehder and Hochberg (2014) used difference-in-differences analysis to analyze the impact of 
accelerators on entrepreneurial ecosystems. They found that start-ups located in MSAs with an 
accelerator receive more financing whether or not they participated in the accelerator and argued 
that this indicates that accelerators have an impact on ecosystem strength. The role of 
accelerators in ecosystems and compared to other workspace provision models, however, would 
benefit from greater theoretical and empirical development. 
Co-working Spaces. Co-working spaces—low-rent alternative workspaces intended to 
offer a fun and informal atmosphere—are another new phenomenon in the workspace 
intermediary field. Co-working spaces are distinguished from earlier shared office facilities by 
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their emphasis on social interactions, aesthetic design, and management by cashed-out 
entrepreneurs and potential investors (Waters-Lynch et al., 2016). They are found in hotspots of 
activity and range from small operations to national organizations (such as WeWorks) to large 
firms (such as Microsoft and Google). Incubators and accelerators have evolved to offer co-
working spaces, but Moriset (2014) questioned their future, arguing that the spaces neither create 
much profit for operators nor add much value to occupants. There are three types of co-working 
space users: freelancers, microbusinesses, and people working for themselves or for companies 
external to the space (Parrino, 2015). Knowledge exchange through collaborative relationships 
occurs only when the coworking organization encourages such collaboration—collocation alone 
does not foster collaborative relationships. Data from an online co-working magazine, Deskmag, 
indicates that entrepreneurs are present and active users of co-working spaces; approximately 
20% of co-workers are entrepreneurs who employ other workers (Foertsch, 2011). 
Research on the contribution of co-working spaces to science entrepreneurship is limited 
thus far. A case analysis in South Wales found that co-working spaces support entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial activities through networking, peer mentoring, and easier access to forms of 
capital, among other things, but this study has limited generalizability (Fuzi et al., 2015). Waters-
Lynch and colleagues (2016) argued that Schumpeterian economic theory is a useful theoretical 
lens through which coworking may be studied to understand how it contributes to innovation. 
For scientists working on an idea, a third place to go to meet with like-minded people may be an 
important first step. Future empirical work will be important for this field. 
Professional Service Firms 
Professional service firms (PSFs) aid in the commercialization of science by vetting 
proposals for new companies and connecting founders to a wider pool of resources, networks, 
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and entrepreneurial support. These service professionals have access to specialized knowledge, 
are usually embedded in an existing entrepreneurial community, and can serve as network 
bridges for new entrepreneurs, thus helping reduce transaction and search costs (Zhang & Li, 
2010). Extending the entrepreneurial ecosystem concept, Stam (2015) considered PSFs to be 
vital “feeders” into that system. Hayter (2016) found that service providers are especially 
important to academic entrepreneurs as they provide information related to law and accounting, 
as well as services such as product testing that might not be accessible to them through their 
established academic networks. 
Professional service firms have not been studied widely in the management literature 
(Empson et al., 2015). This reflects difficulty in identifying which ancillary firms qualify as 
technology intermediaries. Von Nordenflycht (2010) presented a taxonomy based on three 
defining features: knowledge intensity, low capital intensity, and high degree of 
professionalization. Knowledge intensity— high degree of knowledge specialization—is the 
most important defining feature. The higher the degree of knowledge specialization, the more 
important the service is to the entrepreneur. 
The majority of studies focus on law firms. Gilson’s (1984) seminal work found that 
Silicon Valley attorneys act as transaction cost engineers, reducing costs of engaging in 
commercialization. In a study of prospective entrepreneurs, Shane (2001) found that local 
attorneys provide initial advice on patent protections and scope, affecting the decision to start a 
company. Accountants and investment bankers provide a similar function in reducing the impact 
of information market failures on start-ups (Gilson, 1984). Suchman and Cahill (1996) found that 
Silicon Valley business attorneys further define local business norms and integrate norms into 
the legal and business community. Suchman (2000) found that Silicon Valley attorneys function 
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as business counselors, dealmakers, gatekeepers, proselytizers, and matchmakers. As 
dealmakers, lawyers link startups to other firms, such as VC. As gatekeepers, they selectively 
connect start-ups to other members of their networks. As proselytizers, they use their influence to 
educate start-ups on business norms, further solidifying those norms. As matchmakers, attorneys 
sort and match clients and resources. These roles shape the broader community. Cable (2014) 
argued that this model of start-up lawyering has grown with the proliferation of entrepreneurship 
as an economic development strategy. Originating in Silicon Valley, the practice has several 
distinctive features as attorneys set contract standards and defer initial payments in lieu of equity, 
believing that greater return will follow.  
In an investigation of the spatial patterns of semiconductor firms that had recently had an 
initial public offering, Patton and Kenney (2005) found that legal counsel used by entrepreneurs 
is always proximate to start-up activity, followed by investment bankers, venture capital, and 
finally independent directors. While locational patterns differ across industries, a subsequent 
paper using the same data found that attorney start-up services remain highly local (Kenney & 
Patton, 2005). 
Gompers and Lerner (2010) argued that real estate brokers and managers familiar with 
equity investing also reduce transaction costs of obtaining finance. Accountants and investment 
bankers provide a similar function, reducing the impact of market failures on start-ups (Gilson, 
1984). Zhang and Li (2010) analyzed the impact of start-up network ties to PSFs on production 
innovation in a study of 202 firms in a Chinese technology cluster. They found that new 
ventures’ networks with technology service firms, law firms, and accounting firms have a 
positive impact on firm product innovation. 
    
 27 
The sparse and disconnected nature of the literature outlined here shows ample room for 
continued research on the role of PSFs as intermediaries in the entrepreneurship and technology 
commercialization process. The literature lacks a theoretically constructed conceptualization of 
the impact of attorneys, accountants, insurance agents, and other service providers on technology 
commercialization. Additional analysis at a regional scale will be most useful as previous studies 
show service providers mostly operate at a local level. Finally, an important yet unanswered 
question raised by Friedman et al. (1989) is whether Silicon Valley attorneys help the high-
technology industry grow, or whether—conversely—the high-technology industry led to growth 
in the local legal sector. Perhaps it is less a case of determining directionality and more a future 
research opportunity for studying positive feedback and mutual reinforcement. 
Networking, Connecting, and Assisting Organizations 
Public, quasi-public, and nonprofit programs frequently step in to support scientific 
entrepreneurship. These public service organizations have limited expectation for direct financial 
gain, but rather a greater focus on the public outcomes of economic growth through the 
promotion of start-ups. They serve networking support roles for entrepreneurs, coordinating local 
organizations and programs by bringing together public and private entities, and serve agenda-
setting roles for policy and practice. Motivated to serve a public purpose, these organizations 
exist to address network failures (Schrank & Whitford, 2009). 
One example of such an organization is the North Carolina Biotechnology Center (herein, 
“the Biotech Center”), established by the North Carolina legislature in 1981 as a nonprofit 
501(c)(3), with the majority of its budget derived from annual state appropriations (Feldman & 
Lowe, 2011). As a quasi-public nonprofit, the Biotech Center has the option to secure additional 
funding, including federal research grants. This nonprofit structure has enabled the Biotech 
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Center to position itself as less partisan, and thus retain state support even during changing 
political environments (Lowe & Feldman, 2015). Another example of a successful quasi-public 
coordinating and networking program is San Diego CONNECT. This intermediary was founded 
in 1985 as a bottom-up effort of entrepreneurs, supported by economic development officials, to 
connect industry to academia and advance local entrepreneurship and the commercialization of 
academic science (Kim & Jeong, 2014; Walcott, 2002). Disconnecting from the university may 
have allowed CONNECT to reach a broader base of entrepreneurs to assist. 
Not-for-profit organizations with more limited government involvement also offer a 
portfolio of topical programs to respond to local needs and contribute to the commercialization 
of science through entrepreneurship. One example is the nonprofit Council for Entrepreneurial 
Development (CED), one of the nation’s first membership organizations dedicated to supporting 
new firms by providing networking assistance, mentorship, entrepreneurial education and 
training, and identification of capital sources. Research has found such organizations’ efforts 
fruitful. Cumming and Fischer’s study (2012) of the one-stop Innovation Synergy Center in 
Ontario found that publicly provided business advisory services positively affect entrepreneurial 
outcomes. 
Both nonprofit and quasi-public programs can operate at multiple scales. Nonprofits such 
as SCORE and America’s Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) have a national reach 
and receive federal funding from the Small Business Administration (SBA), but they operate a 
decentralized network of local programs. SCORE offers entrepreneur training workshops and 
mentoring through more than 300 chapters. SBDCs form an entrepreneur and small business 
assistance network that offers training and mentoring through partnerships with universities and 
state economic development agencies. Chrisman et al. (2005) found that the time entrepreneurs 
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spent in “guided preparation” with an outside adviser at an SBDC before starting a company was 
associated with increased start-up performance, including better employment and sales 
outcomes. Still, the time spent had diminishing marginal returns. Yusuf (2010) argued that start-
up assistance programs like these may not have an immediate effect, but often help support 
entrepreneurs’ latent, rather than perceived, needs. 
Local programs to support entrepreneurship also exist and may be directed by a higher 
level of government. In their case study of a Midwest region, Feldman and Lanahan (2010) 
found that firms pursue state and local funding programs more often than federal programs. They 
also found that local innovation programs have difficulty coordinating activities and practices 
and argue for the creation of bottom-up regional coordinating bodies. 
As nonprofit and quasi-public structures and governing bodies continue to proliferate, 
there is a need for greater research on these organizations, their programs, and their impact. 
Multiple points of contact, however, make evaluations of single organizations more difficult. 
There is an opportunity for more empirical work on the interaction, sequencing, and coordination 
of various forms of public and quasi-public support. 
Finance Providers 
Finance organizations are especially important intermediaries for supporting the 
commercialization of science through entrepreneurship. Without money, science- and 
technology-based companies simply cannot grow. Kerr and Nanda (2015) reviewed the literature 
on innovation finance and found that four features of the R&D process constrain finance. First, 
the innovation process is uncertain. Second, innovation’s returns are highly skewed. Third, 
information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors favor entrepreneurs. Fourth, new 
innovation-focused ventures often rely on intangible assets that can easily be lost if employees 
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leave; these expenses for science-based start-ups are higher than average due to the costs of labs 
and clean workspaces, highly skilled employees, insurance, consulting services, and the need to 
protect intellectual property. This list of expenses could easily be substantially increased, 
depending on the technology. Thus, a variety of entrepreneurial funding sources have emerged to 
help companies commercialize. These sources entail varying costs to the entrepreneur and 
provide different degrees of value-added services. For example, both banks and VCs monitor 
investee firms, but VCs also offer value adding services (Fraser et al., 2015). 
Funding sources are typically characterized by ownership: public, nonprofit, and private. 
Funding organizations may be local or operate at a national level. Furthermore, universities take 
equity in academic start-ups in lieu of licensing fees, which provides legitimacy for the start-up 
and allows the university to share in any potential upside (Feldman et al., 2002). Entrepreneurs 
typically initially bootstrap their companies, obtaining funding from what is known as the three 
F’s—friends, family, and fools. Other financial intermediaries screen start-ups, provide 
contractual agreements, and monitor investments on behalf of investors (Berger & Udell, 1998). 
We look at financial intermediation in terms of its impact on commercialization outcomes, rather 
than just in terms of financial outcomes for investors, and to investigate the nonpecuniary roles 
of financial intermediaries. 
Venture Capital. Defined as “the professional asset management activity that invests 
funds raised from institutional investors, or wealthy individuals, into promising new ventures 
with a high growth potential” (Da Rin et al., 2012, pp. 573), VC firms operate as partnerships 
that raise money from institutional and individual investors. They may be corporate, bank-
owned, or private- or government-sponsored. Private-sponsored VC is less common in European 
countries than in the United States. In Asian countries, however, VCs do not have the same 
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relationships with universities as in the United States: VCs often invest in earlier stages in Asia 
than in the United States (see Kenney et al., 2002, for a review of VC in Asia). VC funding is the 
most extensively studied form of entrepreneurial finance and is noted to have an aggressive 
management model that facilitates the commercialization of science. Samila and Sorenson (2010, 
pp. 1358) argued that “venture capital supports the development of these [innovative] ideas and 
helps to train and encourage a community of entrepreneurs capable of bringing those ideas to 
market,” making clear the contribution of VC as a commercialization intermediary.  
Venture capitalists use a multistage financing approach that provides funding in tranches. 
This allows VCs to stop funding if specific benchmarks are not met, or if it becomes apparent 
that the firm is not going to succeed (Kerr et al., 2014). Public research funding and VC are 
complementary and result in more innovative activity, as measured by patents and start-ups, 
when a region has a greater amount of VC (Samila & Sorenson, 2010). The ability of VC 
investment to stimulate innovation also depends on characteristics of the VC firm (Kortum & 
Lerner, 2000). Hsu (2006) found that VC-funded firms are more likely to engage in cooperative 
commercialization strategies such as strategic alliances, and more likely to have an initial public 
offering than non-VC funded firms; these results were intensified when well-known VCs 
provided funding. Hsu (2004) found that start-ups will pay more in terms of equity for 
investments from VC firms with higher reputations. VC networks are useful to start-ups (Cable 
& Shane, 1997), yet Wright et al. (2006) identified heterogeneity, as some VC have more social 
capital and involve themselves more deeply with the company. 
Cumming and Dai (2010) found that VC investment decisions have a decidedly local 
focus. Over 50% of investments are made in firms located within 250 miles of the VC firm’s 
office. However, more reputable and well-networked VCs have a broader geographic reach. 
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More local bias is present when VC is specialized in a technology industry and when 
investments are made in a greater number of rounds. Results show that local investments are 
more likely to have successful exits, which also has implications for how VCs add value to 
portfolio firms. Furthermore, the value-added effect of VC tends to vary depending on where the 
VC firm is located. Pinch and Sunley (2009), for example, found VCs in the Southampton, U.K., 
cluster are less effective as knowledge transfer agents than VCs in leading high-tech clusters 
such as Silicon Valley. 
Cumming and Dai (2011) investigated the relationship between VC fund size and 
successful firm exit—finding that fund size has a diminishing marginal return to start-ups. In a 
novel exploitation of exogenous variation in new airline routes, Bernstein et al. (2016) found that 
greater on-site involvement, particularly of the lead VC, increased innovation in firms along a 
number of dimensions; they interpreted these findings as indicating that monitoring by a VC is, 
in fact, a valuable asset for funded firms. 
Wright and colleagues (2008, pp. 1209) argued that “venture capitalists and angels with 
specialist technological skills may act as intermediaries that provide access to customers and 
suppliers.” These connections may be especially important for technology-based firms. Vanacker 
et al. (2013) investigated how VC adds value to start-ups compared to angel investors. They 
matched a sample of VC- and angel-backed firms to similar non-backed firms and used OLS 
regression to assess impact on performance measured by gross profits, finding that both funding 
sources moderate the relationship between slack resources and firm performance compared to 
non-backed companies. Angel investors are associated with better use of human resources, while 
VC investment was associated with better financial and human resource use. The results indicate 
that start-ups’ efficiency in operations, such as commercialization, may benefit more from VC 
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than angel investment. Furthermore, the VC effect is correlated with the equity share: greater VC 
ownership increases performance. 
The literature has also considered how VCs make investment decisions. Nanda and 
Rhodes-Kropf (2013) found that hot markets make VC investors more willing to experiment by 
investing in more radical innovations. Bottazzi et al. (2016) found that trust levels affect VC 
decision making and are a complement to contingent control contracts. Specifically, higher trust 
predicts the likelihood of an investment being made, meaning that contracts are used not to 
overcome trust issues but when trust exists. 
Further investigation into the characteristics of VC that allow them to best act as local 
intermediaries and affect commercialization would be useful. There is a need to consider the 
match between VC characteristics and firm characteristics and commercialization potential. 
Also, there is currently little research that considers how VC interacts with other ecosystem 
intermediaries and members. 
Angel Investors. Angel investors are individual investors who invest in smaller amounts 
and at an earlier, riskier stage of start-up development, which helps to provide proof of concept 
for scientific discoveries. The total amount of start-up financing provided by angels is greater 
than the amount provided by VC (Wessner, 2002). Angels are often experienced entrepreneurs 
with technology expertise, and they offer advice and mentoring for an indefinite amount of time 
(Cohen, 2013; Ibrahim, 2008). Beneficial for commercializing science, angels also have much 
longer time horizons than VC as they do not have to exit at some point on behalf of other 
investors, yet like VC they prefer to be located close to start-ups in which they invest (Berger & 
Udell, 1998; Sohl, 1999). 
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Research on angel investment is still developing, constrained by a lack of data. Sohl 
(1999, pp. 106) described angel investment as a “relatively invisible” venture capital market 
segment. Ibrahim (2008) observed a lack of interest in this group from academics and media, 
even though this group has attributes, such as patience and eclectic interests, that make them 
good first investors in commercializing science. Ten years later this trend has reversed, but the 
difficulty of obtaining data from private angel investors makes empirical work challenging. 
Studying this less visible group requires innovative techniques. Kerr and colleagues 
(2014) used data obtained directly from organized angel groups in a regression discontinuity 
design to study the effect of angels on firm outcomes. Defining a discontinuity threshold as a 
level of critical interest shown in a company by angels, the results suggest that start-ups funded 
by two successful angel groups had a higher probability of survival or successful exit and better 
employment outcomes than those rejected by the same groups. Bernstein et al. (2017) performed 
a randomized field experiment using the online AngelList investing platform to investigate how 
angel investors make investment decisions based on start-up characteristics. The manipulation of 
emails alerting investors to new investment opportunities introduced exogenous variation into 
the information provided to potential investors, allowing identification of angels’ interest level. 
Interestingly, angel investors were more influenced by founding team composition than firm 
sales and the identities of other investors, reinforcing the idea that this class of investor may be 
important for commercializing science. 
Public Funding. Public and quasi-public funding programs often extend financial 
support for commercializing science. Government has taken an active role in supporting 
science and innovation for over half a century, though direct public support for entrepreneurship 
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is more recent. Public programs such as the US Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program, which provides highly competitive grants to develop technology for federal agencies, 
have operated since the 1980s. Such programs operate outside the United States as well: 
Aernoudt (2005) used the case of a successful Belgian program to argue that public co-
investment programs are an effective means to help angels spread risk.  
A long literature evaluates the impact of the SBIR program (Lanahan, 2016; Lanahan & 
Feldman, 2015, 2017; Lerner 1999; Link & Scott, 2010; Qian & Haynes, 2014), yet consensus 
on the program’s impact is elusive. An SBIR-funded project faces a 50% probability of failing to 
produce a commercialized technology, though Link and Scott (2010) compellingly argued that 
this is an acceptable risk level for the federal government. Reinforcing this, Lerner (1999) found 
that firms with SBIR grants grew faster in sales and employment and were more likely to receive 
subsequent VC investment than a matched set of firms without SBIR grants; results were 
stronger in high-technology industries and in regions with a higher concentration of VC. 
Furthermore, SBIR funding has a positive impact on patenting levels in small and medium-size 
nanotechnology firms (Kay et al., 2013). 
While US states create their own entrepreneurship programs, they also leverage and 
augment national programs. Forty-two states have SBIR service assistance programs, and 17 
states have an SBIR matching grant (Lanahan & Feldman, 2015). Lanahan and Feldman (2017) 
provided evidence of the efficacy of such policies, finding that firms that receive an SBIR Phase 
I state match grant have a higher probability of receiving an SBIR Phase II grant, when awarded 
from the National Science Foundation. 
Finance is also available in the form of public VC. Pergelova and Angulo-Ruiz (2015) 
analyzed the impact of US government equity, loan, and guarantee programs for 
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entrepreneurship, finding that guarantees and equity have a positive impact on firms’ competitive 
advantage and an indirect effect on profits. Public sources may offer less added value to start-ups 
engaging in commercialization than private sources, though. Pierrakis and Saridakis (2017) 
found that U.K. firms receiving only public VC apply for fewer patents than those obtaining only 
private VC, attributing this divergence to public fund managers’ lack of expertise compared to 
private managers. 
Indirect public efforts are also seen through attempts to stimulate investments from 
private sources. Lerner (2002) argued that government intervention, in the form of public VC, is 
justified when public investment can certify firm quality to other investors, and when 
technological spillover is possible. Several states have created investment programs, such as 
Connecticut Innovations, a quasi-public, state-funded venture capital fund founded in 1989 
(Feldman & Kelley, 2002). Lerner (2002) warned, however, that public VC programs can be 
inefficient and difficult to design. 
It is certainly true that many public financing programs are oriented toward capturing the 
benefits of science commercialization within their jurisdictions’ boundaries. Moreover, different 
levels of governments, national and local, have the capacity to design their own programs and 
experiment with different requirements and stipulations, which makes program evaluation 
difficult. Future research should continue to investigate the role public funding sources play in 
stimulating innovation and commercialization. 
Crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is the newest—and least understood—practice in 
entrepreneurial finance; it is defined as “the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups—
cultural, social, and for-profit—to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small 
contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the Internet, without standard 
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financial intermediaries” (Mollick, 2014, p. 2). Crowdfunding emerged after the 2008 
recession—when bank financing became less available—and has become more structured with 
time, though equity crowdfunding standards are slow to develop in many countries (Bruton et al., 
2015; Harrison, 2013). The 2012 JOBS Act legalized equity crowdfunding in the United States 
(Agrawal et al., 2014). 
Crowdfunding platforms allow individual or pooled investments in firms or projects, 
usually called campaigns (Bruton et al., 2015). The use of web-based platforms offers an 
opportunity to describe the science underlying a project and to reach a larger set of potential 
investors than possible through the angel-funding model. Crowdfunding models also differ in 
how funders receive compensation. Donation models do not provide compensation for investors 
and usually benefit nonprofits or charities. Reward models offer gifts in return for investment. 
Pre-purchase models provide investors with the product in which they invested. In lending 
models, investors receive returns following typical borrow–lender relationships. Finally, equity 
models offer shares in profit, or ownership (Harrison, 2013). Current crowdfunding research is 
dominated by descriptive and case-based studies. Lehner et al. (2015) uncovered broad, 
nonfinancial implications of crowdfunding using four campaign case studies, including 
crowdfunding’s ability to serve as an alternative distribution channel where funders act as pre-
market testers and help with problem identification, quickening commercialization time.  
Several crowdfunding studies use data from Kickstarter, a prominent reward-based 
platform. Frydrych et al. (2014) found that certain signals affect how projects gain legitimacy, 
including founding team composition and the time it takes to achieve funding goals. Stanko and 
Henard (2016) studied innovation outcomes of successful Kickstarter campaigns and found that 
beyond funds generated, campaigns help creators with product feedback and idea sharing—both 
    
 38 
of which are important to commercialization. With surveys and data from more than 200 
Kickstarter firms, they found that the amount of subsequent innovation by campaigners is related 
to campaign features, such as how open the campaign is to external ideas and how early in the 
development process the campaign began. These findings suggest that crowdfunding may 
provide an enhanced commercialization model. 
The geography of crowdfunding investment is of interest because its online basis should 
theoretically eliminate geographic bias. Agrawal et al. (2011) found that geography does not play 
a role in investment decisions once campaigners’ friends and family network is controlled for. 
Still, most campaigns are concentrated in geographic regions typically viewed as more 
entrepreneurial (Mollick, 2014), highlighting the need to consider crowdfunding as part of the 
regional innovation ecosystem. 
Though some entrepreneurial finance providers have been studied extensively, there is a 
need to understand the relationships and dependencies among finance sources. Learning how 
various sources affect the likelihood of receiving funding from different sources will provide 
important information to entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize scientific discoveries, and 
policy makers designing public finance programs. Better data are imperative to extending 
research on angel investing and crowdfunding. 
Conclusion 
In many ways, the journey from research funding to technology commercialization via an 
entrepreneurial firm conjures up the image of an old suitcase or steamer trunk papered with all 
the tags from the destinations on its journey. Every intermediary or support organization that has 
contact with a firm leaves a fading yet indelible mark. Studying each institutional category in 
detail allows researchers not only to identify important sources of divergence, but also to begin 
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to explore the interdependencies and intersections of different programs. In this paper we 
reviewed five intermediaries commonly mentioned in the ecosystem literature: university 
technology transfer and licensing offices; physical space (incubators, accelerators, and co-
working spaces); professional services providers; networking, connecting, and assisting 
organizations; and finance providers (including venture capital, angel investors, public financing, 
and crowdfunding). 
As we note, university technology transfer and licensing offices have long been known to 
partner with incubators and support organizations within their regions. Reinforcing this, Fini et 
al. (2011) recognized that university supports for academic spin-offs can act to reinforce the 
contribution of other local support mechanisms. Indeed, universities are on the front lines of 
technology intermediation. The ability of TTOs to accumulate stocks of human, network, and 
technological capital make them important players in ecosystems. However, not much is known 
about their actual potential for economic development and how policymakers might exploit their 
resources for broader goals. While the TTO literature is expansive, there are gaps in our 
understanding of the effectiveness and relationships of TTOs to other intermediaries in the 
ecosystem. 
Incubators, accelerators, and co-working spaces offer firms and entrepreneurs varying 
levels of support with one common feature: the provision of a laboratory and/or workspace. 
While incubators have been studied the most closely of all three types, we need more knowledge 
about incubation processes and effectiveness. The research on accelerators and co-working 
spaces is much newer. Empirical and theoretical work is necessary to better understand how 
these organizations contribute to technology commercialization and start-up outcomes. 
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Another promising topic for future empirical research is professional services firms. 
Though these firms are not as glamorized as accelerators and VCs, for example, they provide 
critical services that contribute to successful commercialization. The law literature has 
extensively studied Silicon Valley attorneys, but without an empirical lens. Other service 
providers are mentioned in studies, but often fail to receive due attention. The innovation 
literature has studied PSFs in more depth than the management literature, but this trend is 
improving. 
Additional research is needed to understand the function of institutional intermediaries, 
including networking, connecting, and assisting organizations. Quasi-public programs are well 
positioned here, often connecting firms to a broader range of private and public stakeholders 
compared to their counterparts in academia or corporate settings. Finance providers (including 
venture capital, angel investors, public financing, and crowdfunding) have received the most 
attention, with decades of research. Yet there is continual innovation, including emergent 
funding models such as crowdfunding as well as the evolution of earlier finance sources, making 
the area ripe for continued inquiry. While the VC literature is extensive, literature investigating 
the relationship between VC and other funding sources is less developed. The impact of 
crowdfunders and angels on innovation is still unclear. Though at first glance crowdfunding may 
appear to have fewer value-added services than angels and VC, recent studies illuminate a 
number of features, such as idea sharing and consumer feedback, that angels and VC may not 
provide. 
Popular accounts of innovation in regional economies often presume that venture capital 
is the most essential institutional actor for supporting local entrepreneurship. But as Lerner 
(2009) noted in The Boulevard of Broken Dreams, the presence of VC is not sufficient to create 
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an innovative local economy, and VC investment does not guarantee that entrepreneurial firms 
will be successful. As this comprehensive survey illustrates, there are many other institutional 
actors in the mix, each adding additional and complementary services and supports. In some 
cases, these intermediaries focus on a particular segment of the local entrepreneurial 
community—the most focused of which are incubators, accelerators, and co-working spaces, 
which service only those firms that secure residency in their facilities. But others have a broader 
reach. 
In our own research, we introduce the concept of entrepreneurial pathways to capture the 
different combinations and sequences of institutional supports that firms engaged with over time 
to grow their businesses and support innovation (Lowe & Feldman, 2017). More than a static 
inventory, the pathway concept places the firm within a well mapped institutional surrounding. It 
allows us to study the exact navigational routes that firms use to traverse that regional 
institutional landscape, and thus offers a unique vantage point for exploring the contribution of 
multiple institutions in advancing science, innovation, and sustained entrepreneurial growth. As 
we begin to recognize this fuller institutional picture of a region, it also creates an opportunity to 
propose an alternative policy narrative—one less focused on evaluating and identifying the best 
institutional fix and fit, and channeling all resources there: one that instead considers the longer 
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CHAPTER 3 – FUNDING EMERGING ECOSYSTEMS. 
Abstract 
Although prior research argues that location is important for firm performance, we lack 
an understanding of how resources accumulate in regions and how innovative ecosystems 
emerge and evolve over time. This paper focuses on the temporal development of an industry in 
a region and provides a framework for characterizing phase changes in a geographically defined 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. We add to the literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems by considering 
emergence as a temporal process and explicating finance as a mechanism that transitions 
between phases. Emergence is captured by the accumulation of individual entry by entrepreneurs 
and punctuated by phase changes as the region accumulates resources and evolves. Threshold 
regression identifies inflection points in stages of industry emergence. We then focus on the role 
of finance, from both public and private sources. Using a dynamic random effects probit model 
with regime analysis, we demonstrate interrelationships between public and private funding 
sources that differ over time.  Finally, we estimate the relationship between the funding from 
various sources and firm survival within different phases using a discrete event history analysis. 
Results demonstrate that public and private funding sources are complementary but with 
different impacts on firm survival during different phases. This paper has implications for startup 
firms seeking funding and for policy making trying to encourage industry emergence. 
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Introduction 
Our understanding of the emergence of Silicon Valley, the archetype of a geographically 
defined entrepreneurial ecosystem, has evolved from attributing primacy to venture capital to 
recognizing the importance of early seeding from federal grants (Baker, 2017; Lécuyer, 2006; 
Kenney & Von Berg, 2000). Understanding how industries take hold and transform regional 
economies is critical for both public and private investment and also for entrepreneurs who find 
they are attracted to agglomerations. Our understanding of the spatial-temporal geographic 
emergence of new industries coincides with other exploration of the dynamics of industry 
emergence (Moeen & Agarwal, 2017). Current economic development theory and policy advice 
ignores the intricate historical processes inherent in the creation of an industry in a regional 
economic context. Until scholars provide more evidence on how funding affects regional 
dynamics, investors and policymakers will continue to make decisions with little evidence to 
guide them.  
In considering emergence within a local entrepreneurial ecosystem, the focus has been on 
the entry and survival of start-up firms, and the availability of resources (Spigel & Harrison, 
2017). We heed Stam’s (2015) call for more theory development on entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Through an empirical assessment of historical context, we gain numerous insights from a careful 
study of industrial development within its regional ecosystem. While social networks and 
support organizations certainly play a role in industrial ecosystem development, the literature on 
new industry financing is generally underdeveloped (Goldfarb et al., 2012). Influencing financial 
investment can be useful to the myriad places trying to create innovative local economies. 
In order to explain geographic ecosystem emergence, we analyze the long-term 
development of an industry in one region. Specifically, we examine the development of the life 
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sciences industry in the Research Triangle Region from 1980 to 2016. We focus on 
entrepreneurial entry and trace the interacting roles of state and federal public funding and 
private funding of new firms. Specifically, we ask how the interplay of these three sources of 
funding influenced the emergence of the Research Triangle region’s life science industry. 
Emergence is straightforward to track in this example because there was very little life science 
activity that existed previously, either in the region or nationally. Of paramount importance to 
entrepreneurial ecosystem emergence is the need for new ventures to survive long enough to 
contribute as a part of the whole. We find that the steady hand of government provides financing 
to allow entrepreneurs to realize opportunity. Over time, the private sector, attracted by these 
opportunities, becomes active as an investment vehicle. Thus, an industry emerges through 
public-private interaction. Key to the idea of emergence, though, is that these interactions are 
nonlinear with phase changes moving the system along.   
This paper makes the following contributions. First, we add more theoretical and analytic 
rigor to the study of regional entrepreneurial ecosystems. We introduce data that is the 
culmination of a long-term project that aims to take a long-term perspective on ecosystem 
development. The second contribution is methodological: to address phase changes in the 
ecosystem, we provide a method for detecting ecosystem life-cycle transition points. Finally, we 
contribute to our understanding of how finance from blended sources affects ecosystem 
development. 
Theoretical Background 
In examining the industrial evolution of a regional economy, the product life cycle 
model, a biological metaphor, is often used. It is modeled by the canonical S-curve, where 
growth is some function of time against a metric of industry dynamics, such as entry, with three 
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or four defined stages. The application of the life cycle model to geographic clusters has been 
criticized as atheoretical and lacking a mechanism for an evolutionary framing (Bathelt & Boggs, 
2003; Essletzbichler & Rigby, 2007). Moving to an ecosystem framework, and away from a 
consideration of clusters, permits a more dynamic focus on the context in which entrepreneurs, 
as the prime actors in industry evolution, operate and an opportunity for appreciative theorizing.  
In reviewing industry life cycle models, Agarwal et al. (2002) find theoretical 
explanations from evolutionary economics, technology management, and organizational ecology. 
Each stream offers differing arguments for the movement between phases, emphasizing the 
process of shakeout as the industry moves from growth to maturity: evolutionary economics 
attributing maturity to routinization; technology studies to the appearance of dominant designs; 
and organizational ecology to population density. These theories are still dominant (Wang et al., 
2014). While these theories may be applicable to understanding why certain regions become 
dominant in an industry, they do not address the question of how an industry initially begins in a 
specific location.  
Recently, attention has turned to industry emergence (Agarwal et al., 2017; Moeen & 
Agarwal, 2017; Stine et al., 2015). Prior frameworks did not explain the initial birth phase of an 
industry and the conditions that precede growth and industry shakeouts. The concept of 
emergence is especially important for the development of a geographically defined ecosystem. 
While the importance of geography to novel ideas and innovation is well established, we lack an 
understanding of the dynamics of this advantage. As regions emerge, there is consensus that a 
variety of endogenous forces are at work, but these are not well specified (Martin & Sunley, 
2011). Our understanding of the process of geographic emergence can only be understood within 
the context of temporal dynamics. Organizational ecology offers one potential avenue, yet our 
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view of emergence is based on the actions of agents which encompass more than population 
dynamics.  
Finance and ecosystem emergence. Of course, building ecosystems requires financial 
resources. Publicly funded research and development (R&D) is associated with increased local 
firm births (Chen & Marchioni, 2008; Kolympirisa et al., 2014; Zucker et al., 1998). Kolympirisa 
et al. (2014) empirically demonstrate that public funds to firms are associated more strongly with 
local firm births when compared with funds directed toward universities, research institutes and 
hospitals. These studies establish the importance of examining firm level R&D awards in order 
to understand geographic dynamics.  
Private sources of new firm funding, once entrepreneurs move beyond friends and family, 
include venture capital (VC) and angel investors (see Drover et al., 2017, for a review). A 
common question in policy discourse is the effectiveness of government R&D subsidies relative 
to private funds. Skeptics and opponents argue that public funds may crowd-out private funds 
while proponents argue that public funding alleviates the market failures associated with the 
private sector investment below a socially optimal level (David & Hall, 2000). Montmartin & 
Massard (2015) further argue that public funding creates knowledge externalities that are 
important to locations with young firms. Samila & Sorenson (2010) find that public research 
funding and VC are complementary and result in more innovative activity, as measured by 
patents and startups, when a region has a greater amount of VC. Yet, public R&D financing 
programs, especially for high-risk, new technologies are provided by a multitude of federal, state 
and local agencies, involving questions of multi-level governance and coordination between 
different funding sources (Charbit, 2011; Duruflé et al., 2018). Scholars have looked at public 
and private funding, or multi-level public funding, but are rarely able to obtain data to examine 
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all of these sources together. 
Related work uses university research as the unit of analysis. Blume-Kohout et al. (2015) 
are able to distinguish federal funding from non-federal sources, which include philanthropic 
organizations, industry, and state government. Using the National Institute of Health (NIH) 
budget doubling in late 1990s and early 2000s as an exogenous shock, they find that federal 
research funding at universities crowded-in funding from these non-federal sources for 
biomedical research. Using more recent data, Lanahan et al. (2015) find an increase of 1% 
increase in federal funding, “is associated with a 0.411% increase in nonprofit research funding, 
a 0.217% increase in state and local research funding, and a 0.468% increase in industry research 
funding,” arguing these results indicate that federal government induces complementary 
investments by other sources. With regard to federal versus local funding, Wu & Merriman 
(2017) find a substitution effect between federal and state funding of university research, with 
effect depending on federal R&D spending trends. A stronger effect is found during times of 
slow growth in federal R&D spending. They suggest that local funds may be used to stabilize the 
amount of financial resources available. Taken together, these studies suggest a crowding-in 
effect of public funding on private funding, but that the relationship between different levels of 
public funding are less certain. 
Research has considered the interrelation between private and federal R&D funding for 
firms (Zúniga-Vicente et al., 2014). For example, Lerner (1996) finds that federal SBIR funding 
serves as a certification effect to entice private funding for entrepreneurial firms. David et al. 
(2000) find disagreement about the degree to which public funding is a complement or substitute 
for private funding, noting that the literature is mostly based on cross-sectional or limited time 
series data, with limited nuance about the firm’s context. In a 10-year panel study of 316 MSAs, 
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Lee (2018) found no significant regional employment or income growth effects from SBA 
guaranteed small business loans. In contrast, Minniti & Venturini (2017) find R&D tax credits 
have a significant and economically important effect on the rate of long-term productivity 
growth. Duruflé et al. (2018) analyze emerging ecosystems around universities and suggest that 
further research consider the appropriate combination of different types of policies for 
emergence. Our paper takes up this call for further investigation using a unique dataset which 
allows investigation of different types of policies in one region. 
Empirical Context 
North Carolina's Research Triangle region's life science cluster ranks 5th in the US for life 
science clusters, following Boston-Cambridge, the Bay Area, San Diego, and New Jersey (CBRE 
Research, 2019). What makes the Research Triangle unique is that it has been able to establish 
preeminence without any industrial strength in related sectors before the 1980s. Unlike 
Cambridge and the San Francisco Bay area—the country's leading life science regions—the 
Research Triangle region was not an obvious candidate to develop a life science industry 
(Markusen, 1996; Luger & Goldstein, 1991). The origins of the Research Triangle region’s life 
science cluster can be traced back to the establishment of Research Triangle Park in 1958. The 
Park was the result of a collaborative effort involving politicians, academics, and financiers to 
make the region more competitive (Leyden & Link, 2011). Over time, in the region adjacent to 
and surrounding the Park, an ecosystem developed. 
Figure 3.1 displays an increasing number of active life science entrepreneurial firms 
founded in the Triangle over the time period analyzed. The ecosystem is defined as dedicated 
biotechnology firms, human therapeutics, diagnostics, medical devices, biomaterials, health IT, 
and service providers (including contract research organizations). The Research Triangle 
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region’s development, in terms of the number of start-ups established per year, largely mirrors 
the general national trend, taken from Bioscan in 2013. While the region lags a few years behind 
the national trend, there was significant divergence beginning in the mid 1990s, when the region 
begins to take-off. After 2010, while Bioscan indicates a decrease in number of firms founded, 
the Research Triangle region’s number continues to increase.1   
Figure 3.1 Annual number active Research Triangle region entrepreneurial life science 
firms. 
 
Source: PLACE: RTP Database. 
Data & Descriptives 
This analysis uses data on the universe of 933 life science firms founded between 1980 
and 2016 in the Research Triangle Region. The year 1980 is when the Cohen-Boyer patent 
(which allowed patenting of recombinant DNA) was issued, the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, and 
Genentech was founded as the first dedicated biotechnology firm. This is an appropriate time to 
begin an analysis of industry and ecosystem emergence.2 The data used in the analysis is 
 
1 Comparison is available upon request.  
2 There were 10 entrepreneurial firms operating in this region prior to 1980 but these firms were arguably not 
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obtained from the PLACE: Research Triangle Database, which contains information on the 
universe of life science firms founded in the Research Triangle region.3 PLACE: Research 
Triangle includes information on firms’ founding, sector, activities, milestones, and founders 
(Feldman & Lowe, 2015). Firm lists were collected from a variety of sources, including 
universities and support organization archives. Lists were compiled, de-duplicated, and each firm 
individually researched for information on founding, and data were triangulated to ensure 
accuracy. Firm founding was verified with filings from the North Carolina Secretary of State. 
The data gathering process has the benefit of including start-ups which fail early, before most 
available data sources can capture them, thus mitigating issues of selection bias. Firms were 
vetted by local veterans of the life sciences industry, providing us confidence that our dataset 
contains the full universe of entrepreneurial life science firms. The firm is our unit of 
observation: we match on firm name and prior alias used by the firm.   
State-level funding data was obtained directly from the two funding sources: the North 
Carolina Biotechnology Center (NC Biotech) and NC IDEA. Both of these sources provide early 
stage seed funding. NC Biotech is a quasi-public entity dedicated to promoting biotechnology 
and the life sciences in North Carolina with a, “mission to accelerate life science technology-
based economic development through innovation, commercialization, education and business 
growth,” (NC Biotech, 2019). Established in 1981, NC Biotech offers business and employment 
services, and hosts meetings and events to connect researchers and other industry stakeholders. 
Starting in 1989, NC Biotech Center has continuously provided small loans to new ventures. NC 
IDEA was created in 2006 to support high growth entrepreneurial firms and was formed out of 
the break-up of the Microelectronics Center of North Carolina. NC IDEA began providing seed 
 
3 Data was obtained from the PLACE: RTP database in February of 2019. 
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grants to entrepreneurial firms in North Carolina that year and has continuously made such 
grants available. In 2015 the organization converted to a private foundation, and in 2016 made its 
100th seed grant. For each seed grant, we collected the date and award amount. 
To measure federal funding, we use SBIR and STTR awards from the Small Business 
Administration (SBA), combined with awards from NIH. Funding from these sources is focused 
on research the firm is performing and awarded based on evaluations of that research. Dollar 
amounts of each award are typically larger than those of the State funding sources, but still much 
less than the quantities of private funding a firm might receive. Data were obtained from the NIH 
Federal RePORTER and SBIR.gov.  
Data on private funding was gathered from CB Insights. Most private funding recorded in 
CB Insights comes from VC firms and angel funds. Other sources, added in the past decade, 
include start-up competition awards and funding from accelerator participation. This data 
includes information on the amount, date, and round of the investment, as well as the name of the 
investing entity. For some observations the dollar amount of the investment was missing. If the 
amount could not be determined from online press releases or other sources, we used $100,000 
as a modest imputation. Data on private funding in the 1980s was obtained from NC Biotech 
archived records as this data is not available before the 1990s from CB Insights.  
Together state, federal, and private funding accounts for the majority of external finance 
a firm will receive.4 Other possible external sources include foundation funding, but these 
awards are uncommon. Start-up founders might also “bootstrap” by not taking any type of 
finance that involves an exchange of equity. Bank loans and credit card debt are other means of 
financing but these data are not available.   
 
4 All dollar amounts are inflated to 2017 real dollars. 
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Figure 3.2 Annual number Research Triangle entrepreneurial life science firms receiving 
funding by source. 
 
Source: PLACE: RTP, adapted from CB Insights, NIH Reporter, SBA, NC IDEA, NC Biotech 
Center. 
 
Of the 933 firms, 179 received national funding, 162 received state funding, and 163 
received private funding. A total of 264 firms have received public funding from state or federal 
sources. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present annual counts of the number of firms receiving funding and 
the dollar amounts received by source, respectively. When examining the number of firms 
receiving funding from each source, it is apparent that most firms who have received funding 
receive it from the federal government. There is a general upward trend among all funding 
sources until the financial crisis, when all three sources allocate funds to less firms, with state 
funding experiencing the largest drop. When examining which source provides the most funding 
in terms of dollar amount, it is evident that private funding provides the most, followed by 
national support, and then state. Thus, even though the federal government supports the largest 
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Figure 3.3 Annual real dollar of funding to Research Triangle entrepreneurial life science 
firms by source.  
 
Source: PLACE: RTP, adapted from CB Insights, NIH Reporter, SBA, and NC Biotech Center. 
Table 3.1 Sector classifications. 
Sector Definition No. Firms 
Dedicated Biotech / 
Biomaterials 




Treatment of disease; drug development; clinical trials; 
includes some veterinary drug development  
357 
Services 
Specialized service providers for the life sciences, 
including staffing and management firms, which are not 
involved in scientific or technological development 
109 
Health IT 
Health and life science related software and information 
technologies; health informatics 
87 
Tools / Diagnostics 
Biotechnology tools and diagnostics tests; use 
biomarkers 
104 
Medical Devices Instruments and machines for medical purposes 152 
 
Finally, we examined sectoral differences in the development of the region’s life science 
cluster. Each firm was classified by the authors into one of the following six sectors, based on 
their technology focus: (1) dedicated biotechnology or biomaterials, (2) human therapeutics, (3) 
tools or diagnostics, (4) medical devices, (5) health IT/informatics, and (6) services. Table 3.1 
provides definitions of these sectors. Classifications were verified in consultation with local 
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medical devices (152 firms). Our descriptive analysis, available upon request, revealed that 
services firms are quite different than other members of the life sciences industry, receiving their 
funding largely from federal sources, with little private sector investment. Furthermore, while 
these firms are part of the ecosystem, their activities are more service-oriented rather than 
research-related. For these reasons, we do not include these firms in the analyses. This reduces 
our sample from 933 to 821 firms.  
Methodology 
Our data allows deep, longitudinal exploration of emergence in one region. This data, 
combined with the exploratory nature of our research questions, lends itself to a methodology 
that follows an exploratory, empirical analysis. We therefore employ five different techniques to 
examine how an industry emerges and develops in a particular local ecosystem, and investigate 
the role of start-up finance. Here we present an overview of these methods, which we explicate 
mathematically in subsequent sections. 
First, appealing to theory on industry and cluster life cycles we examine the emergence 
and development of the industry by empirically distinguishing stages. There is no agreed upon 
way in the literature to measure different life cycle stages in this context (Wang et al., 2014) so 
we introduce the use of threshold regression analysis to help with this task. An exception is the 
discriminant method, which Agarwal & Bayus (2002) implement to detect the shift from growth 
to maturity. We heed the caution that life-cycle models can be overly deterministic (Lippmann & 
Aldrich, 2016) and so use the lifecycle in order to frame an historical narrative and add empirical 
insights from data rather than argue a priori that the region should have experienced certain 
stages. 
After we establish the dates upon which the regional ecosystem moved between phases, 
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we provide a chronicle of the region’s development, relying on detailed qualitative information 
we gathered over several years of interviewing entrepreneurs, support organization managers, 
entrepreneurial service providers, public officials, and other individuals with first-hand 
knowledge of the regional ecosystem. This data provides a qualitative argument for why phase 
changes occurred when they did, providing support for quantitative analysis.  
Next, we examine how multi-level public and private start-up funding influenced the 
region’s development. First, we establish the relationships between federal, state, and private 
finance, and examine how these differed among stages using a dynamic random effects probit 
model with unobserved heterogeneity and regime-switching analysis. With these two techniques 
we are also able to examine how receipt of one type of funding is related to prior funding from 
the same source, and other sources, and how this relationship changed across the ecosystem 
lifecycle.  
Third, we examine how funding influences ecosystem development through firm 
survival. To answer this question, we employ discrete event history analysis to see how the 
source, or combination of funding, influences firm survival. Start-up survival is of paramount 
importance to ecosystem development.   
Detecting Emergence 
 To detect industry stages, this paper builds on the life cycle theory’s logistic S-shaped 
curve, which is characterized by different underlying functions that specify slope or rate of 
change (Agarwal & Bayus 2002; Argyres & Bigelow 2007; Moeen & Agarwal 2017). The curve 
is characterized by changing functions, with varying degrees of convexity during emergence and 
growth stages. When a system enters a period of maturity or decline, the function then becomes 
concave. The intent is not to map the Research Triangle’s life sciences industry to the life cycle 
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curve, rather to use the cycle and its derivative elements to characterize the nonlinearity of 
emergence and development. 
 This method uses the distribution of active, entrepreneurial firms to detect discontinuities 
in the growth of firm density in the region. Building on derivative elements of the life cycle, we 
detect the dates when the sign of the second partial derivative changes with respect to time. We 
thus write the industry dynamic as a second order polynomial function of time, that is: 
            𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡    (1) 
which translates into the following first difference model: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(2𝑡 − 1) + 𝑢𝑡. (2) 
We can further simplify this expression by demeaning the first difference model, and obtain: 
∆𝑦𝑡 − ∆𝑦𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅ = 𝛽[(2𝑡 − 1) − (2𝑡 − 1)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] + 𝑣𝑡 (3) 
With this expression, we need only estimate one parameter, β, which corresponds to the second 
partial derivative of the industry dynamic with respect to time. Consequently, by identifying the 
structural change in the β value, we are able to precisely detect different industry lifecycle 
transition points and phases.5   
 We employ a threshold model to detect break points in the regional industry lifecycle, 
because these models capture abrupt breaks or asymmetries observed in most time series data 
(Hansen, 2000). Threshold models are flexible in that they allow specification of a known 
number of thresholds or let the software find the optimal number of thresholds through different 
efficiency criteria (see Hansen, 2001).   
 Consider first the empirical specification for the dynamic of the industry,  
∆𝑦𝑡 − ∆𝑦𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅ = 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡        (4) 
 
5 Additional details are available upon request.  
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where 𝑦𝑡 represents the number of active firms in region at time t. Let 𝑥𝑡 represent the first 
difference demeaned variable of time [(2𝑡 − 1) − (2𝑡 − 1)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅]. In our case, the empirical 
specification does not include any stage-invariant covariates because the dynamics of the 
industry lifecycle are only a function of time, which is also our threshold variable. Therefore, we 
estimate the following threshold model: 
∆𝑦𝑡 − ∆𝑦𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅ = ∑ 𝑥𝑡𝛽𝑗𝐼𝑗(𝜆𝑗 , 𝑡)
𝑛+1
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑡      (5) 
Here, 𝜆𝑗 represents the threshold value in t, that is, the break point dates in the industry lifecycle.  
𝐼𝑗(𝜆𝑗 , 𝑡) is an indicator for the jth stage. Estimation uses the threshold command in StataSE 15.1.  
Table 3.2 Threshold regression. 
 3 Stage Specification 4 Stage Specification No Stage Specification 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Stage 1 0.445*** 0.445*** 0.445*** 
Stage 2 0.899*** 1.467*** 0.899*** 
Stage 3 -0.065 0.775*** -0.065 
Stage 4  -0.065  
Break Dates 1997 & 2009 1997, 2004, & 2009 1997 & 2009 
Notes: * denotes p<  0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.  
 
Threshold estimation results. Table 3.2 presents three different threshold estimations 
using different specifications. The typical lifecycle specification is 4 stages, but we are not sure a 
priori that the region has experienced decline. Model 1 set the number of stages to 3 stages while 
Model 2 specifies 4 stages. Model 3 uses the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) to decide the 
optimal number of thresholds.    
Models 1 and 3 provide identical estimation. According to the BIC, the optimal number 
of thresholds is two, which results in three threshold phase changes. This is what was imposed in 
Model 1. The results suggest that the Research Triangle’s life science industry has experienced 
three different stages from 1980 to 2016. The initial phase, which exhibits a positive convex 
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dynamic (β=0.445), began in 1980 and lasted until 1997. The next stage is estimated between 
1998 and 2009 with a stronger convex dynamic (β=0.899), indicating higher growth. Finally, we 
estimate that the industry entered into a third stage in 2010, marked by a significant change in the 
industry dynamics as the curve becomes more concave (β=-0.065). 
Model 2 imposes four different stages for the industry lifecycle. An important artifact is 
that we still detect the same time period for our three main stages: an initial phase (1980-1997), 
followed by higher growth (1998-2009), and then slower growth (2010-). By imposing another 
threshold, we detect the turning point of the second phase–the date when the dynamic becomes 
less convex. Model 2 highlights a strong dynamic during the first part of this stage (1998-2004) 
with a β estimated at 1.4767, whereas the second part (2005-2009) has a β estimated at 0.775, 
which is approximately half the former.6 Overall these results are robust and confirm the 
existence of three ecosystem phases from 1980 to 2016. 
Qualitative mapping of regional life cycle phases. We examine these quantitative 
results with a qualitative mapping of events in the region. Over time, the Research Triangle 
region slowly nurtured an entrepreneurial ecosystem, thanks to mergers and layoffs from high-
profile multinational firms (like GlaxoSmithKline), a more aggressive technology transfer stance 
from the region's research universities, and the development of a plethora of support institutions. 
The result is a steadily growing number of entrepreneurial firms and the presence of intermediary 
entrepreneurial support institutions. Notable events in the development of the Research Triangle 
region’s life science industry are chronicled in the timeline in Figure 3.4. Specifically, we 
 
6 Using industry turnover as the dependent variable with sales data is confirmatory of the breaks identified with 
industry density presented here, but data problems limit their explanatory power. Therefore, whatever the dependent 
variable, it seems that using our empirical specification with threshold regression allow us to precisely determine the 
date of the life-cycle transition points. Results are available from the authors upon request. Data on sales was 
obtained from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) for the years 1990-2014 (Walls & Associates, 2013). 
We supplement NETS with more recent data from Lexis Nexis6 and used Stata’s mipolate command to interpolate 
across missing years as this data was usually available for one year between 2014 and 2018 for our firms. 
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examine events that preceded the discontinuities that occurred in 1997 and 2009. Within this 
complex system it is impossible to establish causality, however we are interested in events that 
coincide with moving the ecosystem from one phase to the next.  
The three universities, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), Duke 
University (Duke), and North Carolina State University (NCSU) were important for anchoring 
the region and providing access to skilled labor and collaborations. IBM and the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) were early tenants in the Park, moving in 
1965. Becton Dickinson and Wellcome were the first life science firms, becoming Park tenants 
in the early 1970s.  
During the Phase 1, state support of biotechnology strengthened. In the early 1980s 
policymakers and civic leaders began a concerted effort to build the biotechnology industry in 
the region as they believed the region’s research universities could be leveraged for competitive 
advantage in the life sciences. The universities had already demonstrated success in bringing in 
federal research funding, but in this time period they established technology transfer offices 
(TTOs) to streamline commercialization efforts. Duke and NCSU opened TTOs in the mid 
1980s, with UNC following in the mid 1990s. The Council for Entrepreneurial Development 
(CED) and the NC Biotech Center were both founded in 1984. The NC Biotech Center is a state-
funded industry development organization. CED was founded by the Raleigh Chamber of 
Commerce, along with several important stakeholders in the industry, to support high-tech 
entrepreneurship in the Triangle region. Both organizations are still active today. During the 
1980s, a series of federal policies also helped strengthen researchers’ ability to perform and 
commercialize life science research. This deepening sociopolitical legitimation of the new 
industry laid important groundwork for its continued development (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  
    
 
  
















Source: Information taken from Smilor et al. (2007), Hardin (2008), Feldman & Lowe (2011), Lowe & Feldman (2015), McCorkle 
(2012), a variety of online sources, and interviews with local entrepreneurs and ecosystem members.  
Note: Brown font indicates a funding relate event. Red font indicates a university related event. Blue font indicates public event.
• NC Biotech Center, 1981 
• Quintiles founded by UNC prof, 1981 
• Glaxo HQ move, 1983  
• Council for Entrepreneurial Development, 1983 
• NC State TTO, 1984 
• Syngenta move, 1984 
• Intersouth Partners founded as first local VC firm, 
1985 
• PPD founded by UNC prof, 1985 
• Sphinx Pharmaceuticals, 1986 
• Duke TTO, 1986 







• NC Biotech Center offers first business loans, 1989 
• First Flight Venture Center, 1991  
• Embrex IPO ($16.7M), 1991 
• Sphinx IPO ($75M), 1991 
• Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), 1993 
• LabCorp move, 1993 
• Sphinx sold to Eli Lilly, 1994  
• The Aurora Funds and Pappas Capital (VC), 1994 
• UNC TTO, 1995  
• Burroughs Wellcome & Glaxo merger, 1995, freed 
talent 
• Fujifilm Diosynth (CMO) move, 1995 
• Aeolus Pharmaceuticals & Quintiles IPOs, 1996 
• Mycosearch sold to Onogene ($4.7M) 
• Significant expansion and turnover in 
ESOs 
• Quintiles IPO-II ($947M) & LipoScience 
IPO ($45M), 2013 
• Advanced Liquid Logic sold to Illumina 
($96M), 2013 
• KBI BioPharma (CMO) move, 2013 




• Bamboo Therapeutics sold to Pfizer 
($150-645M), 2016 
• 10+ other IPOs including Liquidia ($50M) 
and G1 Therapeutics ($105M) 
• University Angel Networks: CAN, DAN, 
WIN 
• BioLabs NC, 2018 







• NC ranked #4 in biotech VC investment, 
1998 
• Eno River Capital (VC), 1998 
• BD BioVenture Center, 1999  
• Icagen raises $19M in VC, 1999 
• Inspire Pharmaceuticals IPO ($69M), 2000 
• Glaxo-Wellcome & SmithKline Beecham 
merger, 2000 




• NC State Centennial Biomedical Campus, 
2000  
• Triangle Pharmaceuticals raises $75M in 
VC, 2001 
• Trimeris IPO ($102M), 2002 
• Southeast TechInventures, 2003 
• Icagen IPO, 2005 
• One NC SBIR Match Fund, 2006-2011, 
2016-present 
• Dara Biosciences IPO, 2008 
• Hamner Bioscience Accelerator, 2008 
• Cempra Pharmaceuticals raises $50M 
Series F, 2009 
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When Glaxo moved its headquarters to the Triangle in 1983 it was well positioned to take 
advantage of possible collaborations with the universities. As large firms moved to the Triangle, 
spin-outs from the university started to become more common. Quintiles, now the international 
firm IQVIA, was founded by two UNC professors in 1981. Sphinx Pharmaceuticals, a Duke 
spin-out, was the region’s first initial public offering (IPO) in this industry in 1991, and the 
largest in state history at the time ($70 million). Intersouth Partners, the region’s first VC firm, 
provided Sphinx’s seed funding and original incubation space, and Sphinx founders received a 
$3 million grant that they used to start the company. Sphinx was ultimately bought by Eli Lilly & 
Company in 1994. After this acquisition, Eli Lilly established an RTP presence. Today, 
Intersouth Partners boasts over 30 companies in the region that can be traced to Sphinx’s 
founders. This story highlights the deep connections between incumbents, universities, and 
spinouts in the Research Triangle region (Intersouth Partners, 2019).  
The early success of a few home-grown start-ups (including PPD, Quintiles, Sphinx, 
Embrex) brought national attention to the region. Furthermore, the nature of these early start-ups 
(Quintiles, PPD) and the attraction of large corporations (Glaxo, Fujifilm Diosynth) meant start-
ups had flexibility to easily outsource activities to high-profile, neighboring contact research 
organizations and contract manufacturing organizations, while also exploiting networks within 
these organizations and universities. Several IPOs and large VC deals likely increased the 
amount of funding going to firms as the Triangle region achieved more notoriety in the life 
sciences.  
 These activities laid the foundation for the cluster to expand and move from Phase 1 to 
Phase 2. The 1990s saw a takeoff of spinout companies in the Research Triangle region. This 
trend of an increasing number of start-ups was enhanced by a series of spin-outs created from 
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former Glaxo and Burroughs Wellcome employees after layoffs caused by the 1995 merger of 
the two companies left employees jobless, but with ideas for new firms. Several more local VC 
funds were founded during the 1990s as well, and the decade witnessed more IPOs and some 
larger VC deals. UNC and NSCU established a joint biomedical engineering department in 2003, 
just a few years after NCSU created its Centennial Biomedical Campus with lab and office space 
for life science start-ups. Interestingly, the timing of entry into Phase 2 comports with an early 
prediction made by Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) that significant entrepreneurial activity would 
not occur in the Research Triangle region until the mid 1990s because of the lack of density in 
social networks and low start-up rates when considering the time it took for Silicon Valley and 
Route 128 in Boston to mature.  
The beginning of Phase 3 begins in 2009, which corresponds with the financial crisis. 
While we might call this period “Maturity” because of the decrease density of spin-outs, we 
actually cannot be sure. Most life cycle theories attribute the onset of the Maturity stage to a 
period of industry “shakeout” due to competition, saturation, or the like (Agarwal et al., 2002). 
With the onset of the region’s third phase so closely matching an exogenous economic shock, it 
is likely that this break point which brought an apparent downturn only periodically stunted the 
development of the region, which may already be experiencing a renewal as new technological 
advancements are made that bring new market opportunities. Still, the results indicate a 
structural break from the prior period.  
The number of start-ups continues to increase annually, and the ecosystem continues to 
be successful along other performance measures. During post-recession the region witnessed an 
influx of entrepreneurial support organizations including incubators and accelerators from 
outside the region. Interestingly these organizations have already experienced much turnover. 
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IPOs are rare events, but local start-ups consistently go public and the number of IPOs continues 
to increase in this stage. A recent acquisition of Bamboo Therapeutics by Pfizer brought much 
attention. With a $150 million price mark, the deal had the potential to reach over $600 million 
depending on how the start-up technology developed. G1 Therapeutics completed an IPO in 
2017 for $105 million, after receiving $1 million in loans from NC Biotech and over $95 million 
in venture capital. Other start-ups’ stories demonstrate the embeddedness of the entrepreneurs 
and technologies in the region. Advanced Liquid Logic, which spun-out of Duke, was sold to 
Illumina in 2013 for $96 million. The founders then licensed the technology back from Illumina 
and started Baebies, a company that develops newborn screenings. It is important to note that the 
number of local VC firms supporting the life sciences has declined over the past decade, though 
sources indicate RTP start-ups are becoming more adept at acquiring non-local VC (personal 
interview, 2019).  
Table 3.3 Firms funded and amount of funding by stage and source.  
 Number of Firms Funded 
 




Stage 3:  
2010- 
Private 24 106 115 
Federal 31 72 96 
State 20 108 68 
 Total $ Amount to Firms 
Private $346M $2.54B $2B 
Federal $52.90M $421M $413M 
State $3.78M $13.70M $18.40M 
    
 Average $ Amount to Firms 
Private $14.42M $23.96M $17.39M 
Federal $1.71M $3.90M $4.30M 
State $0.19M $0.19M $0.27M 
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Funding Sources & Emergence  
While the number of firms funded and the amount provided by federal sources increases 
throughout the three stages, the number supported by private sources sees a dramatic increase 
from Stage 1 to Stage 2 (see Table 3.3). State funding is significantly lower than federal and 
private in terms of dollar amount but has seen more growth than the other two sources going 
from Stage 2 to Stage 3.  
Dynamic random effects probit model with unobserved heterogeneity & regime-
switching. We estimate a dynamic random effects probit model with unobserved heterogeneity 
to examine the relationships between funding sources across the entire panel and then implement 
a regime-switching analysis on the same model to see how these results change depending on the 
stage. We perform this analysis separately for each funding source (state, federal, and private). 
Table 3 demonstrates variation across funding sources for the three stages. 
The dynamic random effects probit model is appropriate for several reasons. First, our 
setting is dynamic where lagged values of funding from each source are needed to estimate the 
probability of funding from that source in the current time period. We are most interested in the 
probability of securing funding, given the prior distribution of sources. As such, we must account 
for state dependent processes. Second, we do not use the value of funding because we are more 
interested in the links between funding sources in the ecosystem and want to avoid a value-effect 
from funding caused by noise related to large or erratic values. Thus, we have a binary outcome 
variable.  For example, if a start-up received funding from the same source in every year, but the 
amount decreased we would see a negative effect even if the probability of receiving funding is 
high. Third, the relationships between state, federal, and private funding are nonrecursive. It is 
for this reason we cannot estimate for each type of funding simultaneously. Due to the 
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nonrecursive and binary nature of the data, a structural equation model is inappropriate. We 
follow Grotti & Cutuli (2018) and Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2013) in estimating the model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜌𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡            (6) 
Here 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is the probability of firm 𝑖 receiving funding at time 𝑡. It is a function of funding 
received in the previous period, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, which accounts for state dependence, and covariates 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 
which control for firm-level bias. 𝑐𝑖 is the firm-specific unobserved effect, while 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error term.  
The firm-specific unobserved effect accounts for heterogeneity between firms and is 
written as:  
𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦0 + 𝛼2?̅? + 𝛼3𝑋0 + 𝛼4            (7) 
While 𝛼0 and 𝛼4 (the firm-specific time-constant error) are purely random, 𝑦0 represents the 
initial value of the dependent variable, while 𝑋0 is a row matrix of the initial value of the time 
varying explanatory variables for all firms, 𝑋0 = {𝑋01, 𝑋02, … , 𝑋0𝑛}. Here, this is the initial value 
of the other two sources of funding. For example, if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is the probability a firm received private 
funding in time 𝑡, 𝑋0 accounts for the initial value of state and federal funding. Similarly, ?̅? is a 
row matrix of the mean value of the time-varying covariates (in the example, state and federal 
funding) for all firms, ?̅? = {?̅?1, ?̅?2, … , ?̅?𝑛}. Specifically, it is the within-firm average based on all 
time periods. 𝑐𝑖then accounts that the probability of receiving one type of funding is likely 
influenced by other funding sources in prior periods (Grotti & Cutuli, 2018; Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal. 2013; Wooldridge, 2005). The 𝑋 are a subset of 𝑍. All models are heteroskedastic 
robust. 
 The dynamic random effects probit model assesses state dependence in the probability of 
receiving funding but does not account for differences across life cycle stages. We estimate a 
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regime-switching regression analysis, which is a generalization of the linear model that accounts 
for temporal breaks in the effects of the variables (Elhorst & Fréret, 2009; Montmartin et al., 
2018). We expect the influence on funding is not linear with time and therefore consider the 
break points we identified in the threshold analysis. The model allows us to estimate stage-
specific coefficient values.  
We estimate one dynamic random effects probit model with regime-switching for each 
funding source, including stage specific indicators and interactions that represent the transitions. 
For example, the model for private funding is as follows:  
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝛽12𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝛽13𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽21𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1  
+  ∆𝛽22𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝛽23𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽31𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝛽32𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
+ ∆𝛽33𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝛼2 + ∆𝛼3 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝑐𝑖            (8) 
Here, the 𝛽1𝑖 represent the focal funding source and coefficients of key interest (private funding 
in this equation), with 𝛽2𝑖 and 𝛽3𝑖 representing lagged values of the other two funding sources. 
The 𝛽𝑖1represent coefficients for Stage 1, which we choose to be the base effect, while the 
∆𝛽𝑖2 represent the change of the effect from stages 1 to 2 and the ∆𝛽𝑖3 represent the changing 
effect in stage 3 with respect to stage 1.7 For the regime analysis, the 𝑐𝑖 unobserved effect 
covariates include only state and federal funding. All models are heteroskedastic robust.  
Our estimation includes several firm and industry level covariates (𝑍𝑖𝑡). These are listed 
in Table 3.4 with the literature that included these control variables. We include firm-level 
controls for founding team size, founder human capital, sector, and establishment date, as well as 
the region-level industry density. Covariates describing founders’ human capital are commonly 
 
7 We calculate the net effect by stage by adding the coefficient of the base effect and the coefficient of the associated 
change for stages 2 and 3. We calculate standard errors using the covariance matrix of the coefficients and calculate 
a t-statistic to discern statistical significance at the usual levels. 
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used controls for start-up quality, since start-ups generally lack data on other metrics such as 
sales that would measure this. Summary statistics and correlations are provided in Tables 3.5 and 
3.6.8  
Table 3.4 Description of covariates. 
Covariates Measurement Prior literature 
Total Founders 
Number of founders of firm; 
proxy for early size of firm as 
employment unavailable 
Hyytinen et al. (2015); Wojan et 
al. (2018) 
Max Founder Age 
Maximum age of any founder at 
time of founding 
Boden & Nuccie (2000); Ortiz-
Villajos & Sotoca (2018) 
Founder Cumulative 
College 
Cumulative years of college 
among all founders 
Boden & Nuccie (2000); Dencker 
et al. (2009); Ortiz-Villajos & 
Sotoca (2018) 
Establishment Date Firm establishment year 
Kalleberg & Leicht (1991); 
Wojan et al. (2018); Wooley 
(2018) 
Industry Density 
Number of active, entrepreneurial 
life science firms in the Research 
Triangle region by year, as 
measure of competition 
Hyytinen et al. (2015); Wooley 
(2018) 
Founder Same Prior 
Industry Experience 
Count of founders of firm with 
prior work experience in life 
science industry 
Delmar & Shane 2004; Dencker  
et al. (2009); Hyytinen et al. 




Count of founders of firm with 
prior experience as an 
entrepreneur  
Delmar & Shane (2004); 
Hyytinen et al. (2015) 
Sector 
Categorical for all sectors except 
services as described in Table 1  







8 For 31 firms it was impossible to determine values for some of these variables. Eight firms are missing all founder 
data. The other 23 firms had founders with some missing details of their work experience and/or educational 
background. For these firms we used either the minimum or average value to replace the missing values, whichever 
would cause any bias to be in the direction a null funding. In the case of the same prior industry experience variable, 
we inflated the count by how many founders there are in the founding team for firms for which only some founders 
were missing this variable. 
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Table 3.5 Summary statistics, all firms. 
 All Firms     
  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Duration (years) 8.61 6.54 1 37 
Log (Cumulative Private Funding) 4.11 13.65 0 159.5 
Log (Cumulative National 
Funding) 
6.91 22.70 0 364.4 
Log (Cumulative State Funding) 2.24 6.47 0 66.41 
Total Founders 1.83 0.99 1 10 
Max Founder Age 46.91 10.35 19 74 
Cumulative College 13.26 9.68 0 89 
Establishment Date 1999.53 8.08 1980 2016 
Industry Density 504.41 199.18 11 711 
Same Industry Experience 0.92 0.90 0 9 
Entrepreneurial Experience 0.54 0.81 0 4 
Firm-Year Observations 10,545    
 


















Total Founders 1.000       
Max Founder 
Age 
0.304 1.000      
Cumulative 
College 
0.852 0.323 1.000     
Establishment 
Date 
0.106 0.254 0.158 1.000    
Industry 
Density 
0.080 0.151 0.109 0.632 1.000   
Same Industry 
Experience 
0.518 0.297 0.447 0.147 0.106 1.000  
Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
0.460 0.300 0.411 0.208 0.136 0.526 1.000 
 
Dynamic random effects probit estimation with regime switching results. Results 
from the dynamic random effects probit estimation are provided in Table 3.7, while Tables 3.8, 
3.9, and 3.10 present the dynamic random effects probit result with regime switching analysis. 
We present tables showing the total effects and their significance by stage. The full table of 
regime-switching estimation results can be found in the Appendix 2, Table 3.14.  
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Table 3.7 Dynamic random effects probit with unobserved heterogeneity estimation results. 




Federal Fundingt  
(Model 6) 
Private funding(t-1) 0.291*** -0.111 0.328** 
 (0.108) (0.192) (0.144) 
State funding(t-1) 0.411** -0.030 0.334** 
 (0.174) (0.159) (0.164) 
Federal funding(t-1) -0.084 0.041 0.708*** 
 (0.134) (0.156) (0.115) 
Sector 0.081*** -0.035 0.022 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.029) 
Total Founders 0.176* -0.103 -0.390*** 
 (0.103) (0.089) (0.110) 
Max Founder Age 0.008 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cumulative Education 0.002 -0.019* 0.068*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Establishment Date 0.081*** 0.123*** 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) 
Industry Density -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Same Prior Industry Experience -0.123* -0.088 -0.136** 
 (0.073) (0.057) (0.064) 
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience 0.054 -0.020 0.069 
 (0.068) (0.060) (0.067) 
Stage 2 constant -0.328 0.082 0.246 
 (0.204) (0.162) (0.232) 
Stage 3 constant -0.605* 0.480* 0.152 
 (0.315) (0.285) (0.350) 
Private funding initial 1.855*** -0.316 -0.349 
 (0.145) (0.226) (0.236) 
Federal funding initial 0.156 -0.119 1.396*** 
 (0.328) (0.352) (0.149) 
State funding initial -0.259 1.260*** -0.381 
 (0.264) (0.132) (0.237) 
Private funding initial  0.833*** 0.486 
  (0.289) (0.329) 
Federal funding mean 0.933** 1.399***  
 (0.407) (0.290)  
State funding mean 1.391***  2.055*** 
 (0.507)  (0.528) 
Constant -165.104*** -246.499*** -12.361 
 (35.104) (41.095) (32.353) 
Observations 8,057 8,057 8,057 
LogL -1161.413 -569.192 -1210.406 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. LogL is the log of the likelihood function.  
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 Table 3.7 demonstrates that, even without considering the influence of life cycle stage, 
there  are differences in the dynamic relationships between funding sources. Model 4 considers 
the influence of lagged indicators for whether a firm received private, state, and/or federal 
funding (time t-1) on the probability of receiving private funding in time t. We detect a positive 
influence of private funding (t-1) and a positive influence of state funding (t-1) on private 
funding in time t. We do not, however, find an influence of federal funding in time t-1 on private 
funding in time t. These findings indicate overall that private sources may use state funding as a 
signal. Furthermore, prior private funding is a predictor of future private funding. There is no 
influence of any type of funding in the prior time period (t-1) on state funding in the current 
period (time t) (Model 5). This confirms what we know about state funding—it is awarded at an 
early stage, usually before other funding sources are available, and it is rare that state grants and 
loans are awarded to the same firm more than once. Finally, in Model 6, considering the dynamic 
random effects probit model across the whole panel for the influence on federal funding in time 
t, we detect a positive effect of federal funding (t-1), a positive effect of state funding (t-1) and a 
positive effect of private funding (t-1). This means federal sources rely on signals from other 
funding sources and invest in firms likely that are nearing the end of seed-stage. Furthermore, 
federal funds are likely to go to firms that have already received some federal funding.9  
The stage-based model results in Table 8 provide a deeper understanding of these 
relationships for private funding. We find that the positive effect of private funding in time t-1 on 
private funding in time t is only present during Stage 1 and disappears in later stages. 
Interestingly, the positive influence of state funding is present in Stages 1 and 3. By Stage 3, 
 
9 While the federal SBIR/STTR programs grant funds in phases, with Phase II and Phase III follow-on on funds, this 
structuring is not sufficient to explain this finding as it is unlikely a firm will receive a Phase I grant in year t-1 and 
Phase II in year t. Firms are receiving different grants for different projects. 
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state funding sources are encouraging firms to go after private sources and using their own 
networks to help the firms make connections and access new funding sources. The impact of 
federal funding is not strong. We detect no effect in Stage 1 and only a slightly negative effect 
during Stages 2 and 3. This finding could be driven by a few firms that rely on federal research 
grants to fund their work rather than trying to attract private funding—a practice which has 
earned the nickname “SBIR mills.” 
Table 3.8 Summary of dynamic random effects probit models with regime analysis for private 
funding. 







Private funding (t-1) 0.798*** 0.081 0.099 
State funding (t-1) 0.458*** 0.135 1.180*** 
Federal funding (t-1) -0.091 -0.374* -0.938* 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,057 8,057 8,057 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 3.9 Summary analysis of dynamic random effects probit models with analysis for state 
funding. 







State funding (t-1) -0.070 0.002 -0.153 
Private funding (t-1) -0.085 -0.261 0.537*** 
Federal funding (t-1) 0.058 0.008 0.058 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,057 8,057 8,057 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 3.10 Summary analysis of dynamic random effects probit models with regime analysis for 
federal funding. 







Federal funding (t-1) 0.743*** 0.783*** 0.024 
Private funding (t-1) 0.319** 0.138 -0.049 
State funding (t-1) 0.349** 0.518** 0.319 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,057 8,057 8,057 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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 When considering North Carolina State funding in time t (Table 3.9), there is no 
influence of prior state funding or prior federal funding in year t-1, regardless of life cycle stage. 
This finding therefore most closely aligns with the results for the full panel. We do, however, see 
a positive influence of private funding in year t-1 in Stage 3. As the private funding mechanism 
has evolved over time, we have begun to see more angel funding and more sources of private 
funding being directed to early stage firms, such as accelerators and competitions. It then makes 
sense why private seed funding might pre-date public seed funding and even act as a signal to 
state-level funding sources for more recent start-ups. We know from our own experiences and 
interviews in the region that state agencies which support biotech devote considerable attention 
to developing networks and relationships with local VC and angels.  
 If we consider federal funding in time t (Table 3.10), we see it is strongly influenced by 
all three sources in time t-1 during the first stage. While this influence drops for private funding 
in the second stage, it is maintained for state and federal funding. However, the influence of 
federal and state funding in time t-1 on federal funding in time t disappears in the third stage. 
This indicates that early in the emergence process federal funding may rely heavily on signals 
from other funding sources and be more likely to re-invest in firms which show promise. As the 
industry matures, however, federal funding sources may be more likely to be directed to firms 
developing more high-risk and untested technologies which private may not be interested in 
supporting and state does not have the bandwidth to support. 
Overall these results demonstrate it is important to consider the wide variation in the 
relationships between funding sources, considering each source separately and considering the 
life cycle stage. Interestingly as well, we find across all regime models that the initial value of 
other funding does not well explain future funding, while the mean value is consistently 
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statistically significant. 
Funding Sources & Firm Survival Across the Ecosystem Life Cycle 
 We develop a complementary loglog (cloglog) model including non-parametric frailty 
and a logarithmic duration dependence to model the hazard rate for survival of the Research 
Triangle region entrepreneurial life science firms. Survival analysis begins in 1980 and ends in 
2016 and death occurs on one-year intervals since we do not know the exact date a firm closed. 
Furthermore, the ratio of the 36-year interval length to the typical spell length (or years a firm 
survives) is low, as many entrepreneurial life science firms die in their first 5-10 years. 
Consequently, though survival occurs in continuous time our data are considered to be grouped 
and the observations on the transition process are summarized discretely rather than 
continuously. Therefore, we use econometric methods for discrete survival time data and model 
a complex dynamic for the hazard rate of entrepreneurial life science firms.  
 The cloglog model is better suited to our data than the logistic alternative (see Jenkins, 
2005). The discrete time hazard rate is modeled as: 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝[− exp(𝛽′𝑋 + 𝛾𝑡)]                   (9) 
where X are the covariates influencing the hazard rate and 𝛾𝑡  summarizes the pattern of duration 
dependence in the interval hazard. There are two main ways to model 𝛾𝑡 , either by not placing 
any restrictions on how the 𝛾𝑡  vary from interval to interval (in which case the model is a type of 
semi-parametric one) or by specifying a parametric functional form. The most common duration 
dependence specifications are the logarithm dependence [𝛾𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡)], polynomial dependence 
[𝛾𝑡 = 𝑧1𝑡 + 𝑧2𝑡
2 + ⋯ + 𝑧𝑝𝑡
𝑝], or piecewise constant where groups of years are assumed to have 
the same hazard rate but the hazard differs between these groups. In order to determine the 
appropriate duration dependence, we take the hazard rate value obtained from the life-table 
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method and test which of these three duration dependence specifications is able to explain the 
hazard rate. Efficiency criteria indicate the polynomial form is most useful to model the duration 
dependence, followed by logarithm and the piecewise constant. 
 The main explanatory variables for firm funding differ from the dynamic RE probit 
because we use the value of funding in the survival analysis. This is because we are not worried 
about a potential value effect as we were for the funding relationships analysis. We include the 
same covariates used in the prior analysis with the exception of technology sub-sector, which did 
not improve the model.  
 An important consideration is the potential for unobserved heterogeneity in the hazard 
rate due to omitted variables. We do not have, for example, employment data that would 
consider entrepreneurial firm size. Bruderl and Schussler (1990), Ortiz-Villajos and Sotoca 
(2018), and others show size matters for entrepreneurial firm survival. Thus, we must account for 
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, or “frailty”, as it is called in the survival literature.  
 We therefore consider the following generalized cloglog model: 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋|𝑢) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝[− exp(𝛽′𝑋 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢)]               (10) 
where 𝑢 represents unobserved individual effects. There are three main ways to model these 
unobservable variables: using a normal distribution [𝑢~𝒩(0, 𝜎2)], a gamma distribution 
[𝑢~Γ(1, 𝜎2)] or a non-parametric approach which fits an arbitrary distribution using a set of 
parameters. These parameters comprise a set of mass points and the probabilities of a person 
being located at each mass point. The graph showing the hazard rate is not helpful to 
discriminate between these three possibilities.10 Consequently, we choose the best specification 
for frailty by comparing the relative performance of each estimation.   
 
10 Additional details are available upon request. 
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Table 3.11 Non-parametric duration models for business survival. 
Non-parametric heterogeneity Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Log (Cum. Private Funding) -0.006  -0.045*** -0.044*** 
 (0.007)  (0.014) (0.013) 
Log (Cum. Federal Funding) -0.028**  -0.040*** -0.034*** 
 (0.011)  (0.015) (0.011) 
Log (Cum. State Funding) -0.017  0.017 -0.008 
 (0.023)  (0.046) (0.021) 
Total Founders -0.770*** -0.879*** -0.759*** -0.760*** 
 (0.271) (0.297) (0.255) (0.255) 
Max Founder Age 0.002 0.024 0.000 0.003 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
Cumulative Education 0.033 0.050* 0.029 0.030 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.023) 
Establishment Date 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.215*** 0.213*** 
 (0.056) (0.000) (0.044) (0.042) 
Industry Density -0.002 -0.002*** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Same Prior Industry Experience -0.353* -0.417** -0.289* -0.297* 
 (0.181) (0.166) (0.164) (0.164) 
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience 0.362* 0.273 0.277 2.909*** 
 (0.186) (0.172) (0.175) (0.171) 
Log (Cum. Number of Private Fundings) -0.126   
  (0.094)   
Log (Cum. Number of Federal Fundings) -0.318**   
  (0.124)   
Log (Cum. Number of State Fundings) -0.355   
  (0.256)   
Square of Log (Cum. Private Funding)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Square of Log (Cum. Federal Funding)  0.000  
   (0.000)  
Square of Log (Cum. State Funding)   -0.000  
   (0.002)  
Constant -328.463*** -330.409 -438.385*** -434.837*** 
 (112.470) (.) (88.494) (84.480) 
Mass point 2 4.548*** 4.688*** 4.683*** 4.666*** 
 (0.444) (0.381) (0.368) (0.359) 
Logit(Prob. type 2) -1.585*** -1.601*** -1.591*** -1.596*** 
 (0.146) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135) 
Logarithmic Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,881 8,881 8,881 8,881 
LogL -896.343 -898.025 -889.722 -890.028 
AIC 1820.686 1822.049 1813.445 1810.056 
BIC 1919.969 1914.241 1934.003 1916.431 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Discrete event history analysis results. Our first survival estimation results can be 
found in Table 3.11. Information criteria from estimations comparing the normal distribution, 
non-parametric approach, and gamma distribution indicate the non-parametric approach is 
preferred. We present results from the non-parametric estimation only. For comparison, results 
from the Gaussian and gamma estimations can be found in Appendix 2 Tables 3.15 and 3.16, 
which confirm the robustness of this model. Table 11 presents four models, each with a different 
functional form of the main dependent variable. Model 16 displays the results using the logged 
cumulative dollar amount of funding a firm receives separately from state, federal, and private 
sources. Model 17 estimates instead the logged cumulative number of investments a firm 
receives from each source separately. Model 18 again uses the logged cumulative dollar amount 
invested and adds a squared term for each funding source. Model 19 presents the preferred 
specification, which uses the logged cumulative dollar amount, with a nonlinear effect of private 
funding.  
Overall, firms that received federal funding experience less chance of failure, and this 
effect is nonlinear with the cumulative amount received. Importantly, the effect of federal 
funding is statistically significant across all specifications. The coefficient for federal funding in 
Model 19 indicates that as the amount of federal funding increases, the probability of firm failure 
decreases, which provides support for the argument that federal funding plays a role in industry 
emergence. This funding helps firms extend research lines by hiring staff or outsourcing. Of 
course, these grants depend on the quality and promise of the research, but by modeling the 
unobserved heterogeneity in our discrete time models we alleviate concerns of cross-firm 
heterogeneity.  
We also find that firms that received private funding experience less chance of failure, 
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and the effect is non-linear with the cumulative amount received. Overall this result confirms 
prior literature on the importance of VC and other private funding sources to emerging 
ecosystems. Private funding generally comes in larger amounts than state and federal, though as 
mentioned previously such trends have changed, and focuses on building the firm. Private 
therefore should help firms survive and have a larger magnitude influence than federal funding. 
Private funding from VC and angels generally comes with mentorship and access to the funders 
networks of resources which further help firms develop.  
 Finally, however, we find that firms that received North Carolina state funding do not 
experience less of a chance of failure, as results are not significant, controlling for the amount of 
federal and private funding. This finding does not suggest state funding is inconsequential. 
Instead, state funding is likely to impact firms in many ways, not just on their ultimate survival. 
The smaller dollar amount of state funding may be too small to have an ultimate impact on 
survival. As show in previous results, state funding does influence the probability of later private 
and federal funding, which do show a positive relationship to firm survival. 
Concerning controls, a higher level of competition in the industry and region, as 
measured by industry density, has a significant effect on the risk of failure, decreasing the risk of 
failure. In contrast, being a newer firm with a later establishment actually increases the 
probability of failure. The fact that a firm has an entrepreneur that has already worked in the 
same industry decreases the risk of failure. Also, firms with more co-founders have a decreased 
probability of failure. Finally, firms who have more serial entrepreneurs have an increased 
probability of failure. This finding is at odds with theory about the benefits of prior 
entrepreneurial experience but could suggest that these entrepreneurs are better at knowing how 
to fail fast.  
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Table 3.12 Duration models for business survival by funding source(s). 
Non-parametric heterogeneity Model 20 
Received State Funding Only 0.191 
 (0.471) 
Received Federal Funding Only -0.929 
 (0.623) 
Received Private Funding Only -1.319** 
 (0.537) 
Received State & Federal Funding -2.222** 
 (1.081) 
Received State & Private Funding -1.638** 
 (0.638) 
Received Federal & Private Funding -4.756*** 
 (1.132) 
Received State, Federal, & Private Funding -1.915*** 
 (0.580) 
Reference Group: Received No Funding  
Total Founders -0.730*** 
 (0.278) 
Max Founder Age -0.005 
 (0.015) 
Cumulative Education 0.041 
 (0.026) 
Establishment Date 0.165*** 
 (0.062) 
Industry Density -0.003 
 (0.002) 
Same Prior Industry Experience -0.310* 
 (0.183) 




Mass point 2 4.554*** 
 (0.371) 
Logit(Prob. type 2) -1.445*** 
 (0.170) 





Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. LogL is the log of the likelihood function. AIC is the 
Akaike Information criteria, while BIC is the Bayesian Information Criteria. 
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We examined further variations on the functional forms of the state, federal, and private 
funding variables. These results are presented in Table 3.12 (Gaussian and gamma specifications 
in Appendix 2 Table 3.17). Here we include all possible varieties of funding that a firm might 
receive as a series of indicator variables, with the reference category being firms that received no 
support. These results confirm the previous ones and improve our understanding of the effect of 
funding an emerging ecosystem. Receiving only private funding or any combination of sources 
decreases the probability of failure. Receiving only state funding or only federal funding has no 
effect, while receiving state and federal funding, even without private funding, does decrease the 
probability of failure. However, an important finding from these models is that firms that 
received both private and federal funding and firms that received all three sources of funding 
have the lowest magnitude chances of failure.  
When examining the controls, we again see that being a newer firm in the ecosystem 
increases the probability of failure. Results also indicate that firms whose founder(s) have some 
prior industry work experience have a lower chance of failure, as well as firms with team 
founded firms. Again, we see that firms who have more serial entrepreneurs have an increased 
probability of failure.  
Table 3.13 Summary analysis of discrete event history models with regime analysis.  






Log (Cum. $ Private) 0.026*** -0.015 -0.082*** 
Log (Cum. $ Federal) -0.041*** -0.061*** -0.138** 
Log (Cum. $ State) 0.034 0.022 -0.087* 
Logarithmic Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,881 8,881 8,881 
Notes: * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.  
 
Discrete event history analysis with regime-switching. We also implement a regime-
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switching regression analysis to investigate the stage-specific influence of each funding source 
on the survival prospects of firms. The results are provided in Table 3.13. We apply the same 
regime method here as for the prior dynamic probit model and calculate stage specific 
coefficients the same way. The full estimation can be found in Appendix 2 Table 3.18. 
Findings indicate there exist important differences in the influence of funding on firms’ 
probability of failure across ecosystem life cycle phases. This is an important finding as it 
indicates looking at the industry over the entire time period overlooks important differences 
across regimes. In terms of private funding the regime findings accord with our previous finding 
that private funding is not significant overall in decreasing the probability of firm failure without 
a square term (see Table 3.11 for reference), because this effect is changing over time due to 
industry dynamics. In Stage 1, private funding is not helping firms survive. This could be due to 
the fact that these firms were entering a new industry and may have been very high risk. 
Furthermore, the private funders may not have yet developed expertise in identifying more 
promising technologies and start-ups as dominant forms in the new industry are still 
undiscovered. In Stage 2, private funding becomes associated with a decreased probability of 
firm failure, but this is not statistically significant. In the third stage (Model 23), however, we see 
a decreased probability of failure and this is stronger in magnitude and statistically significant. In 
contrast, federal funding is associated with a decreased probability of firm failure across all 
stages. The statistical strength of this effect decreases in the third stage, but the magnitude 
increases. This means federal funding decreases the probability of firm failure in Stage 3 with a 
higher probability than in Stages 1 and 2. When considering state funding we do not see an 
influence until Stage 3, when the funding begins to reduce the probability of firm failure.  
 These results demonstrate that all three funding sources become more efficient in their 
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funding allocations over time so that by the third phase these sources are all associated with a 
decrease in firm failure above prior stages. Ultimately, this method improves our understanding 
of how the funding that is available to firms in an ecosystem is related to their survival, and how 
this influence differs depending on industry dynamics which define the ecosystem life cycle.  
Discussion & Conclusion 
Surprisingly little research examines how financing that supports entrepreneurial 
businesses indeed promotes regional growth and influences the emergence of new industries. 
Studies tend to examine one program in isolation, either venture capital or specific government 
programs, with a focus on the degree to which the receipt of that particular funding affects firm 
performance. Yet the combined impact on a regional economy—the sum of effects on individual 
firms—remains unexplored.  There is general consensus that the social rate of return to public 
R&D investment is high (Toole, 2012), which is used as a justification for government funding. 
Another related stream of literature considers the degree to which public funding affects private 
funding or the extent of crowding-out versus crowding-in. This topic has been debated since the 
1960s (see Zuniga-Vicente et al., 2014, for a survey of this vast empirical literature). The 
empirical evidence suggests that government R&D subsidies lead to an additionality effect and 
induce private investment at the firm level. For example, Howell (2017) finds that a government 
SBIR award doubles the likelihood of the subsidized firm to subsequently receive venture 
capital. The literature is relatively silent on the relationship of government financing to other 
sources of financing at the aggregate regional level.   
We find emergence and the ecosystems view of the region to be a useful extension of the 
theory for explaining how regions, through myriad small efforts of firms and ecosystem 
stakeholders, develop capabilities through public and private financial resources that help them 
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grow and develop new industries. In order to empirically explicate the region’s development, we 
employ several new techniques which allow us to assess varying temporal relationships within 
the region over a long-time horizon. 
First, through threshold analysis we find that the Research Triangle region’s life science 
cluster has experienced two distinct ecosystem life cycle transition points corresponding to three 
phases. The first phase, lasting until 1997 coincides with a period of capability building 
dominated by state and federal sources. Then, the region enters a period of dramatic growth 
characterized by a higher number of start-ups entry and the availability of greater amounts of 
private finance as the region gained prominence in the US. This period of growth began to slow 
with the start of the financial crisis as shown by the industry dynamic beginning to exhibit a 
concave dynamic with respect to time. Time will tell whether this is actually a downturn for the 
region or rather the result of an exogenous economic shock if the start-up entry rates regain 
momentum. Our contribution is not mapping the life cycle stages onto an ecosystem, rather we 
are arguing that an ecosystem goes through different phases and funding has a different influence 
over the phases. 
Second, the dynamic RE probit model depicts the relationships between funding sources 
at the firm level over time. We find prior state and private funding (time t-1) influences private 
funding in time t, while no prior sources influence state funding in time t. However, we see a 
relatively strong influence of prior funding from all three sources on federal funding in time t. 
Combined with regime analysis, we are able to show that these relationships actually differ 
across different life cycle stages of the ecosystem. In the initial phase of emergence, private 
funding is strongly influenced by prior private and state funding, while federal funding is 
strongly influenced by prior funding from all three sources. Moving to a phase of higher growth 
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we see a consistent influence of prior federal and state funding on federal spending, but we lose 
the influence of private and state funding on state spending. The trends change again during the 
third phase, when state funding actually influences private spending, a finding that would be 
overlooked with an analysis of the full panel alone. We also find the converse, that prior private 
funding influences state spending. 
 Finally, discrete event history analysis provides evidence that the mix of multi-level 
public and private funding of these firm matters for firm survival, and therefore ecosystem 
emergence. Necessarily, firms in an emerging industry much be able to reach a point of viability 
in order for an ecosystem to develop around them. Notably our results show the importance of 
having a strong base of federal funding. Private funding, which provides substantially more 
funds to Research Triangle firms in terms of dollar amount than both public sources combined, 
also decreases the chances of firm failure. Contrary to expectations, we do not find an effect for 
state funding, which typically provides the least funding in terms of dollar amount. Still, our 
results show the interrelationship between funding sources as firms that receive funding from a 
variety of sources experience the greatest magnitude decrease in probability of firm failure. 
Furthermore, findings from the application of the regime model to the survival analysis have 
direct policy implications and improve the overall survival model. We find an increased 
efficiency of state funding and private funding over time, and a consistent influence of federal 
funding.  
Our results shed light on the process by which new industries and ecosystems develop 
and emerge in a regional context. They have direct implications for policymakers and for firms. 
The results suggest the firms may benefit from strategically considering the sources of funding 
they seek depending on the phase of the ecosystem. Furthermore, policymakers interested in 
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growing their economies by the development of a new industry ecosystem should not merely 
copy the current actions of already successful regions, as they would essentially be following the 
old idiom of comparing apples and oranges. Our results show that the industry dynamics of the 
Research Triangle ecosystem changed in important ways over the ecosystem life cycle. The 
private, state, and federal funding sources exhibited differing relationships to each other 
depending on the stage, and firm survival was more influenced by different sources also 
depending on the stage. Consequently, the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the 
literature by using innovative methods to show how results from a full panel mask these 
dynamics. 
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CHAPTER 4 – DON’T GO IT ALONE: FIRM SURVIVAL, FUNDING, AND THE 
INFLUENCE OF LOCAL ENTREPRENEURIAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS, 
HUMAN CAPITAL, AND SOCIAL NETWORKS. 
 
Abstract 
This paper finds a positive association between participation with entrepreneurial support 
organizations (ESO) and start-ups’ receipt of funding and survival. Findings suggest start-ups 
most benefited by participation are those that do not have redundant university support, have 
female co-founders, and already occupy network brokerage positions. The paper matches on pre-
startup observables to create a control group with the universe of start-ups from the Research 
Triangle’s life science industry, which holds constant regional variation and the ESO choice set. 
Support organizations help start-ups by brokering networks to finance and other resources and 
endowing them with institutional capital that helps them overcome information barriers and 
navigate the local entrepreneurial ecosystem. ESOs simultaneously contribute to, and embed, 
institutional logics into regional entrepreneurial ecosystems.  
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Introduction 
Since the first endeavors of ancient Mesopotamians, entrepreneurs have been supported, 
and sometimes hindered, by their institutional context (Hudson, 2010). Considering the potential 
economic returns to supportive mentoring by modern-day venture capital fund managers as an 
example, it makes sense that pioneering individuals would themselves behave entrepreneurially 
and create new institutions and organizations to support entrepreneurs. What is most striking, 
however, is the visible proliferation in the number and forms of these institutions in the last 10-
15 years, as well as the fact that many operate with no expectation of return and a mission only 
to contribute to the public good. We are faced with the conundrum of why the literature has been 
so silent on these organizations. 
There is a renewed call for more careful consideration of the social, cultural, as well as 
economic context of entrepreneurship (Lounsbury et al., 2019; Zahra, 2007). Part of the story of 
geographically defined entrepreneurial ecosystems is that supporting institutions and 
intermediaries are necessary to have a robust ecosystem. This is an important, new framework 
which considers deep understanding of context central to our understanding of entrepreneurial 
processes and outcomes. Firms embedded in geographically bound structures, either clusters or 
ecosystems, benefit from access to specialized resources (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013) and lower 
information costs (Balland & Rigby, 2017). This location advantage extends to firm-level 
innovation (Huggins & Thompson, 2014) and growth (Dahl & Sorenson 2012). Yet, results are 
mixed when considering the effect of location on start-up survival (Pe’er & Keil, 2013). This 
result is perplexing as nascent small firms, which lack the resources of their large counterparts, 
should benefit most from location advantages.  
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At the earliest stages of conception, before a start-up has accessed finance, resources are 
limited to a combination of human and social capital from founders. Human capital, in the forms 
of advanced degrees and years of prior work experience, is associated with increased start-up 
performance. In the case of technology, entrepreneurs’ prior experiences supply them with 
technological knowledge and organization-specific tacit knowledge useful to starting a firm. An 
entrepreneur’s prior work and educational experiences also contribute to the formation of social 
capital through network affiliations, which provide access to resources for problem solving and 
acquiring information. Entrepreneurs augment these resources by participating in local 
entrepreneurial support organizations (ESOs)—e.g., incubators, accelerators, co-working spaces, 
mentoring programs, etc.—where they benefit from external networks and knowledge from 
organizations and individuals in their local ecosystem that provide advice ranging from growth 
strategies to how to access to finance.  
Unlike social and human capital, the institutional capital resulting from ESO participation 
requires a decision to participate. Institutional capital creates both information and connections 
and aligns the start-up with the local ecosystem and its institutional logics. ESO participation is 
one way of measuring institutional capital. These three types of resources are especially 
important to new ventures and interact in ways typically not considered together in the literature. 
This is due to a lack of longitudinal data on firms’ use of ESOs and related outcomes. 
Understanding this phenomenon is of interest not only to scholars of entrepreneurship, but also 
to the public and private sponsors of these organizations and the entrepreneurs who forego 
alternative resource acquisition methods to use them.     
This paper asks why entrepreneurs choose to participate in ESOs and under which 
conditions their firms benefit. It provides answers by empirically investigating the relative 
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influence of social, human, and institutional capital on start-ups’ ability to acquire finance and 
survive. This question is important given the lack of information and sometimes conflicting 
accounts of ESOs performance and their influence on firms. At a higher level, the paper is an 
examination of why ESOs are important members of entrepreneurial ecosystems. The paper 
theorizes that entrepreneurs use ESOs because they find their current levels of human and social 
capital resources insufficient to build firms. Founders believe ESOs will help them acquire 
further knowledge and resources than they could manifest themselves, which will ultimately aid 
firm development. As such, ESOs act as network brokers for entrepreneurs who need to create 
connections outside of their generally homophilic, small world networks (Breznitz et al., 2018). 
Start-ups receive information and access to networks that affect their ability to attract finance, 
solve technical problems, reach consumers and suppliers, and ultimately become a better firm. 
Simultaneously, ESOs contribute to, and embed, institutional logics of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. However, not all firms respond equally to ESO participation. 
If ESO participation positively influences start-ups’ ability to receive funding and 
survive, then we have good reason for why entrepreneurs should participate. The paper is 
informed by the literatures on intermediaries and social and human capital as they relate to 
entrepreneurial ventures. Empirical analysis exploits a longitudinal database of entrepreneurial 
life sciences firms that formed in North Carolina’s Research Triangle region. Findings 
demonstrate that ESOs indeed support entrepreneurs. Start-ups that participate in ESOs receive 
greater funding and are more likely to survive. These effects are not uniform though, as firms 
with local university human capital appear to benefit less from ESO participation, while firms 
with women founders and firms with more well-networked founders benefit more. 
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A first contribution of this paper is to advance understanding of the influence of ESOs. 
Most of the literature has developed based on qualitative studies that often lack the longitudinal 
data richness required to evaluate start-up performance outcomes. While ESOs belong to theory 
on intermediaries, we lack empirical evidence on whether and how these organizations matter for 
entrepreneurship. Framing ESOs as institutional capital providers furthers our ability to 
understand their purpose, impact, and relation to the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
While an extensive literature describes the influence of founder human capital and 
networks on start-ups, most evidence on the role of support institutions is limited to case studies 
that do not consider the full ecosystem. While some studies examine the relative or combined 
influence of human and social capital on firms (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Pennings et al., 1998), 
few studies investigate the relative role of human capital, network capital, and ESO use, with 
notable exceptions such as Davis et al. (2006) who examine the influence of voluntary 
associations on small business owners’ networks, controlling for human capital. Another 
contribution of the paper, therefore, is to more holistically consider the ecosystem and context of 
entrepreneurship by bringing together literatures typically considered in isolation. As such, ESO 
studies and related theory progress with insufficient regard to the context of participant firms and 
founders. This paper focuses on institutional capital but recognizes the need to account for other 
resources. The distinction is that ESOs are something a founder chooses to participate in, while 
human and social capital are things founders possess due to past experiences and bring with 
them.  
A final contribution of the paper is exploitation of the full choice set of ESOs across the 
universe of entrepreneurial life science firms founded in one region over a 25-year time horizon. 
The analysis focuses on a specific configuration of firms and organizations specializing on one 
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industry within one region (Alcácer & Zhao, 2016). This allows factors that might affect a 
regional economy to be held constant. Further, by considering one industry the paper reduces 
another source of heterogeneity. The strategy literature defines ecosystems as groups of firms 
that produce products or services that together comprise a coherent solution, while another 
literature focuses on geographically defined entrepreneurial ecosystems (Spigel, 2017). This 
paper contributes to the latter by examining the universe of start-ups in a limited geographic 
space and considering their involvement with institutions. While the literature examines how 
clusters of economic activity impact firm location choices (Alcácer & Chung, 2014; Shaver & 
Flyer, 2000) and value creation and appropriation (Alcácer & Zhao 2012; Almeida & Kogut, 
1999; Delgado et al., 2014; Giarratana & Mariani, 2014; Zhao, 2006), this paper examines 
dynamics within one geographic space. The paper relies on a unique dataset that allows 
empirical exploration of the relationship between founders, start-ups, and support organizations. 
This is an important step to deeper understanding of the entrepreneurial ecosystem framework.   
The paper is organized as follows. First, the theoretical framing relates the literature on 
ESOs to that of founders’ human and social capital. Next, is a review the empirical setting and 
data, followed by a detailed methodology. Subsequent sections present the results and conclude.  
Theoretical Background 
Start-ups are endowed with different types of pre-entry resources (Helfat & Leiberman, 
2003), including expertise and knowledge acquired through education, experience (Harris & 
Helfat, 1997) and social connections (Castanias & Helfat, 2001). At a start-up’s earliest stages, 
the ability to acquire funding is limited by the pre-entry endowments of the founder(s), namely 
human and social capital (Dencker et al., 2009; Fichman & Levinthal, 1991; Levinthal & Myatt, 
1994). Support organizations provide an additional resource, institutional capital, to augment 
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start-ups. The proliferation of supporting institutions, especially in the past decade, suggests 
these organizations provide useful resources for start-ups, yet only by examining human, social, 
and institutional capital together may we discern how ESO participation relates to start-ups’ pre-
entry resources and affect their ability to acquire funding and survive.  
Though prior studies examine human and social or financial capital for firms (Cooper et 
al., 1994; Pennings et al., 1998), not much is known about the role of ESOs. In related analysis 
Davis et al. (2006) and Reese and Aldrich (1995) examine the role of entrepreneurs’ membership 
in supporting institutions with data from two surveys administered in the Research Triangle 
region in 1990 and 1991. While Davis et al. find such supporting institutions help entrepreneurs 
overcome the limitations of their networks, Reese and Aldrich find no connection between 
networking from membership and firm survival or financial outcomes. Breznitz et al. (2018), 
however, find start-up firms experience different network creation outcomes related to their use 
of different types of services of an entrepreneurial support organizations. Certainly, further 
research is warranted. Each literature is briefly reviewed in turn.  
Founders’ social capital and affiliation networks. Social capital, resulting from 
positions in social networks, is central to the study of entrepreneurship (Adner & Helfat, 2003; 
Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Kim & Aldrich, 2005). Social capital, supported and generated by 
norms of reciprocity, mutual trust and friendship among network members, facilitates access to 
resources and knowledge (De Carolis et al., 2009; Vohora et al., 2004; Mosey & Wright, 2007). 
Networks are crucial in start-up development, especially in industries with dispersed knowledge 
of how to bring products to market (Powell et al., 1996). Strong inter-organizational networks 
provide access to external sources of information and facilitate rapid and effective knowledge 
transfer (Schilling & Phelps, 2007); allow resource acquisition, integration, and sharing (Ahuja, 
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2000; Blyler & Coff, 2003); provide opportunities for capabilities development (Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005); and provide access to capital, expertise, advice, and 
endorsement (Batjargal, 2003; Ardichvili et al., 2003). More highly connected entrepreneurs are 
able to overcome their bounded rationality and more accurately assess potential partners (Hallen 
& Pahnke, 2016). Social capital from different sources may confer different advantages 
(Hernández-Carrión et al., 2017). When entrepreneurs are better able to engage networks outside 
their start-ups, sales and employment increase (Brinckmann & Hoegl, 2011). Social networks 
deserve important attention when considering the context and ecosystem of entrepreneurship. 
Networks take identifiable forms. Structure confers advantages to network members 
depending on their position. Aldrich & Kim (2007) delineate three types of network structures: 
random, truncated scale free, and small world. In random networks, ties have a short path length 
and unlimited access to form ties with alters. Truncated scale free networks have a hierarchical, 
resilient structure. A few nodes have many ties, while most nodes have few ties. In small world 
networks, connections are clustered as ties are formed nonrandomly, constrained by context. 
Bridging ties, called brokers, connect different clusters. Brokers are the subject of much research 
due to their potential for influencing information flow (Burt, 2000). Intermediary organizations 
and public agencies can act as network brokers for entrepreneurs and influence business 
development and entrepreneurial outcomes (Aldrich & Glinow, 1992; Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). 
There is a strong local dimension to networks as individuals are more willing to share 
knowledge and resources when there is trust and a sense of reciprocity. This variety of network-
based benefits lower costs for firms (Kalnins & Chung, 2006). In the life sciences industry, the 
number of collaborative relationships a firm has positively influences innovative output (Shan et 
al., 1994). Career affiliation network ties formed by regional labor mobility are one explanation 
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for the development of San Diego’s biotechnology cluster (Casper, 2007). These studies suggest 
consideration of a geographic dimension is important. 
Founders’ human capital. The pre-entry human capital of a start-up is limited to the 
endowments of the founders. Pre-entry human capital from prior management experience and 
same industry knowledge contribute to firm survival (Dencker et al., 2009). Human capital 
provides the basis for organizational learning. It sets the stage for the accumulation of further 
human capital post-founding and for growth (Symeonidou & Nicolaou, 2018). The initial human 
capital level can even matter more for firm survival than subsequent human capital 
improvements (Geroski et al., 2010). Founders’ human capital can be a predictor for future 
success (see Marvel et al., 2016 for a review of the literature on human capital in 
entrepreneurship research). This is especially true in the context of knowledge-intensive and 
high-skilled industries such as the life sciences where years of education, including specialized 
training in scientific knowledge and business knowledge, as well as prior entrepreneurial 
experiences, can influence how well a start-up turns resources and capabilities into competitive 
advantage. The types of human capital a founder possesses—whether from education experience, 
work experience, or some combination—can differentially influence how entrepreneurs perceive 
market opportunities (Gruber et al., 2012). The quality of the firm’s human capital also provides 
a signal to potential investors (Ko & McElvie, 2018). Human capital is therefore important to 
consider for a holistic understanding of entrepreneurial outcomes and ecosystems. 
ESOs and firm performance. One perspective is that the entrepreneurial firm primarily 
acts as an integrator of different kinds of knowledge (Grant, 1996; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). 
Knowledge, broadly defined, is one of the most important resources available to start-ups. 
Knowledge of technical or scientific findings is important, but knowledge about how to 
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transform technical knowledge into commercially viable products is also vital. While human 
capital exists in different forms, encompassing different types of knowledge, some forms of 
knowledge exist outside firm boundaries (Hitt, Ireland & Lee, 2000). The search for, and 
integration of, external knowledge is crucial to success in knowledge-intensive industries such as 
life sciences (De Clerq & Dimov, 2008). Intermediary institutions, such as incubators, industry 
associations, and government-funded research centers, are important means by which 
entrepreneurs access external knowledge and build institutional capital. 
Even when knowledge is acquired, entrepreneurs may have difficulty employing it 
effectively. One stream in the literature focuses on the role of entrepreneurs’ bounded rationality, 
following the tradition of Simon (1955) and March (1978), in limiting their search for, and 
assimilation of, necessary knowledge and resources to help their start-ups (Cohen et al., 2018; 
Hallen & Pahnke, 2016). The use of accelerators, which act as organizational sponsors, mitigates 
the bounded rationality of founders, allowing improved search and learning processes (Cohen et 
al., 2018). The persistent need for knowledge, and for ideas about how to assimilate knowledge 
under conditions of bounded rationality, are therefore one reason entrepreneurs join ESOs. A 
variety of intermediary institutions—including business incubators, accelerators, and 
membership, education, and mentoring programs—have emerged to help new firms grow and 
succeed (see Clayton et al., 2018 for a review). These organizations can be operated privately, 
publicly, and quasi-publicly. Their ability to have a positive impact is therefore of interest to 
support organization managers, public agencies, and scholars.  
This paper proposes that ESOs influence firm performance because they provide access 
to new resources and new knowledge, while also assisting entrepreneurs in integrating these 
resources in ways that lead to better performance. There is evidence suggesting ESOs have a 
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positive effect on firm outcomes. Incubators and accelerators have been found to positively 
impact firm performance outcomes, with outcomes differing depending on characteristics and 
service offerings (Hallen et al., 2019; Lewis et al., 2011). In the emerging economy context, 
where private capital is often not available, less connected entrepreneurs can instead use 
institutions to source capital (Armanios et al., 2017). Winston-Smith and Hannigan (2015) find 
accelerated firms achieve quicker exits (through acquisitions or closings) than a matched sample 
of not accelerated firms. However, evidence of a negative or null effect has also been found 
(Schwartz, 2013). ESOs may be more or less effective depending on ownership and 
management. Lewis et al. (2011) found top-performing incubators were more likely to be 
nonprofit. Therefore, while a positive influence of ESO participation on firms is expected, it is 
not prescribed. 
Methodological issues hinder the development of ESO research. Support organizations 
exhibit a range of support and participation. Many studies lack a comparison group. Because the 
evidence is mostly in favor of a positive impact of participation in ESOs, this exploratory paper 
predicts a positive association and argues ESO participation should be associated with enhanced 
firm performance. However, we might also expect that some firms may benefit more from ESOs 
than others. From prior research we know that women founders are often disadvantaged, as well 
as founders less well-connected to regional networks. It is therefore possible that some firms are 
disadvantaged in receiving ESO support and this paper will explicate these contingencies.  
Empirical Setting 
North Carolina's Research Triangle region's life sciences cluster is one of the largest in 
the US A 2019 CBRE Research Report ranked the Raleigh-Durham life sciences market fifth, 
trailing Boston-Cambridge, the Bay Area, San Diego, and New Jersey. Unlike these places, the 
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Research Triangle was not an obvious candidate to develop a life sciences industry (Markusen, 
1996; Luger & Goldstein, 1991), and the three research universities that anchor the Triangle 
lagged in spinning out life science start-ups compared to peers (Donegan, 2016). Over time, the 
region nurtured an entrepreneurial ecosystem, thanks to mergers and layoffs from high-profile 
multinationals (e.g., GlaxoSmithKline), a more aggressive technology transfer stance from the 
universities, the development of a plethora of support institutions, and a concerted state 
development effort. The result is a steadily growing number of active entrepreneurial firms (see 
Figure 4.1).11 The life sciences are defined as the following sectors: dedicated biotechnology/ 
biomaterials, human therapeutics, tools/diagnostics, medical devices, health IT/informatics, and 
services (definitions and firm count in Appendix 3.1).  
Figure 4.1 No. of active firms in the Research Triangle’s life sciences ecosystem by year. 
 
Source: Author rendering from PLACE: Research Triangle Database. 
 
Data & Methodology 
Data. Data is obtained from the PLACE: Research Triangle Database, which contains 
information on the universe of life sciences firms in the Research Triangle region including 
 
11 A comparison with national Bioscan data indicates the Research Triangle’s growth generally mirrors the national 
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information on their founding, sector, activities, milestones, and founders (Feldman & Lowe, 
2015). Firm lists were collected from a variety of sources, including lists archived by local 
institutions, de-duplicated, and each firm researched. Final firm lists were vetted by local life 
sciences industry veterans. This data gathering process has the benefit of including start-ups 
which fail early, before most available data sources can capture them, and negates issues of 
selection bias. 
Founders were identified through web-based sources including state business records, 
company websites, and news articles. Each founder’s career history and educational background 
were collected using web-based sources. Social media sources including LinkedIn are especially 
useful in compiling detailed career and educational profiles for company founders. Other sources 
include bibliographic information from company websites, Bloomberg, personal websites, news 
articles, SEC filings, and results from Internet search platforms. A process of data triangulation 
verified information to ensure accuracy. Founder career and education data allow identification 
of linkages between founders simultaneously employed or enrolled at the same organization. 
There are many social connections to measure. Being in the same cohort at a large company may 
not capture the degree of connection, but these are the best data that can be gathered at present.  
Data on ESO participation was collected from individual organizations, which shared participant 
lists. Interviews with ESO managers provided information on organizational history and 
operations. The analysis focuses on formal participation in four Research Triangle ESOs: one 
venture mentoring (VM) program and three incubators (hereafter, Incubators A, B, and C). 
Though many organizations provide services to entrepreneurs in the region, the VM program and 
Incubator A are long-standing and codify the institutional logics of the ecosystem. Incubators B 
and C are life sciences incubators that operated for around 10 years each but are now closed. 
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While the number of ESOs in the Research Triangle region grew during and after the 2009 
financial crisis, this paper focuses on two long-standing ESOs that are not industry specific and 
two ESOs that while no longer operative specifically supported life science start-ups.  
Research Triangle ESOs. The VM program is a nonprofit formed in the early 1980s 
with a charge to organize and network the region’s entrepreneurs. It is a membership 
organization with a mission to promote high-growth and high-impact companies in the region 
and statewide. As one of the largest ESOs of its kind in the US, the VM support program 
provides education, mentoring and capital formation resources to new and existing high-growth 
entrepreneurs through annual conferences, workshops and programs on start-up management and 
finance. While the organization offers informal networking opportunities, this paper focuses on 
start-up’s use of two formal education and mentoring programs. One of these is a several month-
long, curriculum-based program that helps entrepreneurs refine business ideas in instruction and 
mentorship settings. The other program connects start-ups to experienced mentors.  
A recent study found the Research Triangle region suffers from a lack of new lab space 
for life science companies, demonstrating the importance of life science incubators (CBRE 
Research, 2019). Incubator A was founded in the early 1990s and is located in Research Triangle 
Park, offering 25 leasable office and lab spaces for high-tech start-ups. It offers affordable space, 
shared services, and mentoring, with the goal of graduating commercially viable tenants. Though 
Incubator A supports start-ups in other industries, it is unique because of its early and public-
sponsored founding and its support of an industry which requires non-standard office and lab 
space.  
Incubator B was founded in the late 1990s as the sole corporate business incubator in 
Research Triangle Park. It provided office and lab space to start-ups working in areas of strategic 
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interest to the parent corporation that could lead to future collaborations. In some cases, the 
corporation made financial investments in tenant start-ups. In most cases a research collaboration 
was established. Almost half of the tenants were Duke University (Duke) spinouts. Companies 
were offered flexible leases and usually resided in the incubator six months to two or more years. 
The program wound down around 2009 because the corporation was not able to find enough 
start-ups to collaborate with. As of 2016, according to a former Incubator B manager, the parent 
corporation began to focus entrepreneurial efforts in partnering with other incubators. Incubator 
B boasts member firms created 400 regional jobs and received over $400 million in funding. 
Incubator C operated as a unit of a Research Triangle Park-located nonprofit from 2008 until 
2016. In 2016 the nonprofit closed after approximately 40 years in the health sciences and 
chemicals space. This ended the incubator, which helped start-ups commercialize technologies 
and offered office space and management, administrative, and other support. The parent engaged 
in joint projects with the start-ups if mutually beneficial and offered customized support, such as 
assistance with federal grant proposals. Most tenants were local university spinouts.  
Sample. This paper considers the universe of 865 life sciences firms founded between 
1991 and 2016. Though social and human capital measures accrue to the founders, the 
combination of these resources accrues to the firm. There are 1,409 start-up founders. Of these, 
53 were missing some prior work history data. Values were imputed by replacing missing values 
with the average for firms with the same number of founders. Founders could not be determined 
for six firms. These firms were assigned the values of solo-founded firms. As the unit of analysis 
is firm-level, the maximum value of any co-founders was used in the case of team-founded 
firms.  
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Table 4.1 Number of ESO users receiving funding by each funding source. 
 VM Program Incubator A Incubator B Incubator C Non-users 
Federal  59 31 8 2 76 
State 46 34 4 2 79 
Private 77 20 8 2 88 
 150 83 12 7 643 
Table 4.2 Mean dollar amount of funding received by start-ups participating in ESOs. 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
VM Program 150 $25,600 $48,200 $0 $276,000 
Incubator A 83 $4,231 $12,600 $0 $81,200 
Incubator B 12 $69,000 $89,600 $0 $276,000 
Incubator C 7 $592 $1,070 $0 $2,968 
Non-users 643 $2,231 $12,000 $0 $161,000 
Note: Real 2017 dollars in thousands. 
 
Of the 865 start-ups, 207 used at least one ESO. Of these, 150 start-ups used the VM 
program, 83 used Incubator A, 12 used Incubator B, and 7 used Incubator C. No firms received 
support from all four institutions, however 27 firms received support from the VM program and 
at least one incubator. Only three start-ups participated in two incubators. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
outline funding patterns of firms and ESO use. A greater number of VM program users receive 
private than federal and state funding, but a greater number of Incubator A users receive state 
funding than other sources (Table 4.1). While Incubators B and C support a smaller number of 
start-ups than Incubator A, at least half of Incubator B start-ups receive some funding, with two-
thirds of their firms receiving federal and private funding. Incubator B firms also on average 
receive the most in total dollar amount of funding (Table 4.2). Incubator C firms receive the least 
funding, though these firms on average will be younger since the organization was most recent to 
open.  
Services sector start-ups were dropped from analysis as they are less technology- and research-
intensive, though still knowledge-intensive. The final sample is 776 start-ups.  
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Matching procedure. Ideal in this study would be to have a group of control start-ups 
that did not participate in an ESO but are identical to those that did participate in other respects. 
While we have the universe of entrepreneurial life sciences start-ups in the region and therefore 
the risk set of firms that would be interested in ESO participation, we do not know which firms 
tried to participate and were declined. Because this knowledge is not possible, the paper uses 
coarsened exact matching (CEM) to create a more precise control group and therefore control for 
firm heterogeneity and reduce model dependence. CEM works like other matching techniques, 
i.e. propensity score matching, by matching treated and control observations on pre-treatment 
variables (Iacus et al., 2012). It accounts for these potential confounders, leading to better 
balance on observables between treated and control groups. The CEM approach replicates and 
coarsens the data, grouping variables based on like values into strata. The algorithm matches 
observations based on strata. Only matched observations are retained, and better matched 
observations receive higher weights. The coarsened variables are discarded, and originals used in 
estimation with strata-based weights. CEM is in the class monotonic imbalance bounding 
methods, meaning the amount of imbalance can be controlled by the researcher (Blackwell et al., 
2009). The method has been shown to reduce imbalance, bias, and error above other matching 
methods. CEM does not require one-to-one matching and meets the congruence principle (Iacus 
et al., 2011, 2012). The method is increasingly popular in the strategy literature (e.g., Armanios 
et al., 2017; Kolympiris et al., 2019; Grimpe et al., 2019).12  
Empirical strategy. After creating a control group through CEM, the paper uses OLS 
and logistic regression to answer the question of whether ESO participation is associated with a 
higher dollar amount of funding (log 2017 real dollars) and a higher probability of receiving any 
 
12 The matching procedure is implemented with the CEM program in StataSE 15.1 (Blackwell et al., 2009).   
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funding, respectively, controlling for human and social capital. In equation (1) the total amount 
of funding received is modeled as a function of ESO participation (ESO Usei) and firm level 
measures of human (HCi) and social capital (SCi). Equation (2)13 models the probability of 
receiving funding as a function of a vector of covariates xi (from equation (1)), where 𝛽 is the 
corresponding coefficient vector. 
(1) Log (Total $ amount of funding)i = β0 + β1(ESO Usei)+ β2HCi  + β3SCi+ i 






The paper uses discrete event history analysis to investigate the association between ESO 
participation, social capital, human capital, and firm survival over time. Though this method has 
been used previously (Dencker et al., 2009; Pennings et al., 1998), prior work often makes 
simplifying assumptions that allow use of continuous methods which are easier to implement but 
may not be appropriate given that firm deaths are usually measured discretely in one-year 
intervals. For this data, we know the year a start-up shuts down, but not the exact day and hour.  
To account for this, the paper employs a complementary log-log model (cloglog) with non-
parametric frailty and logarithmic duration dependence. The cloglog function is more appropriate 
than the logistic model alternative (Jenkins, 2005). The hazard rate does not follow a linear or 
otherwise discernable pattern (see Appendix 3 Table 4.11). A logarithmic duration pattern 
performed better than polynomial and piecewise constant patterns alternatives.14 Frailty models 
account for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity that is likely to bias results as start-ups are not 
all of the same quality. Gamma and Gaussian frailty specifications were sub-optimal to the non-
 
13 The logit model, which uses maximum likelihood estimation, is appropriate as the dependent variable binomially 
distributed. Logit, probit, and linear probability model (LPM) estimations showed similar results. Logit and probit 
models preferred to LPM as LPM may result in out of range predictions. Logit chosen based on author preference.  
 
14 Logarithmic dependence chosen based on optimal information criteria, though it performed closely to polynomial. 
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parametric (see Appendix 3 Table 4.10). The discrete model accounts for right-censoring. 
Equation (3) provides the generalized complementary log-log model. Here x represents 
covariates, 𝛾𝑡  summarizes the duration dependence pattern, and 𝑢 represents unobserved 
individual effects.15  
(3) ℎ(𝑡, 𝐱|𝑢) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝[− exp(𝛽′𝐱 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢)] 
Dependent Variables. For equation one, the dependent variable is the log total dollar 
amount of funding (real 2017 dollars). For equation two, the dependent variable an indicator for 
receiving any funding. The paper also examines the influence of ESO use on the amount of 
funding separated into private16, federal17, and state sources.18 Given the different nature of each 
type of funding it is logical to consider that ESOs may differentially influence start-ups funding 
depending on the source. 
The discrete time survival analysis examines the probability of firm closure. The 
dependent variable takes a 0 value for all years a firm is at risk of closing and switches to 1 the 
year the event (closure) occurs. The analysis only considers exit events in which a firm shuts 
down, ceasing operations. There are other types of exits which are considered positive for start-
ups, such as merger or acquisition. These can be lucrative and an end goal for entrepreneurs, 
therefore they are not considered as closure events here. Firms fail for various reasons (Gimeno 
 
15 Survival and hazard functions plotted in Appendix 3 Table 4.11 using the life-table method (Lee & Carter, 1992). 
 
16 Private funds predominately provided by venture capital and angel funds and generally involve equity exchange. 
 
17 Federal funding is obtained by firms applying to and receiving Small Business Administration grants (SBIR or 
STTR programs) or NIH research grants; funding focuses on quality of research.  
 
18 State funding is from two sources: North Carolina Biotech Center (NC Biotech), a nonprofit that uses state 
funding to develop the state’s life sciences industry, and NC IDEA, a private foundation that supports tech-based 
start-ups. Both provide merit-based seed funding. NC Biotech provides small loans, while NC IDEA offers small 
grants.  
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et al., 1997; Wennberg et al., 2009). The available data cannot distinguish why a firm closed, but 
we can assume closure is a negative, undesired outcome. 
Explanatory variables: ESO participation. When testing the association between ESO 
participation and start-up funding, the independent variable is an indicator for whether a start-up 
used any of the four ESOs. A start-up uses VM support when it participates in either or both of 
the formal VM programs. A firm uses an incubator when it locates in the incubator. The paper 
presents results for the influence of participation in any and for separate ESOs on firm funding. 
The survival analysis only considers incubator participation as the connection between VM 
programs and survival is more tenuous. 
Covariates. Measures of human and social capital are included as covariates. Human 
capital is measured two ways following prior literature: founders’ cumulative years of work 
experience and cumulative years of college prior to founding (Dencker et al., 2009). Social 
capital is measured as the log cumulative amount of affiliation capital possessed by a founder in 
the year prior to founding. Affiliation capital, which is a product of position in affiliation 
networks and anchored in the larger literature on social capital, provides a measure by which to 
understand the social networks and overlapping interactions of entrepreneurs based on their prior 
organizational affiliations.  
The study of affiliation networks allows understanding of the most advantageous types of 
network structures for resource acquisition (Kim & Aldrich, 2005). Affiliation ties are binary 
relations between members of two different entities (e.g., firms and individuals) that provide 
necessary conditions for tie development and are “an observable manifestation of a social 
relation that is perhaps unobservable directly” (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011, pp. 421). Participation 
in events, boards, and co-authorship are examples. Affiliations ties confer legitimacy and allow 
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biotechnology firms to attract prominent underwriters (Higgins & Gulati, 2003). This paper uses 
networks of entrepreneurs connected to other entrepreneurs in the Research Triangle life sciences 
start-up universe because they share same prior work history. These are annual affiliation 
networks where founders are connected to each other when they worked at the same firm in the 
same year. Networks include founders of firms starting from 1967 (the earliest entrepreneurial 
entry in the region) to calculate cumulative affiliation capital. For example, the affiliation capital 
score for firms founded in 1991 would be cumulative scores through 1990.  
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics.  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total founders 865 1.88 1.10 1 10 
Establishment date 865 2005.48 6.40 1991 2016 
Patents in 3 years of founding 865 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Ln(Affiliation capital - harmonic closeness) 865 5.22 1.92 0.69 6.48 
Ln(Affiliation capital - degree) 865 3.29 1.71 0.69 5.58 
Cum. college 865 8.39 3.22 0 17 
Cum. work experience 865 19.20 10.15 0 49 
MBA 865 0.23 0.42 0 1 
PhD or MD 865 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Serial founder 865 0.20 0.40 0 1 
UNC/Duke/NCSU  865 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Use any ESO 865 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Use VM program 865 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Use VM + incubator 865 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Use incubator 865 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Total funding (thousands) 865 6,247.43 24,300 0 276,000 
Total private funding (thousands) 865 5,649.24 23,400 0 251,000 
Total federal funding (thousands) 865 555.07 3,362.43 0 61,700 
Total state funding (thousands) 865 43.12 140.04 0 1,498.4 
Duration (firm failure) 8,976 7.63 5.42 1 26 
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This paper uses harmonic closeness centrality to measure affiliation capital, which shows 
start-ups’ “reachability” through their networks (Kim & Aldrich, 2005).19 Harmonic centrality is 
the sum of the inverted geodesic distances between all nodes. It is used to identify the most well-
connected individuals—best positioned to access information from the entire network most 
quickly. Harmonic centrality is preferable to the general closeness centrality score because it 
allows centrality calculations for founders that exist in the ecosystem but are not connected to the 
network’s main component (Stephenson & Zelen, 1989). Limiting analysis to the main 
component would lose important information about network dynamics.20  





















founders 1.000       
   
Estab. date 0.032 1.000         
Tech sector 0.024 -0.002 1.000        
Patents in 3 
years 0.055 -0.108 0.043 1.000    
   
Ln(Affil. 
capital) 0.223 0.206 -0.063 0.016 1.000   
   
Cum. 
college 0.372 0.118 -0.009 0.005 0.387 1.000  
   
Cum. work  0.254 0.122 -0.128 -0.011 0.171 0.067 1.000    
Use ESO 0.163 -0.157 0.127 0.170 0.044 0.141 -0.078 1.000   
Use VM 0.161 -0.220 0.092 0.169 0.029 0.126 -0.070 0.780 1.000  
Use 
incubator 0.102 0.016 0.067 0.074 0.036 0.102 -0.017 0.612 0.094 1.000 
 
A central concern for interpretation of results in this paper is if predominately higher 
quality firms use ESOs and then also receive greater funding. Because start-ups do not have a 
performance track-record, it is not possible to control for firm quality beyond technology quality 
 
19 In the case of team-founded firms, all variables correspond to the founder with the largest amount of each capital.  
20 Harmonic centrality scores calculated with ‘nwcommands’ and other calculations in StataSE 15.1 (Grund, 2014). 
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and founder characteristics. The incubators and VM program operate within the confines of their 
own available space and support capacity. If an incubator has no vacancies it may try to create 
space, but it is largely limited to accepting firms when space is available. VM programs have 
similar capacity constraints. These facts argue against the conjecture that start-ups that 
participate in ESOs will necessarily be of higher quality and therefore more attractive to funders 
even without the ESO. Still, results are interpreted cautiously.  
Table 4.5 Estimating OLS and logistic regression of ESO use on start-up funding. 
 Ln($ amount of funding) Any funding indicator 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Use ESO 5.699*** 4.267*** 0.310*** 0.239*** 
 (0.586) (0.789) (0.030) (0.042) 
Ln(Affiliation capital) 0.208* 0.440** 0.017 0.036** 
 (0.126) (0.183) (0.010) (0.015) 
Cum. college 0.327*** 0.293** 0.024*** 0.020** 
 (0.080) (0.136) (0.006) (0.009) 
Cum. work experience 0.073*** 0.097** 0.005*** 0.006* 
 (0.024) (0.049) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant -1.039 -1.878    
 (0.776) (1.246)    
Observations 776 537 776 537 
Coarsen Exact Match No Yes No Yes 
LogL -2565.373 -1797.448   
R-squared 0.174 0.142   
AIC 5140.746 3604.897 1.197 1.224 
BIC 5164.017 3626.327 -4211.838 -2696.792 
Note: Table presents marginal effects. CEM variables: establishment date, technology sector, 
number of founders, patents within three years of founding. Standard errors in parentheses; 
clustered at firm level. LogL: log of likelihood function. AIC & BIC: Akaike and Bayesian 
information criteria. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
Results 
ESO participation and start-up funding. Results from the OLS and logistic regression 
of ESO use on start-up funding are presented in Tables 4.5 through 4.7. Models 1 and 2 of Table 
5 present regression results for the influence of using an ESO on the log dollar amount of start-
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up funding received. Models 3 and 4 present results for the probability of receiving any funding. 
Models 2 and 4 use matched samples. There is a strong, statistically significant influence of ESO 
participation on both the amount and probability of funding across models. ESO participation 
(Model 2) increases the dollar amount of funding a firm receives by 70.31 percent on average.21 
Furthermore, ESO participation increases the predicted probability of receiving funding by about 
23.9 percentage points (Model 4). The information, mentoring, network brokering, and tangible 
resources provided by ESOs help start-ups, even controlling for the level of social and human 
capital. Still, social and human capital are significant factors when considering funding.  
Table 4.6 Estimating OLS regression of separate ESO use on start-up funding. 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Use VM program 5.448***   
 (0.981)   
Use incubator  1.915*  
  (0.980)  
Use VM + incubator   3.531* 
   (1.844) 
Ln(Affiliation capital) 0.658*** 0.213 0.649** 
 (0.238) (0.195) (0.321) 
Cum. college 0.257 0.442*** 0.555** 
 (0.173) (0.141) (0.253) 
Cum. work experience 0.099 0.097* 0.149 
 (0.062) (0.052) (0.100) 
Constant -2.060 -1.598 -3.502 
 (1.554) (1.367) (2.233) 
Observations 385 403 156 
Coarsen Exact Match Yes Yes Yes 
LogL -1287.375 -1353.754 -527.610 
R-squared 0.202 0.077 0.198 
AIC 2584.750 2717.507 1065.221 
BIC 2604.517 2737.502 1080.470 
Note: Table presents marginal effects. CEM variables: establishment date, tech sector, number of 
founders, patents in first three years. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at firm level. 
LogL: log of likelihood function; AIC & BIC: Akaike & Bayesian information criteria. * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
21 Magnitudes are large because the distribution of the amount of funding firms receive is right skewed. 
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Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present models further explicating the influence of ESOs on funding. 
We might expect different types of ESOs to influence start-ups in different ways and for the 
relationships between social capital, human capital, and ESO use to also differ. Table 6 
separately investigates: (1) VM program participation, (2) participation in any incubator, and (3) 
VM and incubator participation. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between ESO participation and the amount of funding across all estimations, with the largest and 
most significant effect from VM support (Model 5). VM participation is associated with an 
increase of 231.29 percent in funding on average, with incubators still increasing funding but at 
lower magnitude of 5.79 percent and use of both ESO types increasing funding by 33.16 percent 
on average. Incubators provide office and lab space to firms. Lab space is vital to life sciences 
firms and can be difficult to find at affordable costs. Incubators in the Research Triangle, 
however, provide more than space—they also connect firms to local resources, act as network 
brokers, and offer advice. Interviews with the VM program’s management uncovered that 
program managers and mentors intentionally connect start-ups with funding opportunities. 
During their curricular program they engage different investors and experienced entrepreneurs 
each week. The mentoring program connects founders to successful, experienced entrepreneurs 
who are more familiar with the local ecosystem and can help with advice on problems, but also 
connect founders to individuals with different expertise.   
Depending on the type of ESO, founder pre-entry human and social capital may be more 
or less influential (Table 4.6). In Model 5 (VM participation) social capital is strongly 
statistically significant, but not economically with an increase of 0.93 percent, holding human 
and institutional capital constant. Human capital measures are not statistically significant, 
suggesting founders may use VM programs as a substitute for weaker human capital. In contrast, 
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when considering firms that used any of the three incubators (Model 6) human capital, especially 
from college, is significant and positively related to receiving a greater funding. Social capital 
becomes insignificant, indicating incubators may especially help founders with less reachability. 
This implies founders who lack network reachability should consider the benefits of participating 
in one type of ESO over another, especially if infeasible to participate in multiple ESOs.  
Table 4.7 Estimating OLS regression of any ESO use on start-up funding by funding source. 
 Ln(Total $) Ln(Private $) Ln(Federal $) Ln(State $) 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Use ESO 4.267*** 3.217*** 2.136*** 1.575*** 
 (0.789) (0.798) (0.629) (0.561) 
Ln(Affiliation capital) 0.440** 0.326** 0.240*** 0.185* 
 (0.183) (0.165) (0.088) (0.104) 
Cum. college 0.293** 0.032 0.360*** 0.278*** 
 (0.136) (0.137) (0.078) (0.085) 
Cum. work experience 0.097** 0.103** 0.030 0.043 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.050) (0.047) 
Constant (1.878) -0.945 -2.618*** -2.149** 
 (1.246) (1.260) (0.915) (0.888) 
Observations 537 537 537 537 
Coarsen Exact Match Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LogL -1797.448 -1774.286 -1655.754 -1588.947 
R-squared 0.142 0.081 0.110 0.090 
AIC 3604.897 3558.572 3321.508 3187.893 
BIC 3626.327 3580.002 3342.938 3209.323 
Note: Model 8 is the original from Table 5, Model 2 copied for comparison. Table presents 
marginal effects. CEM variables: establishment date, technology sector, number of founders, 
patents within three years of founding. LogL: log of likelihood function. AIC & BIC: Akaike & 
Bayesian information criteria. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 We might expect ESOs help start-ups acquire funding by funneling them to specific 
sources which or most familiar to support organization managers and mentors. To investigate 
this potential, Table 4.7 presents results dividing the funding variable into amounts provided by 
private, federal, and state sources. Results do not support the conjecture that ESOs funnel start-
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ups to specific types of funding. Rather, ESO use is associated with a larger amount of funding 
received across all models. The strongest relationship is between private funding and ESO use, 
where participation is associated with a 23.95 percent increase the amount of funding (Model 9). 
Results also highlight that different finance providers place different value on social and human 
capital. Social capital has the strongest statistical significance for federal funding, followed by 
private and state. While private sources tend to be influenced by founders’ work experience, 
public sources are more influenced by their college experience. 
Table 4.8. Estimating discrete event history analysis: association with firm exits.  
 Firm Closure 
 Model 12 Model 13 
Use incubator -0.438 -0.829** 
 (0.344) (0.421) 
Ln(Total funding) -0.104*** -0.192*** 
 (0.019) (0.032) 
Ln(Affiliation capital) -0.023 0.085 
 (0.091) (0.089) 
Cum. college 0.072 -0.177*** 
 (0.050) (0.054) 
Cum. work experience 0.006 0.030* 
 (0.013) (0.016) 
Constant -7.897*** -7.800*** 
 (0.737) (0.893) 
Mass point 2 4.165*** 4.832*** 
 (0.347) (0.542) 
Logit(Prob. Type 2) -1.059*** -1.151*** 
 (0.166) (0.172) 
Observations 7,787 3,793 
Logarithmic Duration Dependence Yes Yes 
Coarsen Exact Match No Yes 
LogL -800.071 -385.293 
AIC 1618.143 788.586 
BIC 1680.784 844.754 
Note: Table presents coefficients. CEM variables: establishment date, technology sector, number 
of founders, patents within three years of founding. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at 
firm level. LogL is the log of the likelihood function. AIC is the Akaike Information criteria, 
while BIC is the Bayesian Information Criteria. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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ESO participation, start-up funding, and firm survival. Table 4.8 presents the discrete 
event hazard analysis modelling the influence of incubator participation on the probability of 
start-up failure. The analysis focuses on incubators because VM support is too hands off to 
impact survival. Incubators lower costs and provide resources and support that more directly 
influence survival.22  
 Participating in an incubator is associated with a 56.4% decrease in failure probability in 
the matched sample (Model 13). These organizations provide seed funding, mentoring, access to 
other entrepreneurs, and office and lab space at low costs. Incubators help start-ups overcome 
information barriers when searching for specific technical knowledge. They allow start-ups to 
keep costs low and focus their time more on building the company and acquiring finance. 
An alternative explanation for this finding could be that incubators help failing firms stay alive 
longer as they can subsist on minimal rent and overheads. While this could be true for some 
firms, this argument is not strong enough to explain the findings given that incubator use is also 
associated with receiving greater amounts of finance. Furthermore, the incubators investigated in 
this study are not real estate ploys like some of the newer incubator models that offer no services.  
Under which conditions do firms benefit most from ESO participation? Establishing 
a relationship between ESO participation and start-ups ability to acquire external finance and 
survive expands our understanding of these organizations and the context of entrepreneurship. It 
is important to consider conditions under which benefits from participation will be unequal. We 
know that certain groups are disadvantaged in trying to start a firm. We should similarly expect 
different groups to be less advantaged by ESO participation. Related, recent work found 
entrepreneurship training programs most benefit would-be entrepreneurs who are less 
 
22 The log total dollar amount of funding is added as a covariate in survival models. 
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predisposed to entrepreneurship (Lyons & Zhang, 2018). There are many open questions here 
and this paper attempts to only open a dialogue.  
This paper examines the possibility that three types of start-ups might benefit differently 
from ESO participation: start-ups whose founders have local, university-based human capital, 
start-ups who have a woman founder, and start-ups whose founders already occupy strong 
network bridging positions. The main regression of ESO participation on the log dollar amount 
of funding received is repeated with start-up samples split along these dimensions.23 Firms 
whose founders are already embedded in the local research universities may have access to 
resources that make participation in a local ESO less impactful for finance acquisition. Women’s 
networks differ from men’s and women face different constraints in trying to start a firm 
(Aldrich et al., 1989). The influence of ESOs might similarly differ for woman-founded firms. 
Finally, if founders are already strong brokers in their work history affiliation networks, we 
might expect them to not need as much support from ESOs and benefit less.  
 Results are presented in Table 4.9. Models 14 and 15 examine the differences across 
start-ups whose founders worked at one of the local research universities (UNC, Duke, and 
NCSU) around the time of founding (39% of firms).24 Firms with a university-employed founder 
do not benefit as much from ESO participation when considering the amount of funding raised 
(an increase of 48.8% as compared to 132.9% in the amount of funding received on average, 
respectively). ESO resources may be redundant with university services. The university is 
already helping entrepreneurs overcome information deficiencies and structural holes. While 
 
23 These regressions do not use matched samples as the CEM procedure would discard too many observations. 
Instead, matching variables enter the models as controls. Technology sector enters as a series of indicators. 
24 Using the same variable from the robustness checks for human capital.  
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there is a difference in coefficient magnitude, neither the full model nor the ESO use coefficient 
passes the Chow test. Still, this result provides important, suggestive evidence. 
Models 16 and 17 illustrate differences between firms with a woman founder or co-
founder and firms with no women founders (40.6% of firms have at least one woman founder).25 
Results indicate start-ups with a woman founder benefit more from ESO use. For woman 
founded firms, ESO use corresponds to an increase of 137.9% in the amount of funding received, 
compared to a 66.5% increase for non-woman founded firms controlling for the level of human 
and social capital. Institutional capital from ESO participation may help level the playing field 
for women founders. Chow tests indicate the variables are not statistically significantly different 
across models, so again this is suggestive evidence, yet it comports with recent findings (Lyons 
& Zhang, 2017).  
Finally, surprising results emerge when examining differences across start-ups with 
varying levels of network bridging (Models 18 and 19). This analysis splits the population of 
start-ups based on the 75th percentile of founders’ betweenness centrality.26 Twenty percent of 
firms have a founder at the 75th percentile or higher. Start-ups whose founders occupy positions 
of greater power in the network by bridging clusters benefit more from ESO participation. The 
model passes the Chow test at the p<0.10 level, but the ESO use coefficients do not pass. While 
we might expect, or hope, that ESOs provide greater benefit to less well-connected start-ups in 
the region, these results are opposite. The darlings of the ESOs are well-connected individuals 




25 There are too few solo, woman-founded firms to investigate these separately. 
26 Betweenness centrality is a common measure of the how much a node acts as a bridge between otherwise 
unconnected nodes or clusters. The maximum value of any cofounder is used for team-founded firms. 
    
 
  
Table 4.9 Regression results of ESO participation on firm funding: Local University Employment, Gender, & Network Brokerage 
 













 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Use ESO 4.897*** 3.908*** 4.212*** 4.934*** 4.309*** 5.590*** 
 (0.805) (0.924) (0.817) (0.893) (0.681) (1.235) 
Ln(Affiliation capital) 0.139 0.316 0.237 0.344 0.269** -2.269 
 (0.142) (0.655) (0.152) (0.239) (0.136) (3.635) 
Cum. college 0.154 0.202 0.159* 0.332** 0.202** 0.412* 
 (0.101) (0.143) (0.095) (0.152) (0.087) (0.237) 
Cum. work experience 0.063* 0.007 0.021 0.063 0.037 0.071 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.033) (0.042) (0.029) (0.059) 
Total founders 0.878** 1.138*** 1.498*** 0.736** 1.062*** 0.857* 
 (0.389) (0.320) (0.356) (0.361) (0.295) (0.440) 
Establishment date -0.062 -0.284*** -0.123** -0.144** -0.128*** -0.065 
 (0.048) (0.067) (0.049) (0.063) (0.042) (0.148) 
Human therapeutics -0.071 1.520 1.109 -1.171 0.262 -0.836 
 (0.871) (1.269) (0.796) (1.418) (0.759) (2.025) 
Health IT/informatics -0.466 -0.849 0.356 -2.312 0.018 5.934*** 
 (1.179) (1.594) (1.255) (1.584) (1.039) (2.017) 
Tools/diagnostics 0.777 1.449 1.773* -0.419 0.994 -0.626 
 (1.137) (1.371) (1.070) (1.486) (0.917) (2.256) 
Medical devices 0.565 1.761 1.616 0.004 1.163 -0.730 
 (1.032) (1.427) (1.074) (1.477) (0.889) (2.443) 
Patents in 3 years of founding 4.043** -0.061 6.034*** -0.309 1.376 5.913*** 
 (1.726) (1.966) (1.618) (1.876) (1.631) (1.796) 
Constant 122.758 569.019*** 243.718** 287.620** 255.089*** 144.277 
 (97.105) (133.415) (97.865) (126.730) (83.773) (279.382) 
Observations 473 303 461 315 619 157 
LogL -1539.277 -992.838 -1500.849 -1035.070 -2027.680 -508.024 
R-squared 0.186 0.252 0.226 0.233 0.182 0.361 
Note: Table presents marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses; clustered at firm level. LogL: log of likelihood function. 
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These findings present a nuanced understanding of how ESOs benefit firms. In summary, 
findings indicate some types of firms benefit more than others and suggest future research be 
directed, and data collected, to investigate this question. Evaluating the relative influence on 
other short-term outcomes such as employment and products would also be useful to theory 
building around ESOs and institutional capital. 
Discussion 
Prior research has investigated the roles of entrepreneurs’ human capital, social capital, 
and support institutions in the entrepreneurial process, but generally considered them separately. 
The literature on ESOs has lagged that of human and social capital. While we know that 
founders’ human and social capital influence their decision making and access to knowledge, 
which in turn influences their firms’ outcomes, we know less about the influence of ESOs and 
institutional capital. This paper brings these streams of literature together and provides new 
knowledge about ESO participation outcomes. Results show that the institutional capital 
Research Triangle life science start-ups receive by participating in local ESOs increases their 
probability of receiving funding and the dollar amount received, controlling for human and social 
capital and matching on pre-entry characteristics. These relationships are nuanced as effect 
magnitudes differ depending on the type of ESO. This makes sense given that different ESOs 
focus on different services and resources. The relationship between ESO use and the amount of 
funding received is strong and statistically significant across state, federal, and private funding 
sources. The paper also finds that incubator use decreases the probability of firm failure, 
controlling for human, social, and financial capital. This is a satisfactory finding given the great 
expense in time and money devoted to developing ESOs.  
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Interviews with entrepreneurs and members of the Triangle’s entrepreneurial ecosystem 
indicate that local entrepreneurs navigate varying paths as they attempt to bring the firms to a 
point of viability. Though most founders interviewed believe ESOs provide valuable services, it 
is difficult to identify the direct consequences of services. The finding of positive association 
with greater amounts of funding received and a decreased probability of firm failure is positive 
news for start-ups and ESO managers. While overall the results provide a nurturing and 
supportive view of ESOs, the paper also demonstrates that ESOs differentially influence firm 
performance based on the type of firm. ESO services may be redundant with those offered by 
research universities. Importantly, ESOs may help level the playing field for women 
entrepreneurs. However, firms most advantaged by ESO participation may be those with already 
well-connected founders who can leverage their network position to best advantage. 
By helping bridge structural holes in founders’ networks and providing resources and 
information to overcome information barriers that entrepreneurs face, ESOs effectively cement 
their position in entrepreneurial ecosystems. Furthermore, their continued presence and influence 
contributes to the institutional logics of entrepreneurship in the ecosystem, setting the context for 
how entrepreneurship occurs and the culture of support. While human and social capital are 
important pre-entry resource endowments, resources, knowledge, and networks acquired from 
supporting institutions further help firms acquire finance and survive. This is a satisfactory 
answer for why these institutions are important to start-ups and entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Hearkening back to the paper’s title, start-ups are better off when not going it alone. 
These findings have implications for policy, as ESOs are often publicly funded or 
nonprofit. Their effectiveness is dependent on a contribution to the public good. Many regions 
are currently trying to develop high-tech industries and there is a question of whether ESOs are 
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worthwhile. This paper demonstrates that ESOs are important institutions of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems and that public funds devoted to such organizations are well spent. ESOs help firms 
navigate the early stages of growth as they seek to acquire funding and survive. However, greater 
consideration should be given to tailoring ESO services to support less well-connected 
entrepreneurs and to ensure against redundancies with other ecosystem members.   
Managerial implications. Entrepreneurs face considerable barriers when starting their 
firms. Though prior affiliations and experiences are useful resources, they are usually not enough 
to help firms access finance and survive. ESO participation, specifically in incubators and VM 
programs, helps start-ups gain necessary resources, knowledge, and networks. If raising funding 
is a goal, incubators and support programs can help firms develop to a point of being attractive to 
external finance and help broker connections. Incubated firms have a lower risk of failure than 
non-incubated firms. Firms with female founders should especially consider joining ESOs. 
Not all ESOs are created equally. Findings hold for this specific industry and regional context. 
Program operators of Research Triangle ESOs are experienced. Entrepreneurs should carefully 
consider the ESO before joining. A new program run by well-intentioned individuals who 
nevertheless lack the networks, tacit knowledge, and resources to effectively support start-ups 
may not be a worth the time required to join. Founders should examine the ESO’s track record, 
asking pointed questions of ESO managers about the types of resources they will receive and 
connections they can make. By joining a particular ESO, start-ups may be forgoing other 
external support opportunities.  
Limitations. Though this paper is careful to consider the potential liabilities of studying 
ESOs in its research design, several limitations remain. One is generalizability given the focus on 
a set of organizations in one industry and region. While this approach has many benefits, it also 
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means caution should be used when generalizing results. The Research Triangle region is a top-
ranked life sciences region and has a dense knowledge stock upon which ESOs can draw. Not all 
regions are as strategically positioned, and their ESOs may therefore also not be as effective. 
As mentioned, the matching procedure discards some firms from estimation and this loss 
must be justified. Because the paper looks at only one region, it holds constant the set of firms 
and ESOs at the region level. Start-ups self-select into ESOs believing (or perhaps hoping) these 
organizations will substantively help them start their firms, but their use of incubators and VM 
program ultimately depends on available space. While we do not know which firms that were not 
ESO users might have tried to join and been denied access, we do know the universe of firms 
that would be interested in joining. Knowledge about the universe of firms combined with the 
CEM procedure provides confidence in results.  
 Another limitation is we cannot observe the exact dates the firm used each ESO, as this 
data is not available for all four supports. We can assume firms used ESOs before receiving 
finance based on what we know about entrepreneurial firms. Once firms have accessed finance, 
they may continue to use their mentors but are often able to “graduate” into larger office spaces, 
not needing the full set of ESO resources and services. Future research should avoid this 
dilemma as data is now being gathered more systematically by institutions and researchers. This 
paper benefits from a longitudinal view, which is sometimes at the expense of higher-level detail. 
Finally, social capital is elusive to measure, and we cannot fully study founders’ informal 
networks. This paper studies networks over a long period of time making use of a unique 
longitudinal dataset rather than deploying a survey of current entrepreneurs to identify advice 
and business networks. Such an endeavor would be fruitful for future research. 
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Conclusion 
This study examined why ESO presence is considered important to robust entrepreneurial 
ecosystems, why firms participate in these organizations, and whether firms benefit more under 
certain conditions. ESOs help firms acquire external finance by acting as network brokers and 
helping both start-ups and finance providers overcome information barriers regarding the 
availability of finance and firms to fund. ESOs help firms survive by providing them with 
resources that are necessary for building firms and for which their internal human and social 
capital from their founders cannot fully substitute. Furthermore, these organizations imbue 
participants with institutional capital and orient firms to the institutional logics of their 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. ESOs do, however, benefit certain types of firms over others. 
Interestingly, while ESOs appear to help certain types of disadvantaged start-ups, they 
simultaneously benefited other start-ups already advantaged in different ways. Future research is 
necessary to fully explicate the conditions under which ESOs most benefit entrepreneurs. 
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CHAPTER 5 – KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS AND THE INFLUENCE OF 




This paper examines the differing diffusion patterns of two foundational technologies 
which were sufficiently novel to introduce new patent classes, recombinant DNA (rDNA) and 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), focusing on the role of local social networks and knowledge 
relatedness. The paper adds to the literature on knowledge spillovers by explicitly considering 
the role of organizational form and technology commercialization strategy in technological 
diffusion. I exploit a unique setting where two similar technologies were patented around the 
same time but one, rDNA, was patented by a university, while the other, PCR, was patented by a 
start-up firm and then sold to a larger private incumbent. Furthermore, all three organizations 
employed different licensing strategies. This setting allows the paper to ask whether geographic 
diffusion patterns differ more depending on organization form (private versus public channels) or 
depending on the licensing strategy employed. This question is important as distinctions between 
public and private patent regimes have been made in the literature for many years, without much 
empirical evidence, and the literature on diffusion largely ignores the licensing strategy. The 
paper finds that while diffusion patterns across US metropolitan statistical areas did not differ 
when comparing organizational form, important differences arise when considering the licensing 
regime.   
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Introduction 
The search for new knowledge and invention is motivated by many aims, likely as 
numerous as the individuals engaged in its pursuit. At the macro level, a defining motivation for 
this search is that economic growth has been a proven outcome of innovation. Recognizing this 
potential, the federal government has spent around two percent of GDP annually on research and 
development (R&D) since Vannevar Bush’s famous report, “Science, the Endless Frontier” 
(1945). Cumulative scholarship no longer proffers a linear model of innovation, though, which 
outlines a simplistic series of transactions where public investment leads to private investment, 
which leads economic improvement. Instead, we increasingly recognize the nuance in this 
process and the potential for many outcomes. One aspect of this nuance is the focus of the 
present paper: how organizational ownership and strategy influences knowledge spillovers and 
the diffusion of new technologies. 
Knowledge spillovers across organizational boundaries and industry-science links are 
central to the idea of regional and technological development, as the mechanisms behind 
technological change and ultimately economic growth. The importance of local knowledge 
spillovers is well documented (see Qian et al., 2013). According to theories of economic 
geography, regions experience externalities driven by knowledge spillovers and organizational 
linkages that lead to economic growth when ideas are readily appreciated and able to be applied. 
Recent work has tried to contextualize this understanding and establish a causal chain (Lehmann 
& Menter, 2016). Yet evidence about the precise mechanisms of knowledge spillovers remains 
elusive.  
This lack of understanding is compounded by the fact that the influences of 
organizational structure or ownership and of commercialization strategy have been largely 
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ignored in studies of diffusion. Though common discourse pits the private search for knowledge 
against the public search, a review of the literature presents surprisingly little evidence about 
how the organizational source of a new technology impacts on its diffusion and how diffusion 
occurs between different types of institutions and across geographic space and time. One 
definition of an organization is that it is a goal-directed and boundary-maintaining system 
constructed by humans to direct activity (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). While public 
and private organizations both maintain some sort of boundary, their goals and methods of 
directing activities are often widely different. These differences surely manifest in ways that 
impact on knowledge spillovers and technology diffusion among organizations engaged in 
technological innovation. Furthermore, in addition to the lack of attention to organizational form, 
the literature has also not sufficiently investigated how an organization’s technology 
commercialization strategy (TCS) influences its subsequent diffusion and how the impact of TCS 
compares to that of organization form.  
This paper adds to the dialogue on the differences between public and privately 
performed R&D by adding empirical evidence of how the organizational source and strategy 
influences technological diffusion. The paper provides evidence of knowledge spillover, its 
timing, and mechanisms. Specifically, I ask whether technology diffusion occurs differently 
depending on whether the technology originated from a public (university) or private (for profit 
firm) source or depending on the commercialization and licensing strategy. The paper answers 
this question by comparing two similar, foundational biotechnologies, recombinant DNA 
(rDNA) and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and following the diffusion of the patents taken 
out to protect the intellectual property. While rDNA was patented by a university, PCR was 
patented by a for-profit firm. After identifying the appropriate patent samples to follow using 
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USPC patent classes that were created after each technology was introduced, the paper uses 
event history analysis to track diffusion, where the event is a United States metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) applying for its first patent in either of the two patent classes.  
The paper finds that a simple public versus private dichotomy is ineffective for 
understanding the differences between technology diffusion out of public versus private 
organizations. Rather than the organizational form itself affecting technology diffusion, it is the 
structure of the commercialization and licensing approach which more directly coincides with 
diffusion patterns. This finding offers several contributions to literature and insights for policy 
and practice. First, it provides evidence for Teece’s (1986) proposition that the need for 
complementary assets to commercialize a technology will influence firm TCS and adds the 
finding that such choices ultimately impact on knowledge diffusion. Second, while the 
qualitative evidence and theory supports the idea that organizational ownership should impact 
knowledge spillovers from innovations, this paper finds such a theory does not hold. Third, the 
paper extends the literature on knowledge spillovers by adding consideration of organizational 
form and timing. Finally, the findings suggest that IP policies strongly guide TCS decisions at 
public and private organizations and through these decisions influence how innovations allow 
opportunity for knowledge spillover.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The paper begins with a theoretical 
overview, focused on knowledge spillovers, the academic versus private research regimes, 
technology commercialization strategy, and the identification of emergent technologies. Next, 
the paper provides empirical context by comparing and contrasting the PCR and rDNA 
technologies. After this the paper provides information on the data and methodology, followed 
by the results. The paper concludes with a detailed discussion and implications. 
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Theoretical Foundation 
Industry-academic science links reference a variety of formal and informal relationships 
that foster knowledge exchange (Debackere & Veugelers, 2005). Knowledge spillovers have 
been used to try to explain how knowledge formed in the academic context spills over to industry 
through less formal means. University research is early stage and creates fundamental 
knowledge. This knowledge is freely available in publications and promoted through the use of 
university patents. The idea that university research has local benefit makes intuitive sense. 
There are multiple attempts to verify the existence of university spillovers (Jaffe et al., 1993) yet 
there is also skepticism about methods when using patent citations alone (Thompson & Fox-
Kean, 2005). Interestingly, Lehmann and Menter (2016) find that rather than university 
spillovers causing regional economic growth, spillovers and regional wealth co-evolve. This 
points to the importance of examining temporal development and the influence of other 
organization types. Moreover, the idea that universities are necessary but not sufficient to benefit 
the local economy, even in the case of well-regarded institutions such as Johns Hopkins 
(Feldman, 1994) or the University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, suggests that there should be 
coherence between academic knowledge and the expertise of local firms, government labs, and 
other research institutes.  
Public versus private science and innovation. Theory of the economics of science and 
innovation has long moved from a linear model of innovation where public money funds basic 
research at universities, new science emerges, and industry capitalizes on these advances. Today 
we have a more nuanced understanding. Public institutions’ roles in science is more than fixing 
market failures and “crowding-in” private investment (Mazzucato, 2015). Lines are often in 
reality blurred between the types of research that is undertaken at public versus private 
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organizations and with public versus private funding. Again following Aldrich’s (1979) 
definition of an organization, this blurring would make sense when public and private 
organizations have similar goals (e.g. the creation of new knowledge) and use similar activities 
to pursue them (e.g. acquire federal grants), even if the ultimate end goals are different (e.g. 
profit versus efficiently and equitably providing a public good). Archibugi and Filippetti (2018) 
describe how public and private sector organizations each provide R&D funding in different 
capacities to both public and private sector organizations, arguing there are no purely public or 
purely private goods. Still, public and private funded knowledge production processes exhibit 
key differences in how resources are allocated and in the excludability of consumption and 
production processes. Under certain circumstances private firms can achieve a higher rate of 
basic science than private organizations (Barirani et al., 2015). “Pasteur’s Quadrant”, the use-
inspired basic research that sits in the middle of the applied to basic research spectrum, is a prime 
example of how rigid dichotomies between basic and applied research can be misleading 
(Stokes, 1997). And so greater consideration is required to understand how public versus 
privately produced science may diffuse different across geography. 
We also now recognize the importance of relationships between the public and private 
spheres of innovation and of university-industry partnerships, especially in the case of 
biomedical research (Cockburn & Henderson, 1998). Government actors often encourage such 
collaborations (Rhoten & Powell, 2007). This encouragement is important because knowledge 
spillovers can be difficult to bring about and time-consuming to foster and capitalize upon 
(Cockburn & Henderson, 1998). Recent work by Bikard and Marx (2019) finds that industrial 
R&D patenting hubs help facilitate knowledge transfer and spillover from academia into 
industry, especially into young, innovative firms. Though this work does not focus explicitly on 
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the role of geography, it has implications for the spatial unevenness of innovation and begs the 
question of why hubs, which exist in a certain geography, originate in the first place.  
This paper is focused on the geographic diffusion of new knowledge. Given the prior 
discussion on the blurred public and private realms of science, we may wonder why technologies 
originating from public and private entities should be expected to behave differently in their 
diffusion. There are good reasons. First, public and private actors commercialize their inventions 
with different motivations. These motivations are aligned to their missions. Private organizations 
generally seek to maximize profit, while public organizations generally seek to maximize 
provision of some service or public good. This distinction means that private organizations will 
have a larger incentive to treat their intellectual property with greater secrecy so that competitors 
are not able to copy their innovation and commercialize first. We would expect public 
organizations instead to protect their IP but be more willing to share knowledge and engage their 
social networks in the dissemination of the knowledge. Second, public and private researchers 
are often drawing from different resources under different constraints, which certainly impacts 
their methods of collaboration and their networks, leading to different collaboration partners and 
spillover channels. Finally, researchers in public organizations such as universities are driven 
more by the desire for prestige as this confers greater meaning of success than monetary gains 
which an individual at a private organization may be more driven by. If prestige comes from 
successful innovation, then public organization researchers may desire their innovation receive 
more public attention, which would also influence the timing and process of technological 
diffusion.  
Technology Commercialization Strategy. There is also a possibility that TCS 
influences on geographic diffusion and knowledge spillovers. Teece’s (1986) seminal work on 
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TCS outlined how innovator firms may lose the economic returns to innovation if they do not 
have the complementary assets such as manufacturing capabilities required to bring the 
innovation to market. This theory explains why some innovator firms would therefore license 
their technologies and ally themselves with firms that do have the necessary complementary 
assets. Exclusive licensing agreements, in particular, which may include geographic and other 
scope stipulations, are used by innovator firms to access complementary assets required for 
commercialization (Somaya et al, 2011). Later streams in this literature added that TCS is a 
dynamic process (Marx & Hsu, 2015) which may differ in important ways across technologies 
(Marx et al., 2014). As universities became more prolific agents of technology transfer after the 
passage of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act (Breznitz & Feldman, 2012), scholars have also begun to 
examine TCS in public and nonprofit settings (Pries & Guild, 2011). 
 Commercialization strategy can have far reaching consequences for firms including 
impacting on the propensity to move into international markets (Symeonidou et al., 2017) and 
the likelihood of drug approval (Hsu & Wakeman, 2013). TCS by firms can be influenced by 
external factors such as the broader institutional setting, such as whether markets in a country are 
more liberal or coordinated (Hauessler, 2010), and by whether firms have venture capital 
investment (Hsu, 2006). TCS is also influenced by more internal factors such as the firm’s 
decision to adopt a cooperative strategy through licensing or competitive strategy through 
entering the product market based on the firm’s internal dynamics and the nature of the 
technology (Marx et al., 2014). It is important to recognize that TCS can change over time. 
Using the case of the automatic speech recognition industry, Marx et al. (2014) find that firms 
who introduce a disruptive technology may initially pursue a competitive strategy, and then 
cooperative strategy. Strategies may also differ depending on whether the firm is a start-up or 
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incumbent. Start-ups, with their limited resources, may especially adopt changing TCS as they 
are able to move from non-ideal to more ideal strategies (Marx & Hsu, 2015). Start-ups may also 
begin with no complementary assets but decide to develop them in-house rather than seeking an 
alliance with a larger firm which would cause them to lose control and share of profits (Hsu & 
Wakeman, 2013). This burgeoning literature suggests myriad approaches to TCS and that TCS 
choice and its outcomes are impacted on by a number of internal and external factors. 
When considering the university setting, it is important to recognize that a key difference 
between universities and firms is that universities will not manufacture and therefore the 
question of whether to license and partner in commercialization using a partner’s complementary 
assets is not a salient question for these organizations. Instead, universities choose whether to 
spin-out a firm or license the IP. Pries and Guild (2011) found the type of patent or legal 
protection used and level of commercial uncertainty will influence whether university 
innovations result in a license or a spin-out firm. Specifically, they find innovations with greater 
uncertainty surrounding their potential success are more likely to be spun into a start-up firm, 
while obtaining legal protection is more associated with an eventual licensing approach. These 
are correlative results, and should be interpreted cautiously, but the fact that the authors found no 
relationship of specialized complementary assets to TCS for universities comports with theory. 
Of course, once a spin-out is created and management team assembled, it will then be incumbent 
upon the team to decide these questions about adopting a cooperative or competing strategy. 
 This review of the literatures suggests there are distinct differences in how public and 
private organizations, specifically universities, start-up firms, and incumbents, devise and 
implement their commercialization strategy. The firm’s decision to compete or cooperate 
certainly influences the degree to which new knowledge on the innovation is shared and the 
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likelihood of spillovers. The university’s decision to spin-out a firm, patent, and/or license also 
should influence spillovers in different ways. If a university patents the innovation, which is a 
largely ubiquitous decision across universities currently, they have the option to license and try 
to move the technology out of the university in order to have a public good impact. This 
approach has the potential to generate greater spillovers than if the technology is spun-out into a 
firm, who then could choose a more competitive strategy and limit knowledge spillovers. Still, 
these mechanisms are untested, and it is possible other relationships could emerge from 
empirical investigation. Combined, the literatures on organizational source and TCS suggest 
these factors may influence knowledge spillovers. This paper’s objective is to address this 
question and discern if one factor is more important than the other.  
Tracking emergence and measuring spillovers. Even difficult, though, is discerning 
which are the new technologies for which knowledge spillovers may be identified and traced 
(Feldman & Tavassoli, 2015). This identification is often accomplished by examining historical 
examples. Rosenberg and Trajtenberg’s (2004) historical study of the emergence of the Corliss 
steam engine demonstrated the technology’s role in economic growth. This exercise becomes 
especially difficult when attempting to identify these technologies in real time (Breitzman & 
Thomas, 2015). Rotolo et al. (2015) argue co-word analysis (using keywords) and citation 
analysis are useful when trying to identify new technologies retrospectively. Tracing patent 
technology codes and combinations of technology codes can be useful in this regard as well 
(Strumsky et al., 2012; Strumsky & Lobo, 2015). Co-word analysis has been used to investigate 
the case of dye-sensitized solar cells (Carley et al., 2018) and wind energy (Boelman et al., 
2017). Other approaches include using indicators and trends, overlay mapping, or hybrid 
approaches (described in Rotolo et al., 2015). Ávila-Robinson and Senguko (2017) implement a 
    
 157 
hybrid approach of co-citation, direct citation, and bibliographic network analysis to trace the 
development of pluripotent stem cell technologies. Recent advances in machine learning have 
made possible new methods of identifying new technologies as well (see Lee et al., 2018, for an 
example). These advances demonstrate a multitude of ways it is possible to identify and trace 
knowledge spillovers, with the appropriate data and tools of analysis.  
Measurement of spillover and technological development processes are notoriously 
difficult. Recently, scholars have been working to expand the available set of measures to study 
regional technological systems, capacity, and evolution. A common approach is to look at patent 
citations to show overlapping knowledge following Jaffe et al. (1993), but this approach is 
generally found to be a rough approximation for knowledge sharing and highly dependent on the 
construction of the control group (Thompson & Fox-Kean, 2005; Thompson, 2006). 
Furthermore, many patent citations are added by examiners rather than the inventors themselves 
(Alcacer & Gittelman, 2006). Rigby (2015) builds on this method by looking at the relatedness 
of technologies using patent citations across patent classes, to trace the knowledge spaces of US 
cities over time. Location quotients provide the relative technological specialization of cities. 
Similarly, Feldman et al. (2015) analyze the “uneven geography” of basic innovation by tracking 
the spatial diffusion of rDNA as codified in the Cohen-Boyer patent, for which a new patent 
class was created and to which the development of the biotechnology industry is attributed 
(Feldman & Yoon, 2012). This paper takes up and replicates the rDNA examination, while also 
adding a similar foundational technology (PCR) for comparison. 
Scholars also look to other fields and adapt measures to understand technological 
relatedness and synergy in regions. Boschma et al. (2014), Balland et al. (2015), and Balland and 
Rigby (2017) use Hidalgo et al.’s (2007) product space measure, which defines the relatedness 
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between exported products using a two-dimensional network, to similarly construct technology 
spaces. Here, ties between technology categories (main patent classes) represent relatedness. 
Boschma et al. (2014) use this relatedness measure to study the evolution of technology spaces in 
US cities. Balland et al. (2015) use it to understand how the varying knowledge bases of cities 
might make them more or less resilient to technological crises. Balland and Rigby (2017) further 
refine the technological space measure by calculating a knowledge complexity index, building 
on Hidalgo and Hausmann’s (2009) work on the product composition of countries’ exports. This 
index allows the authors to distinguish between MSAs with more or less complex knowledge, 
and to show that more complex knowledge is less easily transferable to other regions. Aharonson 
and Schilling (2016) provide a further refinement in the measurement of technology alignment 
by developing a method for measuring the technological distance between patents and the overall 
technological footprints of organizations and groups of organizations. Together these works 
suggest several paths that may be followed in identifying and following technology emergence. 
This paper builds on the work of Feldman et al. (2015) and Balland and Rigby (2017) to 
further develop and test knowledge spillover theory. It goes a step further to investigate the 
spillover of the patents across geographic space by type of organization in which the technology 
originated. This in turn allows analysis of how different types of organizations in the same region 
development new knowledge in context. Few studies have looked at the interrelationships among 
the organizations across which spillovers occur at a granular level.27 This paper focuses on the 
organizational form of the originating organization, though available data will allow further 
exploration of organizational form across organizations in the spillover chain in future research.  
 
27 Popp (2017) is an example of a recent study that has begun to look at this. Popp provides extensive detail of the 
process of categorizing patent assignees and scientific article affiliations into five categories: companies, 
universities, government, research institutions, and other. Examining wind, solar, and biofuels research, Popp was 
able to identify important patenting and publishing trends across these organizations. 
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Table 5.1. Comparing PCR and rDNA Technologies and Patenting 
Category PCR rDNA 
Technology Process of multiplying gene 
sequences 
Process of combining genetic 




Kary Mullis (Cetus) Stanley Cohen (Stanford) and 
Herbert Boyer (UCSF) 
Assignee(s) Cetus Corporation  Stanford University 
Year of first patent 
application  
1985 1974 
Year of main 
patent grant 
1987 1980 







Publish, patent, exclusive licensing 
with up-front payment and royalties 
for private and academic license.  
 
Cetus sold all rights to Hoffman-La 
Roche around 1991, who adopted a 
different approach using non-
exclusive licenses and no up-front 
fees. Instead the firm earned royalties 
and sold complementary equipment 
& reagents and profited from 
increased PCR adoption and use. 
Publish, patent, non-exclusive 
licensing. Small fee up-front 
to for-profits with graduated 
royalty schedule. Royalty-free 
for non-profits.  
 
  
 Patent number  4,683,202 4,237,224 
*There is speculation that both technologies had roots in other research groups, but these are the 
commonly accepted inventors.  
Sources: Cook-Deagan & Heaney (2010); Feeney et al. (2018); Feldman & Yoon (2012); 
Feldman et al. (2015); Fore et al. (2006); Nelson (2016). 
 
Tales of Two Technologies: PCR and rDNA 
 PCR and rDNA are interesting to investigate because they are similar technologies that 
were patented around the same time but by two very different organizational forms. Table 5.1 
outlines the similarities and differences between the two technologies. While Nelson (2016) 
examined collaboration patterns in the diffusion of PCR versus rDNA technologies using patent 
citations, this paper instead focuses on geography and considers diffusion through specific patent 
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classes rather than citations. PCR and rDNA are both general-purpose, process technologies. 
Both technologies resulted in Nobel prizes for their respective inventors. PCR is a technique for 
multiplying gene sequences at an exponential magnitude. It has applications across a wide 
spectrum of technologies and industries, including medical diagnostics and criminal forensics. 
rDNA, in contrast, describes a process of combining genetic material from different sources. 
This technology essentially created the field of biotechnology and is now ubiquitous in 
biotechnology research laboratories. 
PCR’s invention is commonly attributed to Kary Mullis, an employee at Cetus 
Corporation (herein, “Cetus”) in California at the time, who claims to have come up with the 
idea for PCR in 1983 while on long drive north on the Pacific Coast Highway. While Mullis is 
listed as inventor on the main PCR patents, Cetus was the original assignee. The first major 
patent was applied for in 1985, granted in 1987, and expired in 2005 (patent #4,683,202). The 
delay in patenting was due to internal struggles at Cetus about whether and how to move the 
innovation forward. Cetus was a start-up biotechnology company with limited resources and 
some individuals in the company thought PCR too experimental and wanted to focus efforts on 
less risky diagnostics and therapeutics (Fore et al., 2006; Rabinow, 1996). Cetus eventually 
patented then technology and then published the science in two articles. The patent application 
was ultimately granted as two separate patents. The start-up chose a TCS strategy that required 
exclusive licensing agreements with an up-front payment as well as royalties. The same schema 
was applied to licenses with private and public or nonprofit organizations (Feeney et al., 2018). 
Ultimately, this approach was not successful. Cetus did not have the complementary assets 
required to commercialize the technology as the PCR method required specific equipment and 
reagents. PCR grew too popular and Cetus could not keep up. The company eventually sold the 
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rights to PCR to Hoffman-La Roche in December 1991 for $300 million. Cetus merged with 
Chiron Corporation also in 1991 (Fore et al., 2006).  
Hoffman-La Roche was a much larger incumbent who had the capacity to manufacture 
and sell the complementary equipment and technologies required for PCR. Furthermore, while 
Cetus had only focused on diagnostic applications of PCR, Roche expanded into many other 
applications. It even formed a subsidiary, Roche Molecular Systems to handle PCR efforts. 
Roche also chose a different TCS, implemented in 1992, where the company would use non-
exclusive licenses, eliminate up-front fees for academics and nonprofits, and reduce PCR based 
sales-royalties in order to encourage greater use of the technology (Fore et al., 2006; Cook-
Deegan & Heaney, 2010). Importantly, for an organization to use PCR, they would need to 
purchase Hoffman’s equipment and reagents. This allowed Roche to reap significant profits from 
the innovation that could not accrue to Cetus. Still, infringement was a common problem Roche 
dealt with. Roche was reluctant to sue individuals, especially those at universities, over 
infringement cases, which likely also enhanced the diffusion of PCR. In total, PCR led to around 
$2 billion in revenues for Cetus and Roche (Fore et al., 2006). 
The rDNA story stands in contrast to that of PCR. rDNA was invented by Stanley Cohen, 
Stanford University, and Herbert Boyer, University of California San Francisco. The first patent 
was applied for in 1974 and granted in 1980 (patent #4,237,224), with Stanford University as 
assignee. The inventors first published their work in scientific journals and then the university 
patented the technology, in contrast to PCR, which was first patented and then published. rDNAs 
invention coincided with a time at Stanford when university leaders became interested in using 
commercialization to bring in revenue for the university. The rDNA story set the ground for the 
Bayh-Dole Act, as before 1980 there were limited federal guidelines or norms for who would 
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control the IP rights to technologies funded by federal agencies with federal dollars (Cook-
Deagan & Heaney, 2010). Stanford’s TCS was to set up different licensing agreements 
depending on the organization type and worked to spur related innovation that would provide 
income for the university. For-profit licensees would pay a small up-front fee and then a 
graduated royalty schedule. Non-profit licensees paid no royalties (Feldman, Colaianni, & Liu, 
2007).28 This approach netted Stanford and the University of California $255 million in revenue 
from 468 licenses (Cook-Deagan & Heaney, 2010).   
Figure 5.1. PCR and rDNA patent applications and inventors by MSA, 1985-2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations with data from USPTO PatentsView, 2019. PCR and rDNA 
patents were included based on whether the patent was classified in either the PCR or rDNA 
attributed USPC code (435/91.2). Patents shown included patent applications of patents that were 
eventually granted by USPTO. 
 
28 Feeney et al. (2018, p. 21) suggest Hoffman and Stanford’s licensing strategies led to greater technology “uptake”, 
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A descriptive analysis of rDNA and PCR geographic diffusion (as provided in Figure 5.1 
and Tables 5.2 and 5.3) shows their patterns follow similar trends. Figure 5.1 considers the 
annual number of PCR and rDNA patent applications as well as the annual number of MSAs 
with PCR and rDNA inventors. There is a large spike in these numbers in 1995, with a slight dip 
following, and then another up-tick around 2001. The trend for rDNA then begins a continuous 
fall, though the drop around 2014 will be due to censoring since these are patent applications and 
it usually takes several years for a patent to be granted after application. The subsequent fall in 
rDNA patents and MSAs is not as linear, but still heavily influenced by censoring around 2014. 
 Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide the key places of PCR and rDNA invention, respectively. The 
tables also provide information on the number of granted patent applications in each MSA, the 
year of the first patent application, and the year the MSA reached ten patents. There is evident 
overlap in the dominant locations of these technologies, including the San Francisco Bay area, 
New York City/New Jersey, the Boston-Cambridge area, San Jose, and San Diego. These MSAs 
are also the regions that had the earliest success with the two technologies.  
Table 5.2. Key places (metropolitan statistical areas – MSAs) of PCR invention, 1985-2014 









1 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 1109 1985 1988 
2 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 664 1987 1991 
3 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 602 1988 1992 
4 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 521 1986 1992 
5 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 
NY-NJ-PA 432 1987 1993 
6 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-
MD-WV 354 1988 1992 
7 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 312 1986 1993 
8 Baltimore-Towson, MD 263 1988 1993 
9 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-
MD 243 1988 1992 
10 Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI 198 1991 1993 
    
 164 
11 Boulder, CO 163 1992 1994 
12 Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 139 1991 1993 
13 Madison, WI 136 1989 1995 
14 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 122 1992 1995 
15 New Haven-Milford, CT 119 1987 1995 
16 Salt Lake City, UT 102 1991 1995 
17 Raleigh-Cary, NC 78 1991 1994 
18 Worcester, MA 78 1991 1994 
19 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 75 1989 1994 
20 Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 72 1990 1995 
Source: Authors’ calculations with data from USPTO PatentsView, 2019. 
 












1 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 2311 1978 1981 
2 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 1896 1978 1983 
3 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-
MD 1217 1981 1988 
4 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 
NY-NJ-PA 1187 1980 1983 
5 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-
MD-WV 1038 1980 1984 
6 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 964 1981 1986 
7 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 962 1982 1985 
8 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 636 1981 1988 
9 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 488 1982 1988 
10 Baltimore-Towson, MD 269 1987 1991 
11 Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI 257 1980 1990 
12 Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 246 1987 1992 
13 Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 244 1984 1991 
14 Madison, WI 207 1982 1987 
15 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 185 1980 1991 
16 St. Louis, MO-IL 177 1976 1990 
17 Trenton-Ewing, NJ 173 1990 1992 
18 Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 161 1989 1995 
19 Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 155 1981 1984 
20 Raleigh-Cary, NC 154 1989 1994 
Source: Authors’ calculations with data from USPTO PatentsView, 2019.  
Note: Because when new USPC classes are created they are applied retroactively by patent 
examiners to previous patents, it is problematic to see a 1976 patent application in this class in 
St. Louis, MO-IL even though we know the innovative breakthrough did not occur there. 
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Data & Variables 
Identifying Emerging Technologies. The first task is to discern the set of patents in an 
emerging technology. This is another contribution of the paper, as it builds upon recent work in 
this field. Our approach is to identify when the emergence of new patent classes. This approach 
is not simplistic, as the patent office retrospectively applies new classes to older patents. For 
example, rDNA and the birth of the biotechnology industry is attributed to the Cohen-Boyer 
patent, for which United States Patent Classification (USPC) subclass 435/69.1 was created 
(Feldman & Yoon, 2012). This class was then attributed to earlier patents than Cohen-Boyer, 
though. Following Feldman et al. (2015), who used USPC class 435/69.1 to classify entry into 
the rDNA technology, this paper identifies the new class which was introduced after the PCR 
invention and later ascribed to it. This method begins by investigating the USPC class codes on 
the main PCR patent (patent #4,683,202). This led to the discovery that USPC class 435/91.2 
best reflects the PCR technology and has a sufficient number of patents through which to track 
diffusion. For the rDNA comparison I again include all patents with a 435/69.1 classification. 
Data. The primary data source for this paper is patent filings from the USPTO, gathered 
from PatentsView. Patents are used to track knowledge spillover and as control variables. This 
paper uses the universe of all granted patents with application dates through 2014 with the USPC 
classes 435/69.1 for rDNA (10,785 patents from 1976-2014) and 435/91.2 (5,013 patents from 
1976-2014) for PCR. The 2014 stop date was chosen to allow for right censoring as patent 
applications generally take several years to be granted.29 The paper also uses data on federal 
research grant recipients from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (retrieved from NIH 
 
29 Individual inventor patents were dropped since the focus is on diffusion across organizations. When examining 
patent assignee organization type, patents with multiple assignees were also dropped where the assignees were 
different categories of organizations. 
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ExPORTER and RePORTER) to control for the amount of research conducted in a city. 
Variables. Variable construction follows and builds upon Feldman et al. (2015). The 
dependent variables are indicators for whether an MSA patented a PCR or rDNA technology in 
each year. The paper uses the set of 384 MSAs in the contiguous US. The main explanatory 
variables are measures of social proximity and cognitive proximity constructed separately for 
rDNA and PCR. The social proximity variable is a social network variable which measures how 
central a city is in terms of the centrality of the inventors which reside in the city in a co-inventor 
network.30 Social networks should influence the spread of knowledge about new innovations and 
allow inventors the opportunity to build upon foundational technologies like rDNA and PCR. 
However, the literature shows that the structure of networks can impede their usefulness due to 
homophily, when social boundaries impede the development of new relationships, and when 
actors’ bounded rationality impedes optimal network formation (Kim & Aldrich, 2005). 
Therefore, the positive influence of networks on diffusion is not guaranteed.   
Table 5.4. Descriptive statistics for city social proximity to PCR, rDNA inventors 
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
PCR        
Mean 1.307 3.128 31.669 33.663 25.406 34.094 26.050 
SD 5.552 12.475 122.522 155.758 104.873 160.804 116.136 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 58.250 128.250 1212.500 1855.000 1097.000 2158.000 1357.750 
rDNA        
Mean 3.198 6.893 64.723 54.710 43.492 52.686 40.017 
SD 13.875 26.342 237.623 209.960 159.938 210.508 162.156 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 118.250 265.250 2150.250 2047.250 1571.000 2230.750 1516.500 
 
 
30 Social proximity is the word for this construct typically used in the economic geography literature. 
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To construct social proximity for PCR and rDNA, the first step is to map separate 
networks for each technology annually, where each annual matrix is dimension 384x384, with 
384 representing the number of cities in the network. Network links, or edges between cities 
represent ties between co-inventors that are located in different cities. Two sets of co-inventor 
linkages are combined in these measures. In the first, co-inventors that work directly on an 
rDNA or PCR patent are counted and for each pair of co-inventors a link is established between 
the cities in which they are located. The second kind of network link captures a co-inventor 
relation on a non-rDNA or non-PCR patent that involves one inventor who has previously 
patented in one of these two classes. In this second type of indirect link, it is supposed that some 
knowledge about rDNA or PCR information might flow between co-inventors even when 
working in different technology classes. The second, indirect link is weighted at 50% of the 
direct link in the construction of the social networks. The result of this counting is a set of city-
city connections that form the social proximity network. This network is evaluated using 
UCINET and the eigen-centrality measure is recovered as the index of the centrality, or 
importance, of each city in the co-inventor network.  
Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics for cognitive proximity of cities to PCR, rDNA technology 
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
PCR        
Mean 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.002 
SD 0.004 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.006 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.039 0.139 0.076 0.073 0.091 0.038 0.053 
rDNA        
Mean 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002 
SD 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.021 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.007 0.033 0.054 0.061 0.082 0.066 0.388 
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 Cognitive proximity is also a density measure that captures how close the patent 
knowledge stock of a city is to rDNA or PCR technology. This index of cognitive proximity is 
constructed from a technological relatedness matrix that captures the “distance” between all pairs 
of technology classes, and from a measure of whether the number of patents in each technology 
class in a particular city is greater than the number you would expect based on the nation’s share 
of patents in each class. The relatedness values between technology class pairs are constructed at 
the national level from counts of co-class pairings on individual patents standardized by the 
number of patents in each pair of technology classes (Van Eck & Waltman, 2009). The co-class 
pairing are among the 438 USPC main classes, plus the mainline subclass for PCR or rDNA 
technology (435/69.1 or 435/91.2, respectively). These measures of technological relatedness (𝜙) 
are then combined in the following relatedness density (cognitive proximity) index developed by 





       (5.1) 
where 𝜙𝑖𝑗 measures the relatedness between patent classes i and j (where j is the class 
representing rDNA or PCR), and where 𝑥𝑖 indicates whether city k has competitive advantage in  
technology i (a greater share of patents in class i than the national average). 
Essentially, cognitive proximity is a measure of how close a city’s knowledge portfolio is 
to a focal technology. The measure ranges from zero to one, where a number closer to one 
indicates that the city’s patents tend to be found in technology classes that are only a short 
distance away from the focal patent class. This measure is widely used in evolutionary economic 
geography (Boschma et al., 2014; Balland et al., 2015). Descriptive statistics for social and 
cognitive proximity are in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.  
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The models include several controls for a region’s general level of inventiveness. I use 
patent data to construct a control variable for each city’s level of inventiveness, using each city’s 
annual patent counts weighted by the location of all inventors on the patent if some inventors are 
in different cities following Feldman et al. (2015). I also include two variables for the logged 
nominal dollar amount of NIH grant funding received by all universities and all private 
organizations in each city and year. This variable is created by first categorizing all NIH grants 
by organization type and location, and then summing across all grants in each city in each year. 
Model & Results 
To investigate the different relationships between organizational form and diffusion the 
paper compares the diffusion of PCR related innovation to that of rDNA related innovation. To 
investigate the differences between TCS and diffusion patterns, the paper stratifies the PCR and 
rDNA samples into subsets based on early years of diffusion when the technology is patent 
protected, later years of diffusion while still under patent, and years after expiration. Specifically, 
regression and event history analysis provide an exploratory analysis of whether and how 
knowledge diffuses across organizations and cities. The dependent variable measures the time 
between the original instance of the new technology field emerging as codified by a patent (1980 
for rDNA31 and 1985 for PCR), and the time each region first applies for a patent in that field if 
ever.32 I use a Cox proportional hazards model (Blossfeld et al., 2019; Cox, 1972), which models 
the transition rate at time 𝑡 for which a city moved from its original state of no PCR or rDNA 
 
31 Note, data limitations of the current version of this paper necessitate that rDNA analysis begin in 1985 even 
though the patent was granted in 1980. I do not suspect any major differences in diffusion patterns in these first four 
years as compared to the next five years based on qualitative work performed on the diffusion of rDNA by earlier 
studies. 
 
32 The Breslow method is used for handling ties (multiple events occurring in the same year). Analysis is performed 
in StataSE 15.1. 
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technology to state 𝑘, when a PCR or rDNA technology was patented in the city. Each 
observation is at the city-year level. This transition rate, or hazard ratio, (𝑟𝑘(𝑡)) is a function of 
social and cognitive proximity and the covariates (represented by vector of independent variables 
𝐴(𝑘)(𝑡) with associated coefficients 𝛼(𝑘)),33,34  
𝑟𝑘(𝑡) = ℎ𝑘(𝑡)exp(𝐴
(𝑘)(𝑡)𝛼(𝑘))   (5.2). 
The coefficients are the associated hazard (or probability) of the event of a PCR or rDNA 
technology (movement to state 𝑘) being patented in a city for each covariate. The original Cox 
model assumes this probability is proportional to the baseline hazard (ℎ𝑘(𝑡)). This a strict 
assumption and therefore, following Feldman et al. (2015), I employ the extended Cox model 
which relaxes this assumption (Blossfeld et al., 2019). This extension requires multiplying all 
covariates by log(time), which leads to the final model, 
𝑟𝑘(𝑡) = ℎ𝑘(𝑡)exp(𝐴
(𝑘)𝛼 + 𝐴(𝑘)(log (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒))𝛼(𝑘))   (5.2) 
where all independent variables are lagged one year. 
 When comparing the diffusion of PCR and rDNA across cities, there are no major, 
apparent differences in the role of social and cognitive proximity (see Table 5.6). Both variables 
are strongly statistically significant predictors of diffusion, but their explanatory power is 
economically small.35 Still, after scaling, we can directly compare coefficient magnitudes across 
 
33 This paper uses a Cox proportional hazards model in contrast to the other two papers which use discrete event 
history analysis. This is to keep in line with the Feldman et al. (2015) paper’s method which the present paper both 
replicates and expands upon.  
 
34 While Feldman et al. (2015) include a measure of geographic proximity as well, this paper does not include 
geographic proximity as a variable in the present analysis, however, because geography is not itself a mechanism. 
Rather it is the networks and knowledge within a geographic area which are the mechanisms of spillover. Indeed, 
Feldman et al. (2015) did not find a significant effect of geographic proximity on diffusion. 
 
35 Each variable except cognitive proximity is scaled so that coefficients are comparable. Effect sizes are very small 
and so not very meaningful to interpret except in comparison to the effects of other variables. Federal funding 
covariates are scaled by a magnitude of 1/1,000,000,000. Weighted patent count and social proximity are scaled by a 
magnitude of 1/10,000. 
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variables which still provides important information. While cognitive proximity’s magnitude is 
similar across rDNA and PCR, rDNA social proximity is actually approximately three times as 
strong of a predictor for rDNA diffusion than PCR social proximity is a predictor for PCR 
diffusion. This suggests there may be some differences in terms of how rDNA and PCR 
knowledge spillovers occurred, yet the finding contrasts any supposition that technologies 
originating out of public versus private organizations will experience widely different diffusion 
patterns. Even the covariates of city patent counts and funding to private and public 
organizations behave quite similarly.  
Table 5.6. Estimating the influence of different forms of proximity on the likelihood of a city 
inventing a first patent in PCR or rDNA in relation to the baseline hazard 
  PCR Diffusion   rDNA Diffusion  
rDNA social proximity  0.314*** 
  (0.065) 
rDNA cognitive proximity  0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
PCR social proximity 0.100***  
 (0.036)  
PCR cognitive proximity 0.001***  
 (0.000)  
Patenting intensity 0.007*** 0.020*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
NIH funding (to private) 0.118*** 0.106** 
  (0.027) (0.045) 
NIH funding (to public) 0.006** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Observations 7978 6627 
LogLikelihood -950.818 -888.228 
Pseudo-R2 0.112 0.098 
Note: Single failure estimated with the extended Cox semi-parametric hazard model with time-
varying covariates. The Breslow method is used for event ties. All variables are lagged one year 
and interacted with log(time). Table presents coefficients. Federal funding coefficients scaled by 
a magnitude of 1/1,000,000,000. Weighted patent count and social proximity are scaled by a 
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Following these results and those of Feldman et al. (2015), we might suspect that 
diffusion differences between public and private organizations manifest in more nuanced ways, 
where perhaps the general inventiveness levels of cities matter for diffusion from public versus 
private organizations. To investigate this question we compare diffusion patterns for low versus 
high patenting cities. We define low patenting cities as cities with fewer than 20 patents (in any 
field) in the entire time period of investigation and high patenting cities as cities with 90 or more 
patents. When we compare low to high patenting cities (Table 7), again we do not see a great 
difference in the role of social and cognitive proximity for diffusion of either PCR or rDNA, 
however both cognitive and social proximity are better predictors of diffusion in high patenting 
cities than in low patenting cities. Still, as in Table 5.6 the relationship between diffusion and 
social proximity is about three times greater for rDNA than for PCR in the case of high patenting 
cities where the result is statistically significant. Based on the results in Table 5.7 the largest 
difference in the probability of a city patenting a PCR or rDNA-related technology is actually 
based on the level of funding for private R&D. While funding of public R&D predicts rDNA and 
PCR diffusion in low patenting cities, when a city’s organizations do not engage heavily in 
patenting, greater funding of private R&D is actually associated with a decreased probability of 
patenting a new PCR invention and has no influence for rDNA diffusion. The magnitude of this 
negative influence on the probability of patenting a PCR-related innovation is larger than the 
influence of all other variables, but still economically small. One explanation might be that those 
private firms which prioritize a competitive and secretive TCS prefer to locate away from dense 
patenting hubs and develop their technologies in more seclusion. Rather than patenting their 
innovations, which makes them public, such firms may make use of trade secrets and guard their 
intellectual property. 
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Table 5.7. Estimating the Cox extended hazard model for different cities with different patenting 
levels 




(< 20 patents) 
High 
Patenting 
( 90 patents) 
Low 
Patenting 
(< 20 patents) 
High 
Patenting 
( 90 patents) 
rDNA social proximity   1.436 0.295*** 
    (1.012) (0.070) 
rDNA cognitive proximity   0.001 0.001*** 
    (0.001) (0.000) 
PCR social proximity 1.040 0.099***    
  (0.710) (0.033)    
PCR cognitive proximity 0.000 0.000***    
 (0.001) (0.000)    
NIH funding (to private) -160.282*** 0.197*** 8.197 0.359*** 
  (4.653) (0.048) (5.290) (0.094) 
NIH funding (to public) 0.411*** 0.007*** 1.493*** 0.016*** 
  (0.150) (0.002) (0.251) (0.004) 
Observations 2053 2074 1992 1477 
LogLikelihood -39.627 -540.232 -32.965 -370.966 
Pseudo-R2 0.059 0.088 0.133 0.085 
Note: Single failure estimated with the extended Cox semi-parametric hazard model with time-
varying covariates. The Breslow method is used for event ties. All variables are lagged one year 
and interacted with log(time). Table presents coefficients. Federal funding coefficients scaled by 
a magnitude of 1/1,000,000,000. Weighted patent count and social proximity are scaled by a 
magnitude of 1/10,000. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p 
< 0.10. 
 
 These models suggest organizational origin may not have a significant influence on 
technology diffusion patterns as traditionally assumed. Still, historical knowledge and qualitative 
research on the diffusion of these technologies suggests diffusion patterns were not uniform 
(Nelson, 2016), and therefore a simple comparison of social and cognitive proximity measures’ 
importance to diffusion may not pick up on these differences. Specifically, the histories of these 
two technologies points to key differences in how they were licensed. Table 5.8 presents an 
exploratory investigation into whether licensing strategies are related to diffusion patterns by 
splitting the 1985 to 2015 time period into periods of different patent ownership and 
commercialization strategy. PCR was patented by Cetus, but Cetus sold the patent rights to 
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Hoffman-La Roche in 1991 (Roche, 2019). The main PCR patents begin expiring in 2004. 
Therefore, I split the PCR time period into three time periods: 1985-1993, the Cetus years; 1994-
2003, the Hoffman-La Roche years; and 2004-2015, the patent expiration years. While the 
Cohen-Boyer patent was never sold and ownership was maintained by Stanford University until 
expiration, I distinguish the early years of rDNA diffusion (1985-1989) from the later years 
when the patent was still protected but diffusion was more widespread (1990-1997) and from the 
years after patent expiration (1998-2015).   
 These results suggest that rather than social and cognitive proximity influencing diffusion 
differently depending on the origin organization’s type, social and cognitive proximity matter 
more for diffusion depending on the licensing strategy employed by the patent owner. The first 
three models in Table 5.8 provide results for PCR, while the second three models are the results 
for rDNA. Social proximity matters more for PCR diffusion during the early years when Cetus 
owned the patent than for the middle years when Roche owned the patent. Cetus employed a 
strict, exclusive licensing regime, so who you know would matter more in being able to access 
the technology and build new, related knowledge during this time. In contrast, Roche employed a 
less strict licensing regime because they were able to profit from selling complementary 
equipment and reagents that were necessary in order for a customer to apply the PCR technique. 
Roche did not need to profit from licensing fees and royalties as Cetus required. This makes the 
TCS of Hoffman-La Roche more similar to that of Stanford.  
 Both Roche and Stanford wanted their respective technologies to be used broadly, as this 
would guarantee income. As a public organization with a mission of public service, this broad 
use would also fulfill the broader university mission. Therefore, during the early years of rDNA, 
and in contrast to PCR, social networks were not statistically significant predictors of technology
    
 
  
Table 5.8. Estimating Cox extended hazard model for different time periods of technology development and/or ownership 
























rDNA social proximity    0.348 0.280*** 0.262** 
     (0.262) (0.081) (0.129) 
rDNA cognitive proximity    0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR social proximity 0.199*** 0.001 0.161***     
  (0.070) (0.046) (0.048)     
PCR cognitive proximity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Patenting intensity 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.006 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
NIH funding (to private) 0.006 0.141*** 0.282** 0.312** 0.091** 0.178 
  (0.064) (0.028) (0.123) (0.144) (0.036) (0.217) 
NIH funding (to public) 0.006** 0.012** 0.031*** 0.012*** 0.027*** 0.028** 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) 
Observations 2902 2834 2242 1312 2378 2937 
LogLikelihood -302.077 -505.994 -133.579 -104.649 -535.410 -244.846 
Pseudo-R2 0.184 0.090 0.074 0.179 0.095 0.080 
 
Note: Single failure estimated with the extended Cox semi-parametric hazard model with time-varying covariates. The Breslow 
method is used for event ties. All variables are lagged one year and interacted with log(time). Table presents coefficients. Federal 
funding coefficients scaled by a magnitude of 1/1,000,000,000. Weighted patent count and social proximity are scaled by a magnitude 
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diffusion. Stronger networks were not required for technological diffusion. As the technology 
matured though, and as the main rDNA patents expired, social networks were better predictors of 
diffusion. Still, we might wonder why we would see different patterns for the role of social 
proximity based on early versus later years of patent ownership under Stanford. This could be 
because as the co-inventor network becomes denser, it is that network itself which begins to 
predict future technology development. However, this mechanism may only work when a 
technology owner like Stanford is eager to share it early on, as compared to the early years of 
PCR when it was owned by Cetus. Looking at social proximity we see that it is a statistically 
significant predictor of PCR and rDNA diffusion post patent expiration. Again, while this 
finding has less to do with direct organizational TCS, it indicates that as a technology matures, 
inventor networks are important predictors of sustained work in the technological field, which 
we would expect.  
Cognitive proximity remains more similar between PCR and rDNA as a statistically 
significant predictor of PCR and rDNA patent diffusion in all models except after PCR’s 
expiration when the significance of the effect is lost. Once the PCR process was well known and 
widely available, the corpus of local related knowledge was not necessary for its diffusion. The 
effect sizes across models are again economically small, but similar in size when comparing the 
two technologies across time. Therefore, having a dense body of related knowledge in a city is a 
strong predictor of the event of technology diffusion and this mechanism is less influenced by 
the patent owners’ TCS than the social network. 
 The amount of R&D funding going into public and private organizations did not 
influence PCR diffusion during the Cetus years, but both are strong positive predictors for all 
future years. In contrast, both funding variables predict rDNA diffusion in all years under patent, 
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though private funding’s statistical significance is weaker and drops by the time the patents 
expire. This indicates that in general, and as we would expect, having research active public and 
private organizations is a significant predictor of technology diffusion. 
Table 5.9. Estimating Cox extended proportional hazard model for PCR diffusion with rDNA social 
and cognitive proximity predictors 















rDNA social proximity 0.025** 0.023 0.024 0.023 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) 
rDNA cognitive proximity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patenting intensity 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
NIH funding (to private) 0.115*** 0.036 0.142*** 0.333*** 
  (0.025) (0.059) (0.028) (0.081) 
NIH funding (to public) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.011** 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) 
Observations 7978 2902 2834 2242 
LogLikelihood -951.552 -303.787 -505.087 -135.119 
Pseudo-R2 0.111 0.179 0.092 0.064 
Note: Single failure estimated with extended Cox semi-parametric hazard model with time-
varying covariates. Breslow method used for event ties. All variables lagged one year and 
interacted with log(time). Table presents coefficients. Federal funding coefficients scaled by a 
magnitude of 1/1,000,000,000. Weighted patent count and social proximity are scaled by a 
magnitude of 1/10,000. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
 From these results a natural question would be which cities would be most at risk of 
patenting these technologies. Because rDNA predates PCR but is closely related, I test whether 
rDNA social and cognitive proximity predict PCR diffusion. These results are provided in Table 
5.9. The presence of a strong local related knowledge base of rDNA is a statistically significant 
predictor of whether a city will patent in the PCR class code while PCR is under patent. This 
related knowledge base does not have a different influence depending on the assignee’s TCS—it 
has the same magnitude during the Cetus and Roche years of ownership. The variable has no 
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statistically significant relation to diffusion after the patent expires, however. Interestingly and 
perhaps in contrast to expectations, rDNA social networks are not a predictor for the likelihood a 
city will patent in the PCR field. When examining these influences by epoch, however, we see 
that the influence of rDNA social proximity is most strong during the early years of the patent. 
These findings suggest the social networks of the focal invention’s inventors (PCR) matter much 
more for knowledge spillovers than the social networks of even closely related technologies 
(rDNA). 
Conclusion 
Overall these findings indicate that the comparison of PCR to rDNA is a useful exercise 
for attempting to better understand how organizations impact on the diffusion of the technologies 
they develop and suggest further research in this area would be useful. PCR’s original owner, 
Cetus, adopted a cooperative commercialization strategy by licensing to other firms for 
partnerships, but included strong exclusions which limited the ability of related knowledge to 
diffuse. This approach ultimately proved unsuccessful for the firm as it had to merge into Chiron 
in order to stay alive and sell PCR rights to a larger incumbent, Roche. Roche was able to profit 
from the sales of PCR’s important complementary asset—the machine equipment and reagents 
necessary to perform PCR. Roche adopted a commercialization strategy that allowed for greater 
spillover as its revenue model required broad licensing and the sale of equipment. The TCS 
adopted by Stanford for rDNA was to license rather than to spin-out a firm. This allowed the 
university to maintain control of licensing, but with its public mission the university licensed 
broadly so that the technology could be adopted and built upon, ultimately enhancing rDNA’s 
geographic diffusion. The question of complementary assets was not relevant to the university, 
    
 179 
who did not have the manufacturing and other capabilities that would be required to bring a 
product to market as these activities are outside the boundaries of a university.  
In summary, these results highlight an important conclusion: organizational form in and 
of itself is not a sufficient explanation of technological spillovers and diffusion. Social and 
cognitive proximity behave similarly as conduits for PCR and rDNA diffusion when considering 
only organizational form as a differentiating mechanism. Furthermore, social and cognitive 
proximity behave similarly for PCR and rDNA diffusion despite the patenting level of cities. 
Therefore, a simple public versus private dichotomy is ineffective for understanding how 
spillovers occur from public versus private organizations. The relationship between organization 
type and diffusion is more nuanced. 
 Another conclusion from these results is that the network and knowledge density 
mechanisms of diffusion actually appear to play different roles depending on the organization’s 
commercialization strategy. When the organization patents and then implements difficult, 
expensive, and exclusionary licensing terms, social networks matter more for the technology to 
be able to diffuse across cities (e.g. PCR’s Cetus years). When the organization patents but 
licenses broadly with more minimal requirements and easier access for public organizations, 
stronger social networks are not required for spillovers (e.g. rDNA’s early years). The density of 
related knowledge in a city will have more influence for diffusion in this case. This pattern of 
insignificant social proximity and significant cognitive proximity is again born out during the 
Roche years for PCR, when Roche attempted to make licensing easier and less expensive, while 
profiting from complementary assets sales. Interestingly, the results for the years after both PCR 
and rDNA patents expired show that social capital is still a strong predictor for a city innovating 
in the now mature technological fields. Cognitive proximity stays significant for rDNA diffusion 
    
 180 
but not for PCR diffusion, indicating that as the technology matured there was less need for 
related local knowledge for an inventor to make a start in the PCR field.    
These findings have implications for theory and practice. First, the results show that firm 
and university TCS can have consequences with both great breadth, in terms of how they are 
related to the innovation’s geographic diffusion, and depth, in terms of consequences for firms. 
The paper also provides evidence for the role of complementary assets in TCS decisions (Teece, 
1986). Furthermore, this work shows that a simple comparison of public to private based science 
hides nuance that impacts on the ability of technology to spillover across organizational and 
geographic boundaries. Still, the findings indicate that greater consideration of organizational 
form is a useful extension of spillover theory.  
Finally, implications for policy concern IP policy and the TCS decisions of universities. 
Results indicate that patenting may not hinder the spread of new knowledge, a common criticism 
of the patent regime, as much as the commercialization strategy of organizations may hinder 
diffusion–how they use and profit from the patents. Findings also reinforce the view that 
universities’ engagement in IP and technology transfer is nontrivial and can have broad impacts. 
Just as firms carefully consider their TCS based on expected returns, universities (especially 
public universities) must try to anticipate the expected benefits and consequences of their 
commercialization strategies. Blockbuster inventions and licensing deals are a major draw for 
public universities struggling with seemingly ever-diminishing public appropriations, however a 
strategy that puts university revenue ahead of the broader public mission could risk a positive 
impact of technological developments. As these developments are often the very ones which 
save lives, this consideration should be an imperative in university strategic decision-making 
toward technology transfer.  
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APPENDIX 1: CHAPTER 2 
Literature search keyword combinations: 
(1) intermedia* AND (technology commercialization OR academic entrepreneurship) AND 
spinoff AND (local OR region) 
(a) intermedia* AND spin-off AND (technology commercialization OR academic 
entrepreneurship) 
(2) ((intermedia* AND spin-off) OR (commercial* OR tech* transfer OR entrepreneur*)) AND 
university technology transfer/licensing office AND (local OR region) 
 (a) intermedia* AND spin-off AND university technology transfer/licensing office 
(3) ((intermedia* AND spin-off) OR (commercial* OR tech* transfer OR entrepreneur*)) AND 
(KIBS OR professional service firm) AND (local OR region) 
(a) intermedia* AND (entrepreneur* OR spinoff) AND (KIBSOR professional service 
firm) 
(4) ((intermedia* AND spin-off) OR (commercial* OR tech* transfer OR entrepreneur*)) AND 
(government support program OR nonprofit support program) AND (local OR region) 
(a) intermedia* AND (entrepreneur* OR spinoff) AND (government support program 
OR nonprofit support program) 
(5) ((intermedia* AND spin-off) OR (commercial* OR tech* transfer OR entrepreneur*)) AND 
(incubator OR accelerator OR co-working space) AND (local OR region) 
(a) intermedia* AND spin-off AND (incubator OR accelerator OR co-working space) 
(6) ((intermedia*AND spin-off) OR (commercial*OR tech* transfer OR entrepreneur*)) AND 
(venture capital OR angel OR crowdfunding OR public funding OR government funding) AND 
(local OR region) 
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(a) intermedia* AND spin-off AND (venture capital OR angel OR crowdfunding OR 
public funding OR government funding) 
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APPENDIX 2: CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.14: Dynamic random effects probit model with regime switching  
 Private Funding 








Time t  
(Model A3) 
Private funding(t-1) (Stage 1) 0.798*** -0.085 0.319** 
 (0.156) (0.190) (0.147) 
Private funding(t-1) (Stage 2) -0.708*** -0.176 -0.181 
 (0.200) (0.207) (0.194) 
Private funding(t-1) (Stage 3) -0.699** 0.622** -0.368 
 (0.274) (0.265) (0.357) 
State funding(t-1) (Stage 1) 0.458*** -0.070 0.349** 
 (0.172) (0.383) (0.166) 
State funding(t-1) (Stage 2) -0.323 0.072 0.169 
 (0.201) (0.426) (0.179) 
State funding(t-1) (Stage 3) 0.722** -0.083 -0.030 
 (0.305) (0.442) (0.350) 
Federal funding(t-1) (Stage 1) -0.091 0.058 0.743*** 
 (0.138) (0.155) (0.210) 
Federal funding(t-1) (Stage 1) -0.283 -0.050 0.040 
 (0.188) (0.180) (0.254) 
Federal funding(t-1) (Stage 1) -0.847 0.000 -0.719** 
 (0.524) (0.321) (0.349) 
Sector 0.081*** -0.031 0.022 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) 
Total Founders 0.200* -0.112 -0.384*** 
 (0.103) (0.090) (0.110) 
Max Founder Age 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Cumulative Education -0.006 0.020** 0.068*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Establishment Date 0.080*** 0.124*** 0.004 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) 
Industry Density -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Same Prior Industry Experience -0.110 -0.094* -0.129** 
 (0.072) (0.057) (0.064) 
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience 0.053 -0.019 0.072 
 (0.070) (0.061) (0.067) 
Stage 2 -0.206 0.089 0.248 
 (0.217) (0.169) (0.231) 
Stage 3 -0.518 0.376 0.294 
 (0.341) (0.292) (0.352) 
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Private funding initial 1.895*** -0.286 -0.388 
 (0.149) (0.228) (0.244) 
Federal funding initial 0.133 -0.143 1.430*** 
 (0.350) (0.331) (0.158) 
State funding initial -0.196 1.259*** -0.367 
 (0.268) (0.132) (0.239) 
Private funding mean  0.633** 0.668* 
  (0.319) (0.384) 
Federal funding mean 1.386*** 1.473***  
 (0.426) (0.325)  
State funding mean 1.117*  2.092*** 
 (0.594)  (0.581) 
Constant (Stage 1) -162.446*** -248.766*** -10.076 
 (36.362) (41.206) (32.532) 
Observations 8,057 8,057 8,057 
LogL -1145.898 -565.169 -1205.356 




Table 3.15: Results of Gaussian frailty duration models for firm survival 
 Model A4 Model A5 Model A6 Model A7 
Log (Cum. Private Funding) -0.003  -0.026*** -0.027*** 
Log (Cum. Federal Funding) -0.013**  -0.015 -0.014** 
Log (Cum. State Funding) 0.004  0.027 0.010 
Total Founders -0.274* -0.426 -0.264 -0.264 
Max Founder Age 0.012 0.019 0.012 0.011 
Cumulative Education 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 
Establishment Date 0.165*** 0.251*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 
Industry Density -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
Same Prior Industry Experience -0.179 -0.388* -0.177 -0.177 
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience 0.143 0.320 0.153 0.153 
Log (Cum. Number Private Fundings) -0.110   
Log (Cum. Number Federal Fundings) -0.313**   
Log (Cum. Number State Fundings) 0.015   
Square of Log (Cum. Private Funding)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Square of Log (Cum. Federal Funding)  0.000  
Square of Log (Cum. State Funding)   -0.001  
Constant -334.906*** -511.683*** -346.127*** -345.950*** 
lnsig2u -1.049*** 2.145*** -1.073*** -1.072*** 
Logarithmic Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,881 8,881 8,881 8,881 
LogL -910.743 -902.223 -905.920 -906.128 
AIC 1847.487 1830.446 1843.839 1840.256 
BIC 1939.678 1922.638 1957.306 1939.539 
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Notes: * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. LogL is the log of the 




Table 3.16: Results of gamma frailty duration models for firm survival 
 Model A8 ModelA9 Model A10 Model A11 
Log (Cum. Private Funding) -0.017  -0.043** -0.036*** 
Log (Cum. Federal Funding) -0.043**  -0.029 -0.018** 
Log (Cum. State Funding) -0.011  -0.002 0.019 
Total Founders -0.252 -0.251 -0.167 -0.254 
Max Founder Age 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.012 
Cumulative Education -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 0.005 
Establishment Date 0.183** 0.180** -0.167*** 0.168*** 
Industry Density 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004*** 
Same Prior Industry Experience -0.544 -0.546* -0.427 -0.215 
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience -0.447 0.445 0.408 0.204 
Log (Cum. Number Private Fundings) -0.242   
Log (Cum. Number Federal Fundings) -0.533**   
Log (Cum. Number State Fundings) -0.109   
Square of Log (Cum. Private Funding)  0.000 0.000*** 
Square of Log (Cum. Federal Funding)  -0.000  
Square of Log (Cum. State Funding)   -0.000  
Constant -372.896** -366.507** -341.076*** -341.068 
ln_varg 2.834*** 2.830*** 2.461*** 0.992*** 
Logarithmic Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,881 8,881 8,881 8,881 
LogL -896.322 -896.794 -894.796 -904.444 
AIC 1818.645 1819.588 1821.592 1834.888 
BIC 1910.836 1911.779 1935.058 1927.079 
Notes: * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. LogL is the log of the 
likelihood function. AIC is the Akaike Information criteria, while BIC is the Bayesian 
Information Criteria. 
 
Table 3.17: Detailed funding: Gaussian and gamma frailty duration models for firm survival 




Received State Funding Only 0.121 0.717 
Received Federal Funding Only -0.862* -1.064 
Received Private Funding Only -1.727*** -2.188*** 
Received State & Federal Funding -1.616** -3.126** 
Received State & Private Funding -1.078 -2.477** 
Received Federal & Private Funding -4.540** -7.151*** 
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Received State, Federal, & Private Funding -0.995 -2.045* 
Reference Group: Received No Funding   
Total Founders -0.333 -0.256 
Max Founder Age 0.018 0.003 
Cumulative Education 0.013 -0.005 
Establishment Date 0.239*** 0.181*** 
Industry Density -0.005*** -0.001 
Same Prior Industry Experience -0.389** -0.537 
Prior Entrepreneurial Experience 0.387* 0.667** 
Constant -486.923*** -369.915*** 
lnsig2u 1.939***  
ln_varg  2.737*** 
Logarithmic Duration Dependence Yes Yes 
Observations 8,881 8,881 
LogL -890.902 -885.777 
AIC 1815.803 1805.553 
BIC 1936.362 1926.112 
Notes: * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. LogL is the log of the 




Table 3.18: Discrete Event History Analysis with Regime Model Estimation Output 
 Model A14 
Log (Cumulative Private Funding) (Stage 1) 0.026*** 
 (0.007) 
Log (Cumulative Federal Funding) (Stage 1) -0.041*** 
 (0.013) 
Log (Cumulative State Funding) (Stage 1) 0.034 
 (0.031) 
Stage 2 1.631*** 
 (0.476) 
Stage 3 3.909*** 
 (0.744) 
Log (Cumulative Private Funding) (Stage 2) -0.041*** 
 (0.012) 
Log (Cumulative Private Funding) (Stage 3) -0.108*** 
 (0.036) 
Log (Cumulative Federal Funding) (Stage 2) -0.020 
 (0.022) 
Log (Cumulative Federal Funding) (Stage 3) -0.097 
 (0.063) 
Log (Cumulative State Funding) (Stage 2) -0.012 
 (0.041) 
Log (Cumulative State Funding) (Stage 3) -0.121** 
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 (0.054) 
Total Founders -0.756*** 
 (0.221) 
Max Founder Age -0.003 
 (0.013) 
Cumulative Education 0.030 
 (0.021) 
Establishment Date 0.107** 
 (0.043) 
Industry Density -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
Same Prior Industry Experience -0.402** 
 (0.161) 




Constant (Stage 1) -223.442** 
 (85.028) 
Mass point 2 4.744*** 
 (0.348) 






Notes: * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. LogL is the log of the 
likelihood function. AIC is the Akaike Information criteria, while BIC is the Bayesian 
Information Criteria. 
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APPENDIX 3: CHAPTER 4 
Appendix 3.1: Technology Sector Definitions 
Technology Sector Definition # Firms 
Dedicated Biotechnology 
/ Biomaterials 




Treatment of disease; drug development; clinical trials; 
includes some veterinary drug development 
345 
Services 
Specialized service providers for the life sciences 
including staffing and management firms, which are 
not involved in scientific or technological development 
89 
Health IT 
Health and life sciences related software and 
information technologies; health informatics 
85 
Tools / Diagnostics Biotechnology tools; diagnostics tests; use biomarkers 99 















Total Founders 158 1.867 379 1.867 1.00 
Establishment Date 158 2004.46 379 2004.51 0.94 
Technology Sector 158 4.411 379 4.411 1.00 
Patents in 3 years 158 0.019 379 0.019 1.00 
Note: P-values from Wald tests on equality of means. Standard errors clustered at firm level. 
 
Appendix 3.3: Robustness 
There are many ways to measure human and affiliation capital. For robustness the paper 
tests four other human capital variables: whether any of the founders had an MBA, whether any 
of the founders had a PhD or MD, whether any founder was a serial entrepreneur of life sciences 
firms in the Research Triangle region, and whether any founder worked at one of the local 
research universities (UNC, Duke, or NCSU) at the time of start-up founding. All are dummy 
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variables equal to one if the founder, or at least one co-founder, possessed the trait. Social capital 
robustness is tested using degree centrality, which provides the number of direct links each 
founder has to others in the network and shows how well-connected a founder (Disney 2014). 
Models A1 and A2 of Table 4.3 show alternative measures of human capital while Model A3 
considers an alternative social capital. Results remain robust across all models. Model A1 
includes an indicator for whether any founder has an MBA and an indicator for whether any 
founder has a PhD or MD. Having a PhD or MD is positively related to the amount of start-up 
funding received. Because these firms are scientific and technology intensive, having a founder 
with a strong science background may be particularly important to investors. Model A2 uses 
indicators for whether a cofounder has human capital through prior entrepreneurial experiences 
in the region and through their work history at UNC, Duke, or NCSU. There is a positive and 
statistically significant relation for both measures. Model A3 shows robust results when using 
degree centrality as the measure of social capital. 
 
Table 4.10. Robustness of OLS Regression of Any ESO Use on Start-up Funding 
Ln($ total amount of funding) Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 
Use ESO 3.881*** 4.364*** 4.354*** 
 (0.816) (0.747) (0.787) 
Ln(Affiliation capital – harmonic closeness) 0.493*** 0.251  
 (0.183) (0.152)  
MBA 1.569   
 (0.983)   
PhD or MD 2.173**   
 (0.973)   
Serial entrepreneur  4.504***  
  (1.016)  
Duke/UNC/NCSU work experience  2.886***  
  (0.857)  
Ln(Affiliation capital – degree centrality)   0.479* 
   (0.245) 
Cum. College   0.310** 
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   (0.136) 
Cum. Work experience   0.099** 
   (0.049) 
Constant 0.429 1.398** -1.373 
 (0.760) (0.678) (1.310) 
Observations 537 537 537 
Coarsen Exact Match Yes Yes Yes 
LogL -1801.489 -1778.834 -1797.933 
R-squared 0.129 0.199 0.14 
AIC 3612.978 3567.668 3605.865 
BIC 3634.408 3589.098 3627.295 
Note: Table presents marginal effects. CEM variables: establishment date, technology sector, 
number of founders, patents within three years of founding. Standard errors in parentheses; 
clustered at firm level. LogL: log of likelihood function. AIC & BIC: Akaike and Bayesian 
information criteria. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Appendix 3.4: Discrete Event History Analysis Functions & Frailty Specifications









Figure 4.3. Firm survival function 
 
    
 196 









Use incubator 0.129 -0.829** -0.026 
 (0.541) (0.421) (0.744) 
Ln(Total funding) -0.188*** -0.192*** -0.240*** 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.061) 
Ln(Founder affiliation capital) 0.031 0.085 0.297 
 (0.115) (0.089) (0.188) 
Cum. college -0.114 -0.177*** -0.251** 
 (0.071) (0.054) (0.111) 
Cum. work experience 0.023 0.030* 0.010 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.029) 
Constant -7.439*** -7.800*** -4.861*** 
 (1.194) (0.893) (1.060) 
Ln(Gaussian panel-level variance) 2.132***   
 -0.298   
Mass point 2  4.832***  
  (0.542)  
Logit(Prob. type 2)  -1.151***  
  (0.172)  
Ln(Gamma panel-level variance)   2.430*** 
   (0.345) 
Observations 3,793 3,793 3,793 
Logarithmic Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes 
Coarsen Exact Match Yes Yes Yes 
LogL -390.169 -385.293 -387.147 
AIC 796.337 788.586 790.293 
BIC 846.265 844.754 840.221 
Note: Table presents marginal effects. CEM variables: establishment date, technology sector, 
number of founders, patents within three years of founding. Standard errors in parentheses; 
clustered at firm level. LogL: log of likelihood function. AIC & BIC: Akaike and Bayesian 
information criteria. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
